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Abstract
Drawing on John Keegan’s Face of Battle approach, this MA thesis reconstructs the
soldiers’ experience during the final phase of the Athenians’ Sicilian Expedition (415413 BC).
By integrating a thorough analysis of the extant historiographical sources (Thucydides,
Diodorus Siculus, Plutarch’s Life of Nicias) with the intrinsic aspects of ancient Greek
naval and land warfare, the topography around Syracuse, and the Athenian soldiers’
psychological condition, I seek to improve our understanding of how and why the
Athenians and their allies lost the decisive naval engagement in the Great Harbour and
failed to escape the Syracusans during their final retreat overland.
I make the case that the Athenian defeat is largely caused by factors outside of their
control such as access to resources, geography, and Syracusan preparedness. However,
the Athenians also suffered owing to their own inaction caused by demoralization.
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Chapter 1: Objectives, Methods, and Sources
Objectives
In September of 413 BC, the Athenian expeditionary corps stationed just south of
Syracuse was in dire straits. The Athenians and their allies made a final attempt to escape
from the Syracusans and their allies and to return to their various homelands. This was a
complete reversal of fortune for the Athenians. They had gone to Sicily with the intent of
defeating Syracuse and possibly conquering the entire island, and had now become
themselves besieged, desperately fighting for their very survival. In this thesis, I
investigate and analyze the Athenian soldiers’ experience from the Battle in the Great
Harbour to the surrender of Nicias’ forces at the River Assinarus. In the literary sources,
we learn that the Athenians – although having a few minor successes - were soundly
defeated and destroyed over a ten day period. While Thucydides’ account provides a
gripping narrative of the Athenian defeat, his writing does not clearly explain why the
preeminent navy of Greece was overcome by the Syracusans and why the Athenian land
army failed to reach a safe haven in Sicily. Essentially, Thucydides’ narrative paints a
picture of utter consternation with a great emphasis on the pathos of the Athenian army.
Thucydides’ descriptions of the mood in the Athenian camp are important to our
understanding of the ineffectiveness of Athenian forces, but he does not provide enough
information in regard to military affairs. In terms of the battles themselves, Thucydides
describes these engagements from a macro level, and sometimes summarizes encounters
in a single line or less. Writing as a former Athenian general for readers who would
almost certainly have military experience, Thucydides does not deal with the subtleties of
1

the actual naval and infantry combat, which are necessary for us to understand the cause
of the Athenian defeat. In this thesis, I intend to rectify this deficiency by exploring the
underlying causes for the Athenian defeat. Of course, much has already been written in
regard to the Sicilian Expedition. However, these writings seem to fall into three
categories. The first group of scholars focuses on the literary goals of Thucydides, which,
while elucidating and informative in regard to Thucydides’ methods and influences, does
not have an interest in analyzing the military matters.1 The second group of authors
discusses the final phase of the Sicilian Expedition as but one element in their general
treatment of ancient Greek history.2 The Sicilian Expedition is recounted for its political
importance. Historians often do not go beyond what is present in Thucydides. Since
Thucydides’ account is so lucid and detailed, the reader is often presented with a
condensed version of events. The third group of scholars freely uses their own
imagination to flesh out Thucydides’ narrative further.3 While these accounts are
certainly enjoyable to read, a major drawback of these writings is that they tend not to
have a sufficient level of footnotes or citations, and thus it is difficult to discern what

1

A few examples are: Allison (1997), Cogan (1981), Connor (1977), Dover (1983), Lateiner (1977),
MacLeod (1982), Rood (1998), Zadorojnyi (1998).
2
This approach is largely found in populist histories that are attempting to cover a massive amount of
material, such as Robin Lane Fox’s The Classical World (2006). However, even if we consider Victor
Davis Hanson’s A War Like No Other (2005) (a very enjoyable and informative read), he recounts the
Battle in the Great Harbour in 2 paragraphs (219). He summarizes the entire Athenian retreat in less than 2
pages (221-23). In other chapters he provides much useful information that can be applied to these battles,
but he does not connect them for the reader. The Cambridge Ancient History (1992) similarly gives a
condensed account of events. This approach is also apparent in Donald Kagan’s emphasis on political
history in his The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition (1981).
3
A great example of this is Peter Green’s Armada from Athens (1970). Green provides a great amount of
new information that goes against the communis opinio, but his work lacks citations which would allow the
reader to understand how he came to his conclusion. See Cawkwell’s scathing review in The Classical
Review 22 (1972), 245-48, for criticism of the lack of citations. However, Green’s findings from a survey
of Sicily’s topography led him to propose a new Athenian marching route during the retreat that has, for the
most part, become the standard interpretation.
2

information is being filled in by the author and what is either grounded in the text or
based on other scholarly research. Arguably, there is no comprehensive treatment of the
failures of the Sicilian Expedition in regard to military matters.
To get beyond Thucydides’ account, I apply the Face of Battle approach
pioneered by John Keegan in 1976, which focuses on the experience of individual units,
but in doing so, I keep my account as close to the text as possible. I ground my work in
current scholarship and make clear what is supposition on my part.
The focus of the second chapter is the Battle in the Great Harbour. In it, I attempt
to explain why the preeminent navy of Greece was soundly defeated by the Syracusans.
First, I explain what I consider to be the essential aspects of Greek naval combat so that
the reader can easily understand my reconstruction of the battle. I give details regarding
what type of troops and men were on a trireme and what the purpose of that troop type
was on the ship. Next, I lay out the preparations that both sides made for the battle and
the implications of these measures. I argue that the Athenians made the proper tactical
decisions given their situation, but that they were defeated owing to conditions that were
largely outside of their control; most notably, the very space in which they fought as well
as the preparedness of the Syracusan navy. Following John Keegan’s Face of Battle, I
4

consider the impetus for the Athenians to engage in this naval encounter. Next, I lay out
the rationale of my battle analysis in the Great Harbour. With extensive use of primary
and secondary sources in combination with the information that has been garnered from

4

The Section ‘The Will to Combat’ which is an integral element Keegan’s battle reconstructions.
3

the reconstructed trireme Olympias, I look into the advantages of the Athenian navy as
well as the disadvantages that plagued the Athenians in the Battle in the Great Harbour.
When health, experience, location, and positioning are considered, it becomes clear why
the Athenians failed to overcome the Syracusans in this decisive battle.
In the third chapter, my objective is to uncover how and why the Athenians failed
to escape the Syracusans during their retreat through Sicily. To Thucydides’ readers, it
may seem to be a foregone conclusion that the Athenians have no real hope of ever
escaping Sicily. However, when one considers the march of the 10000 as described by
Xenophon in his Anabasis,5 it is clear that it was possible for an army, heavily
surrounded by hostiles, to travel great distances and arrive at a safe haven. I argue that
there were five major reasons for the Athenian failure. The first was the delay directly
after the Battle in the Great Harbour. The second reason was the Syracusan’s highly
effective use of cavalry and light armed infantry, both as a means to harass the Athenians
and to convey quickly troops to the area in which they were required. Further, the
Syracusans used the geography of Sicily effectively and managed to keep the Athenians
in the wide plains where the cavalry could freely operate. The fourth reason was the lack
of provisions, which caused the Athenians to struggle desperately at the River Assinarus.
Finally, the disorder of Demosthenes’ troops likely played a large role in the surrender of
his contingent, and by extension, led to the defeat of Nicias’ forces at the River
Assinarus. Again, I employ the Face of Battle approach in order to gain a better

5

This is something that Hanson also notes in A War Like No Other (pg. 220). The fact of the matter is that
Xenophon’s 10 000 hoplites march a far greater distance against far greater odds and manage to escape
successfully Asia.
4

understanding of the experience of the Athenian troops during the retreat. First, I provide
the general mood and events that transpired directly after the Athenian defeat at the Battle
in the Great Harbour. Next, I come to some conclusions regarding the number of troops
involved in the Athenians march and explore what such a mass of men would have
looked like while on the move. Third, I explain the unit types that were involved in the
march on both the Athenian and Syracusan sides and discuss what the advantages and
disadvantages of these unit types were. Then, I describe the march by dividing it into the
8 days, while paying close attention to the factors that adversely impacted the Athenians.
Finally, I provide a summary of the events that followed the fateful capture of Nicias and
account for the low number of captives taken by the Syracusans given the number of men
on the march.

Methodology
In this paper I use the Face of Battle approach popularized by John Keegan.6
Keegan was frustrated with the general way military history was written. Past works of
military history tended to focus on the grand strategy and on the acumen of a particular
general.7 In this type of history, units of soldiers are generally treated as pawns of the
general with no unique characteristics. In these cases, there is a heavy use of metaphor
8

that does not do justice to the realities of war. We are not told how the soldiers fight, but
rather what the troop movements were and the outcomes of these actions. The approach

6

Keegan (1976), See pages 15-78 of John Keegan’s The Face of Battle for a full explanation of the tenets
of this methodology.
7
Keegan (1976), 28-36.
8
Keegan (1976), 35-36. Keegan provides a quotation from General Sir William Napier’s account of the
battle of Albuera that shows the romantic prose used by military historians of the past.
5

of grand strategy pulls away from the personal nature of combat and focuses on an
isometric view of a battlefield. It fails to take into account the health of the soldier, the
weather and terrain, and the fear and dread that may grip a soldier in various
circumstances. However, the psychological and physical factors of combat can have
massive importance for the outcome of battle.
Keegan’s approach shows this most beautifully in his description of the battle of
Agincourt in AD 1415.9 Here, the French cavalry charged into wooden stakes which were
set up by the English archers and impaled the French horses.10 We learn that, in general,
archers fear cavalry; but in this case, the English archers had employed stakes which they
kept out of view amid their ranks. The cavalrymen fell from their animals.11 The archers
had managed to turn a frightening encounter into a highly advantageous situation. They
came out from behind their stakes, emboldened, and began to slaughter the French
knights with the mallets used for establishing the stakes. The horses that survived became
terrified and ran back into their own lines and wrought havoc on the French infantry,
leaving them shaken.12
The Face of Battle approach gives us a chance to envision how an actual battle
unfolds. With this method, I look to explain the reason for the defeat of the Athenians in
the final phase of the Sicilian Expedition in 413 BC. This approach looks at the
experience of the individual soldier. What was it like to be in battle? How did the morale

9

Keegan (1976), 79-116.
Keegan (1976), 96.
11
Keegan (1976), 96-97.
12
Keegan (1976), 97.
10

6

of the soldier affect the outcome? What was the motivation for the troops to engage?
What were the actual mechanics of battle? What types of weapons were used? What were
the advantages and disadvantages of these weapons? How did a battle line hold up
against these weapons? What happened when a ship got rammed? How did the oarsmen
escape a sinking ship or escape the weapons of a boarding party? How did an army know
that they had won or lost a battle, if there is not a complete surrender or destruction of the
opposing force?
In this thesis, I apply this approach to both naval and land combat. Ancient
historians, first and foremost Victor Davis Hanson, have applied this approach
successfully to ancient Greek warfare in general, but naval warfare is not as sufficiently
13

studied.

Moreover, this approach has not been applied to the particular engagements in

the Great Harbour and the Athenian retreat through Sicily. Using this Face of Battle
approach, I hope to improve our understanding of the cause of the Athenian defeat.
Thucydides placed great importance on morale and psychological factors. It is
clear that he felt that such dynamics were important to the outcome of battle.
Hornblower, writing in regard to Thucydides’ description of the battle in Great Harbour,
says “it is more of an atmospheric evocation and a report of emotions and morale, well
suited to recitation, than a piece of conventional military history.”14 While it is certainly

13

Hanson used the Face of Battle approach in The Western Way of War and A War Like No Other. The
Oxford Handbook of Warfare in the Classical World had specific Face of Battle chapters by John Lee and
others. John Lee also wrote an account of the march of the ten thousand in The Greek Army on the March.
Further, Barry Strauss applied the same approach in The Battle of Salamis. J. E. Lendon (2005) used the
Face of Battle methodology in Soldiers and Ghosts: A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity.
14
Hornblower (2010), 693.
7

accurate to say that Thucydides provides some information on the morale and
psychological state of the combatants, he takes knowledge of the technical aspects of
warfare for granted among his readers. Therefore, this paper takes the necessary step to
combine the morale and psychology of battle with the actual reality of physical combat in
order to answer why the Athenians were annihilated.
However, there is one caveat to the Face of Battle approach in that it requires a
heavy amount of supposition by the author in order to flesh out the battle narrative since
our sources do not provide every minute detail. Yet, since we have sufficient information
regarding military tactics and procedure from other battles of this period, it is possible to
make reasonable inferences about the engagements under question. Many modern
historians attempt to write an account that is both accurate and entertaining, and in some
cases, this can lead to assumptions that are not grounded in the text. I look to avoid such a
calamity in this thesis.

Other scholars have attacked certain aspects of the Face of Battle approach.

15

Everett Wheeler notes that this methodology works on the assumption that there is a
universal human nature.

16

In this way, the modern scholar projects his own feelings and

cultural experiences onto the ancient soldier. And yet, thanks to a considerable body of
5th – and 4th – century literature we are relatively well informed about the Athenians’ way
of life, general attitudes, and cultural norms, and Thucydides informs the reader explicitly
of the general mood among the Athenians and focuses on the pathos and emotions of the

15
16

Wheeler (2011), 64-75. Kagan (2006).
Wheeler (2011), 72-73.
8

soldiers. Therefore, it is not necessary to make conjectures regarding the Athenian
experience. Thucydides was an Athenian soldier contemporary to the events, and
therefore, his judgments regarding the morale of the soldiers is likely accurate. Another
objection to the Face of Battle approach concerns the ‘buddy theory’ proposed by Victor
Davis Hanson. Drawing on the experience of modern soldiers (particularly in World War
II), ‘Buddy theorists’ argue that a soldier does not fight because of patriotism, but rather,
the soldier fights for the preservation of himself and his companions.

17

Wheeler is correct

to note that it may be incorrect to project this motivational concept into antiquity. In
regard to the Athenian phalanx, men would not be grouped with their friends or
18

neighbours.

On the other hand, the ‘buddy theory’ might be more applicable to the

Spartan phalanx.

19

In this thesis, I avoid using the ‘buddy theory’ and instead focus on

unit types as a whole.

Sources
In comparison to other events in ancient history, we have excellent sources for the
Sicilian Expedition. There are three extant accounts: Thucydides (ca. 400 BC), who was
contemporary to the events, Diodorus (40 BC), and Plutarch (ca. AD 100). In addition to
our extant sources, there are three other sources that are no longer available to us. First, is
Philistus (ca. 400 BC) who was contemporary to the events, but there is also Ephorus (ca.
350 BC) and Timaeus (ca. 270 BC). All of the later authors seem to follow the accounts
of the two contemporary writers, Thucydides and Philistus. In this thesis, I supplement

17

Wheeler (2011), 66.
Wheeler (2011), 72.
19
Wheeler (2011), 72.
18

9

Thucydides with the works written by Diodorus and Plutarch. In this way, a fuller
account of events can be provided. The only contemporary extant source we have for the
Battle in the Great Harbour and the ensuing retreat is Thucydides’ Histories.

Thucydides
In the last few decades, Thucydides’ reliability has come into question, especially
by those students of Greek history who want to read the works of Greek historians such
as Thucydides, Herodotus, and Xenophon primarily as literary artifacts. In this section I
provide examples of Thucydides as a literary artist as well as an historian. I show that
there does not necessarily have to be a dichotomy between literary goals and historical
accuracy. Further, I summarize the other sources that can be used to back up Thucydides
as a legitimate historian. In this thesis, I rely on Thucydides as the primary source for the
historical information regarding the Battle in the Great Harbour and the following
Athenian retreat through the Sicilian hinterlands. He has a unique perspective because he
was an Athenian who was exiled, and while living in exile, he was able to travel among
the Peloponnesians (Thuc. 5.26.5). Thus, he could gather information from contacts in
Athens as well as from Sparta and her allies.

Thucydides as Literary Artist and as Historian
There has been a movement for quite some time that calls into question the
reliability of historiographical texts. This movement views ancient historiography
primarily as a literary artifact rather than a trustworthy historical source.20 Proponents of

20

Feldherr (2009), 1-8, gives an introduction to this movement.
10

this approach look at intertextuality as well as style and thus betray a focus on literary
artistry rather than substance. In Thucydides’ depiction of the Sicilian Expedition,
scholars have noted a Homeric as well as a tragic influence.21 In this section, I will only
focus on the sections of Thucydides’ narrative that are relevant to the Battle in the Great
Harbour and the Athenian retreat. Moreover, this is not meant to be exhaustive, but rather
to give a few examples regarding how Thucydides drew on his predecessors while
writing his own narrative. We can see for instance the Homeric inspiration in the
catalogue of ships in Thucydides, which is similar to Iliad Book II (Hom. Il. 2.494759).22 It is similar not only in the fact that the number of troops and their respective
places of origin are noted, but also that the actual narrative composition as written in
Thucydides closely corresponds to the Homeric poem.23 In Thucydides’ catalogue, the
section for the Athenians is much longer than the list of the forces of the Syracusans.
Similarly, in Homer’s account, the catalogue of the Greeks is given far more lines of
poetry than the Trojans. Moreover, the army that is described second is the besieged
city.24 In the case of Homer, this is the Trojan army, and in Thucydides’ account, it is the
Syracusan forces. Thucydides even mentions Homer’s catalogue of ships at 1.10.4, which
shows that he was well aware of the particular passage,25 and thus, it suggests that he
used Homer’s catalogue as a blueprint for his own account. Thucydides also seems to be

21

Hornblower (2010), 12-21.
Dover (1965), 47.
23
Hornblower (2010), 654.
24
Hornblower (2010), 654.
25
Interestingly, in this passage, Thucydides questions Homer’s numbers, calling them an exaggeration
because Homer was employing poetic license. In fact, Thucydides goes on to state that the rowers in the
ships of the Trojan War were also the infantry units. This greatly lessens the number of total troops.
Thucydides concludes that all things considered, the overall number of troops in the Trojan expedition
would not be very impressive.
11
22

indebted to Herodotus’ catalogues.

26

The first influence is the catalogue of Persian troops

marching against Greece, wherein Herodotus lists the forces by their ethnic origin (Hdt.
7.60ff.), which Thucydides also does in his catalogue of ships. More importantly,
Herodotus’ account of the Battle of Salamis is a model for Thucydides’ depiction of the
Battle in the Great Harbour.27 Those naval battles are undoubtedly the most important
sea battles in their respective texts. Herodotus tells the reader about the ethnic origins of
the men in the Battle of Salamis (Hdt. 8.43-48), and Thucydides likely paid close
attention to this account. Thucydides’ categorization of the troops’ ethnicities also merits
note as it both shows his literary flare as well as his possible mining of earlier works,
namely, Herodotus. Dover notes that “the fundamental criterion of classification is
geographical.”28 The Athenian troops are listed from mainland Greece to the Aegean and
then Southern Italy and Sicily. Conversely, the Syracusan troops are listed from Syracuse
to Camarina to northern Sicily to Sicel allies to mainland Greece.29 In Herodotus, the list
starts from the Peloponnese to the rest of mainland Greece to the islands to the one ship
sent from Croton.30 Both authors take care to include the peoples by ethnic group, and
both end the section with the types of ships that are employed. When Nicias introduces
the grapnels in his speech, it is presented as new information to the reader. Luschnat
considers this a technique borrowed from epic to introduce new information in

26

Hornblower (2010), 654-55. Of course, Herodotus certainly looked to Homer when crafting his own
narrative in terms of his catalogues.
27
Hornblower (2010), 655.
28
Dover (1965), 48.
29
Dover (1965), 48, 51.
30
Hornblower (2010), 659.
12

speeches.31 In fact, to withhold critical information until later is one of Thucydides’
major literary devices, and it is something that he uses quite commonly in describing both
the Battle in the Great Harbour and the Athenian retreat. With this narrative technique,
Thucydides gives the reader hope that the Athenians will overcome the current calamity
and succeed. However, in terms of the grapnels, we learn in 7.65 that the Syracusans
were aware of the Athenian preparations and took measures to counteract the grapnels. It
is a masterful technique in order to create suspense. The reader is held by the constant
changing of fates. Another example can be seen in the immediate aftermath of the naval
battle. For a brief moment, it seems that Syracusan celebrations may prevent the
Syracusans from blocking the roads with troops and thus allow the Athenians to escape
by land during the night. However, the reader’s hope is quickly dashed when
Hermocrates’ trick is employed (Thuc. 7.73.3-4).

32

To illustrate this concept further, on

the seventh night of the Athenian retreat, 300 men broke through the encircling
Syracusan army (Thuc. 7.82.5). Now, Thucydides could have noted that these men were
captured, but instead he leaves the reader with the expectation that the 300 will escape
and remain free. Thucydides waits until after the Athenians had formally surrendered to
inform the reader that the 300 escaped Athenians were captured and brought to Syracuse
as well (Thuc. 7.85.2). Further, the battle in the Great Harbour features a teichoskopia

33

which can be seen to mimic the events of Iliad Book III (Hom. Il. 3.161-244).34 One

31

Luschnat, (1942), 85.
See Day Seven in Chapter 3: The Athenian Retreat.
33
This is far clearer in Diodorus’ account of events (Diod. 13.14.5).
34
This is only clear in Diodorus’ report of the events but can be implied in Thucydides. See: Diod. 13.14.5.
13
32

could note the theatrical nature of the battle and cite its similarities to the tragic stage.35
The Battle in the Great Harbour itself appears to be a spectacle. The water of the harbour
is the stage. The Athenians and Syracusans on the shore represent the audience watching
the spectacle unfold. It can be compared to a modern (or ancient) sporting event in an
arena where the two teams have their own cheering sections.
The Athenians began the expedition with early successes. However, the arrival of
Gylippus led to a reversal of fortune (peripeteia) for the Athenians and their situation
became more and more hopeless. Again, in the immediate period before the battle,
Nicias’ speech which suggested that the Athenians had made the appropriate alterations
to combat effectively the Syracusans in the naval battle quickly became subject to
peripeteia when the Syracusans took action to counteract any perceived Athenian
advantages. The retreat of the Athenians after the Battle in the Great Harbour was also
wrought with reversals of fortune. On the fifth evening of the march, the Athenians
managed to march away during the night and Syracusans were left unaware (Thuc. 7.80).
There is a brief glimmer of hope that the suffering of the Athenians will end. Then, the
Syracusans quickly caught up and forced Demosthenes and his army to submit (Thuc.
7.81.2). Thucydides’ use of speeches during the expedition is also subject to intense
scrutiny and debate. At worst, he was simply inventing speeches that never actually
occurred. At best, he had learned from a Spartan the details of Gylippus’ and Syracusan
communications and from an Athenian survivor the content of Nicias’ speeches. This
would also have been the same manner in which he learned the details of the events of
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See Hornblower (2010), 12-21 for a discussion on Sicilian culture and theatricality.
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the expedition itself. Even if we assume the best case scenario, Thucydides’ rendering of
speeches, while maintaining a kernel of truth, was not necessarily a verbatim record of
the statements that were made. Thucydides is honest about this aspect of his
historiographical technique. In 1.22, Thucydides says:

36

So far as all the speeches in this account either told when
the war was about to begin or when the war was already
happening, it is difficult for me to remember distinctly the
precise words of the things having been said, both of the
speeches which I myself heard and the speeches I heard by
report from other sources. So, I have put things so as to
capture how each speaker would have most seemed to say
what in my opinion should be the most needful thing to say
concerning the current circumstance, while keeping as
close as possible to the general opinion of the things having
been said in truth.37
While the Thucydides’ honesty regarding the accuracy of speeches is admirable, it raises
other questions. Pelling says that:
No sentence in the Greek language can be taken quite so
variously as that on speeches here. Some scholars think it
clear that the guiding principle here is as much historical
accuracy as possible, others think that it points to a high
38
degree of free composition.
Pelling further notes that Thucydides cannot be writing what was the right policy to urge
as this would completely eliminate the debates between statesmen as they occur in
Thucydides, since both statesmen would be urging for the correct policy and would thus
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All renderings of the Greek into English are my own, but at times they draw freely on standard published
translations.
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Καὶ ὅσα μὲν λόγῳ εἶπον ἕκαστοι ἢ μέλλοντες πολεμήσειν ἢ ἐν αὐτῷ ἤδη ὄντες, χαλεπὸν τὴν ἀκρίβειαν
αὐτὴν τῶν λεχθέντων διαμνημονεῦσαι ἦν ἐμοί τε ὧν αὐτὸς ἤκουσα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοθέν ποθεν ἐμοὶ
ἀπαγγέλλουσιν· ὡς δ' ἂν ἐδόκουν ἐμοὶ ἕκαστοι περὶ τῶν αἰεὶ παρόντων τὰ δέοντα μάλιστ' εἰπεῖν, ἐχομένῳ
ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τῆς ξυμπάσης γνώμης τῶν ἀληθῶς λεχθέντων, οὕτως εἴρηται.
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be in agreement.

39

Pelling correctly notes that it is difficult to judge the historical

accuracy of Thucydides’ speeches because we do not know which speeches he heard
himself and we do not know how reliable his informants were.

40

In some cases, Pelling

argues that Thucydides would have scarcely any sources for knowing certain speeches.
He cites Nicias’ final speeches during the Sicilian Expedition as an example of this.

41

However, we know that many Athenians survived the Expedition and eventually made it
back to Athens. It is entirely possible that Thucydides was able to garner information
from these individuals. Of course, much still hinges on how faithful Thucydides’
recording of speeches actually was, and how much content was the product of
Thucydides’ free composition.
While these examples highlight Thucydides’ brilliance as a literary artist, I think
that Thucydides’ account can still be valid, as I will argue.
We must consider a few features of ancient historiography that make the historical
works seem less reliable than the reader would hope. It is a naïve assumption to think that
an historian can simply give an account of events as they actually happened. Every
historian is telling a story – with a beginning, middle, and an end – and thus he has to
draw on the various narrative elements of storytelling.

42

For example, in Thucydides’

account of the Battle in the Great Harbour, he is faced with the difficulty of giving a
linear account of a vast naval battle, with a myriad of individual actions. Thucydides
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would have, of course, drawn on his predecessors’ accounts of similar naval battles.
Besides the basic point of historical narrative, we should also not forget the highly
agonistic nature of Greek society, which also left its mark on the Greek historians.43 As
we can see in Thuc. 1.1, Thucydides was openly competing with his predecessors, Homer
and Herodotus, which further explains his use of their techniques and his attempt to
surpass them. Thucydides needed to build on earlier work. So, when Thucydides narrated
an event that has similarities or could hypothetically contain similarities, he used the
paradigms as set forth by Herodotus and Homer. Thus, when Thucydides gave his
account of the catalogue of troops, it is reasonable that he would have looked to the
methods employed by his predecessors. For the Iliadic examples, the catalogue of ships
was simply an efficient way of reporting the various forces in action. Thucydides would
have likely used his predecessors (Homer, Hesiod,44 and Herodotus (7.61-99.)) as a guide
of how such information should be compiled and presented most effectively. He would
have also looked to his predecessors in order to insert himself into the style of discourse
of those who came before him. It is important to emphasize, however, that even when
Thucydides drew on the literary techniques of his predecessors, he was still trying to
represent situations and events which actually happened as best as he could. Thucydides
assures the reader that in describing events he was guided by the principal of ἀκρίβεια
and reports the results of thorough research (Thuc. 1.22).
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Luce (1997). 2.
Hesiod’s Catalogue of Women and Theogony.
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The teichoskopia in fact took place. The walls of Syracuse were directly adjacent
to the Great Harbour.45 It stands to reason that the non-combatants within the city would
have looked out to see how their friends and family members were faring. Moreover, if
the battle had gone awry for the Syracusans, this would have given the Syracusans
immediate warning of an impending threat. Since Homer had already provided an
example of how one would narrate such an event and every Greek had grown up with the
works of Homer, Thucydides would have looked to Homer’s work as a foundation.
Another explanation for Thucydides’ narrative techniques – especially in regard to the
necessity to create suspense – is the potential for recitation. It has been suggested that
several sections of Thucydides may have been meant for recitation either at Symposia or
various Pan-Hellenic festivals.46 There is speculation that the entirety of the Sicilian
expedition could have been a recitation unit that would last roughly 8 hours.47 Otherwise,
the sections could be broken up and the Battle in the Great Harbour and its aftermath
could have been recited.48 Another potential performance piece could have been the
slaughter at the River Assinarus up to the death of Nicias.49 If the potential for recitation
is the case, there was an even greater importance for Thucydides to use various literary
techniques in order to hold the attention of an audience.
The use of direct (speeches) and indirect discourse (summaries of speeches) is a
technique that can be interpreted in a few ways. First, Thucydides could use indirect
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speech as a way to distance himself from the narrative, suggesting that his knowledge of
the speech was either lacking or that he did not feel that the contents of the speech were
worthy of quotation in full. Second, indirect discourse could be used if Thucydides
wished to add his own comments to the speech.50 The use of direct speech implies the
opposite; namely that Thucydides was familiar with the speech and felt it was important
to include. The use of indirect discourse could also be used as a means to maintain pace.51
In some instances, Thucydides simply states that an individual said the same things that
were said in a previous speech. In this way, Thucydides could avoid repetition and thus
prevent the text from being bogged down by very similar speeches.
Ultimately, the historian must make value judgments regarding what is necessary
to include and what can be omitted. In this way, there is no such thing as an unbiased
historian. Thucydides notes in 1.23 that he did not accept the first story given to him as
factual. Instead, he investigated the claims and attempted to uncover the truth. He notes
that even two witnesses to the same event may give different accounts in regard to the
occasion. He was the final judge in terms of what is considered factually accurate. It is
clear that while Thucydides certainly had literary ambitions, it is not correct to say that
his entire work was an artistic invention rather than a truthful account of events. There
does not have to be a strict dichotomy between literature and fact.
In the following sections, I will provide a brief overview of the other
historiographical sources for the Sicilian Expedition which can be used to supplement
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Thucydides’ account. The other authors are Philistus, Ephorus, Timaeus, Diodorus
Siculus, and Plutarch. Both Plutarch and Diodorus are extant sources that can be used to
back up Thucydides’ narrative. These two writers used all of the sources that were
available to them including the Philistus, Ephorus and Timaeus, which are no longer
extant. Notably, although three of the historians are Sicilians (Philistus, Timaeus, and
Diodorus Siculus), their accounts largely confirm or follow Thucydides which suggests
that even the ‘enemies’, despite their pro-Syracusan stance, considered Thucydides’
account accurate or at least plausible enough not to correct him.

Philistus
Philistus is the only other author who was a contemporary to the events of the
Sicilian Expedition.52 Unfortunately, his work only survives in fragments. However, his
writing was available in its entirety to the later authors, discussed in the following
sections, either through direct consultation or filtered through an author such as Ephorus
or Timaeus. Philistus was a Syracusan who lived in the city at the time of the Sicilian
Expedition.53 In fact, he may have been one of the individuals watching from the walls
during the Battle in the Great Harbour. This is extremely important to the overall
accounting of events. Those who were writing after the events had the ability to consult
both Thucydides and Philistus, which would have allowed them to give a potentially
more accurate rendering of events. Thankfully, owing to the work of Meister and other
philologists, we have a better idea of which authors were using either Philistus or
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Thucydides. Plutarch states that Thucydides’ account was superior to that of Philistus by
saying that Thucydides even outdid himself in his display of vividness and passionate
writing (Plut. Nic. 1.1). He further states that Timaeus’ writing looked to build on
Thucydides’ and in turn make Philistus’ work seem “altogether coarse and unskilled”
(Plut. Nic. 1.1). This seems to speak more to Philistus’ narrative technique than it does to
the quality of information provided. Regardless, the importance of Philistus’ work cannot
be overstated because it helps to balance Thucydides. However, there is one caveat
regarding the use of Philistus. It seems that Philistus was writing after Thucydides and,
therefore, may have been influenced by Thucydides’ narrative. Theon said that Philistus
pulled much of his information in regard to the events of the ‘Attic War’ from the
account of Thucydides.54 Certainly, Philistus would have had little knowledge of the
events that are happening in the Athenian camp unless he asked Athenian captives, but at
the same time, he would have provided details from the Syracusan side to which
Thucydides would have little or no access.55 In this way, Philistus acted as a check that
balanced Thucydides’ account.

Ephorus
Ephorus, an historian from Cyme in Asia Minor, wrote a universal history around
350 BC. Like Philistus, his work survives only in fragments. It is apparent that Ephorus
used Thucydides, but there is evidence that he had used a source other than Thucydides
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as well.56 This other source must most likely be Philistus, “über den Ephoros äußerst
positiv urteilt.”57 Ephorus, though largely lost, was a major source for the surviving
account of Diodorus.

Timaeus
Timaeus was an historian from Tauromenium (north of Catane in Sicily). He
composed a history of the Greek world. He was writing in the first half of the third
century BC. On some occasions, Timaeus’ work seems to differ from both Thucydides
and Philistus, but it seems that for most points he followed these two authors.58 Perhaps
he had access to another source that is unknown to us, or there are segments in Ephorus
that differed from the accounts of Thucydides and Philistus. When Timaeus’ account is
inconsistent with Thucydides or Philistus, it suggests that he is attempting to correct their
accounts for accuracy and, thus could be using a source that is completely unknown in
modern times (which is unlikely), or that Ephorus’ attempted to correct the factual
accuracy of Philistus and Thucydides and Timaeus was simply copying what Ephorus
had written. Plutarch says that Timaeus used not only Thucydides, but also Philistus
(Plut. Nic. 1.1).
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Diodorus
Another Sicilian, Diodorus Siculus,59 wrote his universal history around 40BC.
This is the first author after Thucydides whose account of the Sicilian Expedition is still
extant. He is often accused of being a simple epitomator, abbreviating the accounts of
previous authors. For our purposes, this is actually advantageous. In this way, we know
that he was not inserting his own interpretation of events, but rather was rewriting the
information that was previously recorded by others. For the sections that are relevant to
this thesis, namely, the Battle in the Great Harbour, and the Athenian retreat, Meister
argues that the prime source for Diodorus was Timaeus for the sea battle and Ephorus for
the Athenian retreat.60 However, others have argued that Diodorus used Philistus’ work
as his primary source. Based on the Quellenforschung, even if Diodorus derived his
information from Timaeus or Ephorus, his account goes back to both Philistus and
Thucydides. Since he more or less had access to the works of both contemporary authors,
what he records is essentially a unified account that was likely considered the most
realistic by Timaeus and Ephorus. Ultimately, Diodorus’ account can be viewed as a
collation of Philistus and Thucydides.

Plutarch
The final literary source for the Athenian Expedition is Plutarch. Plutarch covers
these events in his Life of Nicias. Plutarch was writing around AD 100, and therefore, he
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was heavily reliant on the earlier sources. He opens his work by informing the reader of
the sources that he used. Plutarch used Philistus, Thucydides and Timaeus (Plut. Nic.
1.1). Since Plutarch’s version of events does not directly contradict Thucydides on any
major points, and he had access to the work of Philistus, we can assume that the facts as
presented in Thucydides are likely accurate or at least seemed acceptable to the
Syracusan, Philistus. However, it is important to note that Plutarch was a biographer. As
such, he had a different focus from that of an historian who provided a linear narrative of
events. Instead, Plutarch was interested in the character of Nicias, but there is still much
in his account that is useful to the historian since the biographer needed to give the
historical background that applied to the individual about whom he wrote.

Other Literary Sources
In addition to the sources that cover the Sicilian Expedition, it is also possible to
use other military texts in order to explicate Thucydides and the other authors. In other
works we can look for parallels that can help to elucidate how events came to pass in the
Athenian defeat. For example, Xenophon’s Anabasis provides a good comparison for an
army attempting a retreat in hostile territory. Furthermore, Xenophon in his Hellenica
features a battle on the Munichian hill in the Piraeus in 413 BC that is very reminiscent of
the Athenian battle for the Acraean Heights during the retreat. Polybius also is important
as a means to garner information regarding how an ancient army functioned. Thus, in this
thesis, I will often make comparisons with other events as narrated by other historians as
well as general information as to how the armies of ancient Greece operated.

24

Non-Literary Sources
Besides the historiographical sources, there is much other information that can be
brought to bear in order to gain a better perception of the technical aspects of the Battle in
the Great Harbour and the military matters of the retreat. The most important for the
purposes of the Battle in the Great Harbour is the insights gained from the reconstruction
of an Athenian trireme and its trial runs. The trireme - named Olympias and reconstructed
by J.S. Morrison and J.F. Coates using information gathered from the ancient sources allows us to gain valuable insights as to how a trireme actually performed at sea.61 The
data obtained from these experiments are critical to understanding the speed, power, and
size of the ancient Greek warship. In addition, the trials of the Olympias give us an idea
of how quickly a rower can become dehydrated from his exertion. However, the testing
of the ancient trireme does not recreate the ancient experience completely. For example,
the ancient man was on average far shorter than his modern counterpart.62 Since the
trireme is built to its ancient scale, the space provided for the arms to move during
rowing is not entirely suitable for the modern person who is generally unable to perform
full strokes. Further, the trials were carried out with volunteers who would not in any way
be trained as thoroughly as an ancient Athenian rower.63
The equipment of Greek marines is known from both literary sources and from
archaeological finds. For example, we know that the trireme employed hoplites, and thus,
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we can deduce the arms and armour of these men based on what we know from the
information about land battles both from writings and archaeological finds. In terms of
the armour and weapons involved in the retreat, much information can be garnered from
the tests performed by Franz as well as Gabriel and Metz.64 With their studies, we get a
better understanding of the form and function of the hoplite panoply. Beyond
archaeological objects and recreations, there are also inscriptions that can be used as a
means to confirm the facts as provided by the historians. Athenian tribute lists are
especially important for gaining information in regard to troops, ships, and money which
were provided to the Athenians for the expedition.

Conclusion
In this chapter, I laid out my objectives, introduced my methodology, and
discussed the available sources. I investigated Thucydides’ goals as a literary artist. I
provided some examples of how Thucydides could be perceived as an author who might
put style before substance and by extension, bring the credibility of his account into
question. Then, I explained why Thucydides used his predecessors in the way that he
does by examining the nature of ancient writing and historiography. In discussing the
other sources for the final phase of the Sicilian Expedition, I suggested that they could be
used to strengthen the historicity of Thucydides’ account. I also laid out the Face of
Battle methodology and how I intend to use it in this thesis.
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Essentially, my modus operandi is to consider every passage in Thucydides’
account of the final phase of the Sicilian Expedition and attempt to figure out how the
actions described would have worked in reality. To do this, I consult other sections of
Thucydides as well as other ancient authors (especially Xenophon), in order to find
parallels for strategies and tactics that help elucidate the military actions during the
Sicilian Expedition. Further, I consult the research of other scholars on specific problems
of military matters, such as equipment and general strategies, in order to inform my own
interpretation.
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Chapter 2: The Battle in the Great Harbour
ὁρῶμεν ἀνθοῦν πέλαγος… νεκροῖς
ἀνδρῶν Ἀχαιῶν ναυτικοῖς τ' ἐρειπίοις (Aesch. Ag. 659-60).

Essentials of Naval Battle
The purpose of this section is to provide the reader with a sufficient amount of
information regarding the general techniques employed in a naval battle so that it is easier
to comprehend the reconstruction of the Battle in the Great Harbour. Thus, I focus
heavily on trireme strategies. In trireme warfare, there were two main forms of combat,
ramming and boarding.65 These two tactics were not mutually exclusive and navies
would have used both skills in order to achieve their objectives. Another tactic that is
generally not included in the forms of combat, but was important in the Battle in the
Great Harbour, is forced beaching.

66

This tactic is not included because it does not

require actual engagement with the enemy, but rather, forced beaching is a maneuver that
relies on the threat of engagement. In the Battle in the Great Harbour, the Syracusans
used forced beaching to take Athenian ships out of the battle. The Athenians tended to
focus primarily on ramming tactics which required more skill, while the other navies of
the Greek world preferred boarding enemy ships.67 However, in the Battle in the Great
Harbour, we will see that the Athenians embraced the boarding strategy (Thuc. 7.62.2),
albeit unsuccessfully.
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First, it is necessary to discuss the role of the oarsmen in the trireme. The trireme
had a crew that was composed of several different people or groups with their own
distinct duties. The crew of an Athenian trireme usually consisted of about 200 men,68
which was less than that of the ships of other Greek states. There were three groups of
oarsmen (thalamioi, zugioi, and thranitai), a captain (trierarchos), hoplites called marines
(epibatai), archers (toxotai), a bow officer (prorates), a helmsman (kubernetes), a flute
player (auletes), a shipwright (naupegos), a boatswain (keleustes), and deckhands.69
However, in the Battle in the Great Harbour, the Athenians increased the number of men
on the deck (Thuc. 7.62.2. and 7.67.2). The oarsmen provided the ships mobility. A
trireme crew employed 170 oarsmen on three levels. There were 54 oarsmen on the
bottom level called thalamioi (27 oarsmen on each side of the ship).70 These men put
their oars through an oar port (thalamia) with leather sleeves called askomata which were
used in order to prevent water from entering the ship (though small amounts of water still
did enter).71 These men had a distinct disadvantage compared to the other groups of
rowers. If the ship took in enough water that it began to sink, the thalamioi would have
been the most likely to drown.72 There were another 54 oarsmen on the second level
called zugioi (27 oarsmen on each side of the ship).73 These men also placed their oars
through oar ports, but there were no askomata for these ports.74 There were 62 oarsmen
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on the highest level called thranitai (31 oarsmen on each side of the ship).75 These men
placed their oars through an outrigger.76 The thranitai were the only group that could
actually see the water while they were rowing.77 Therefore, the thranitai could be hit by
enemy missiles while rowing.78 This could be prevented by blocking the outriggers with
canvas.79 Every oarsman had a seat, and the seats were likely padded with sheepskin.80
Unlike modern rowers, ancient trireme rowers did not have a sliding seat, so they could
not take advantage of their leg strength in order to put more power into their strokes.81
The oarsmen were also quite crowded together. The thalamioi were the closest to the
center of the ship and each successive level was farther out.82 This allowed more men to
fit in a smaller area, but meant that there was greater crowding. This reduction of vertical
space for the rowers gave the ship a lower center of gravity so that the trireme was more
stable in the water.83 While the modern rowers in the Olympias reconstruction only
reached a sustained speed of 7.1 knots (13.1 km/h),84 it is believed that the Athenian
oarsmen might have been able to reach a speed of 10 knots (18.5 km/h).85 This can be
explained by the average height of the ancient man versus the modern man. Because the
space on an ancient trireme allowed for about 85cm of horizontal movement for the
hands, the Athenians who were of a much shorter stature (likely no taller than 1.67
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meters on average) were able to extend fully their arms while rowing which allowed
greater power for strokes.86

Ramming
Triremes were equipped with a wooden ram (embolos) that was plated with
bronze.87 It was placed at the lowest part of the prow of the ship.88 On the ram were three
“chisel-like blades just above the water level.”89 Navies that intended to ram their
enemies rather than to board enemy ships would keep fewer hoplites on deck and craft
their ships to be as small as possible.90 Keeping the trireme light was essential to
maintaining high speeds. Essentially, the goal was to drive the ram into the sides of the
enemy ship in order to cut a hole in its hull. While a trireme would often ram an enemy
at a 90 degree angle, it was far more effective to ram the ship at a lower angle in order to
tear a large gash in the ship. This method also helped to prevent the ram from becoming
jammed in the other ship so that the ramming trireme could back away from the enemy
vessel, since the ram would not enter as deep into the hull.91 Furthermore, a large gash in
the side of a ship would have made it more difficult to repair, and more water would have
rushed into the trireme, incapacitating it more quickly. However, ramming could be quite
a risky endeavor owing to the speed required for a successful penetration of the enemy
ship. It is estimated that a trireme would have needed to reach a speed of between
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roughly 2-8 knots (3.7-14.8 km) to cause a gash in the opposing trireme.92 The necessary
speed differs depending on the angle of attack. A sharper angle required a higher speed.
An attack at a 90 degree angle would have only required a speed of about 2 knots.93 The
speed could be substantially lowered if the target ship was travelling towards the
ramming trireme. If a trireme did not reach the required speed to breach, the ram could
very well be more damaging to the attacking ship and leave the target ship nearly
unscathed.94
A simple way for a trireme to avoid being damaged was to row away from the
attacking ship, thus making it harder for the attacking ship to reach the required ramming
speed. With the reconstructed Olympias, the rowers were able to back water (i.e. to go
backwards) at a speed of 3 knots.95 If the rowers physically turned around and rowed
facing the stern of the ship, the ship could reach a speed of 5 knots.96 The rowers of the
Olympias were able to turn around in their seats in roughly 20 seconds.97 However, there
is no evidence that the Greeks actually used this technique, so physically turning around
in a trireme is simply conjecture. Another tactic was that a trireme could row close to the
side of the ship (rowing towards each other). Then, the attackers could pull in their oars.
If the enemy failed to retract their own oars, the attacking trireme could shatter the enemy
oars, leaving the ship immobile.98
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There were two special tactics that the Athenians employed, that relied on their
superior mobility. These were the periplous99 and the diekplous.100 These maneuvers are
generally thought to be group techniques, but Whitehead argues that these tactics refer to
single ships.101 The periplous is a less clear maneuver based on the descriptions given by
primary sources. Whitehead posits that when an enemy ship began to chase a trireme, the
chased trireme could attempt a periplous. It quickly circled around with its superior
maneuverability and rammed the attacking trireme in the side or the stern.102 It is
somewhat similar to the aerobatic technique of the inside-loop (although on a different
axis) where a chased plane does 360 degree vertical flip in order to get behind the enemy
plane.
Alternatively, the periplous has been envisioned as a group flanking attack.103 In
this method, a group of ships were arranged in a line approaching a hostile line of ships.
The ships on the flanks moved outward in order to attack the sides of the enemy ships.104
Whitehead’s argument is based on the description of the maneuver in our primary
sources. Thucydides claims that these tactics were only to be attempted by highly skilled
helmsmen (Thuc. 7.36.4). The group version of the periplous would not have required a
high level of skill.
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The diekplous was a breakthrough maneuver.105 The goal was to go between two
ships and then quickly maneuver back in order to ram the side or the stern of the enemy’s
ship.106 Holladay argues that another reason to attempt a diekplous was to break the
enemy oars.107 An enemy navy would have used a kuklos formation108 as a defensive
measure against the diekplous.109 The kuklos formation required a group of ships to form
a circle (hence kuklos) with their rams facing toward the outside of the circle. Then, a
much smaller group of ships would form a star formation inside the kuklos. These ships
would also have had their rams pointing outwards. With this technique, a diekplous
became very risky. If the attacking ship broke in between the ships of the kuklos, it would
have been rammed by one of the ships in the star formation inside the kuklos. The kuklos
was utilized by the slower heavier navies of the non-Athenian Greek states as a way to
counteract the quickness and maneuverability of the lighter Athenian ships.110 A
successful ram would tear into the hull of an enemy ship. However, it seems rare that a
ship actually sank.111 Instead, the ship dipped into the water, but tended to have enough
buoyancy to stay afloat.112 Generally, once rescued or cleared of enemy fighters, the
‘sunken’ ship could be towed to a port and be repaired and redeployed.113 This is not to
say that drowning was not an issue for the thalamioi, who were on the lowest level of the
three tiers of rowers. A successful ram could cause hundreds of gallons of water to storm
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in the ship very quickly and submerge most of the hull which would have left the
thalamioi in a dangerous situation.

Boarding
The other major tactic of Greek naval warfare was boarding. Boarding turned a
naval battle into what was essentially a land battle.114 The objective of the attacking ship
was to get close to the opposing vessel. This could be achieved by ramming or simply
pulling up beside the enemy, but it was also an option once a ship was rammed.
Ramming or being rammed could cause the ships to become jammed together, which
allowed the hoplites to leap across and to engage in infantry combat. The Athenians tried
to avoid infantry fights once they had successfully rammed an enemy ship, and they were
well versed in reversing away from the ship that they had rammed. Since the Athenians
tended to keep fewer hoplites on the deck, it was of the utmost importance that the
Athenian trireme avoided being boarded. During the Sicilian campaign, both sides came
up with a few innovations. For example, if a ship was still in close proximity to the
enemy ship, the crew could throw grapnels and hook onto the other ship (Thuc. 7.62.3).
The ship that has been hooked by the grapnels could then be pulled beside the attacking
ship and boarded.
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This is not unlike the Roman practice beginning during the Punic Wars. Since the Romans were far
more confident in their land warfare abilities, they created the Corvus (or Harpago). The Corvus was a
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A ship could make it more difficult to be hooked by placing animal hides along
the outrigger (Thuc. 7.64.2). It was also important to make sure that the mast was down
in battle,115 most likely both to prevent the mast from being hooked by the grapnel and to
stop the wind from wreaking havoc on the maneuverability of the trireme. Once a ship
had successfully become attached to another vessel either by ramming or by the use of
grapnels, the hoplites attempted to engage the enemy upon the ship in what was
essentially a land battle.
However, getting aboard the enemy ship could be a difficult task in itself. First, if
the water was rough, a hoplite may have leapt unsuccessfully to the opposing ship. He
could fall into the water, and the weight of his armour (roughly 19.82 kg)116 would make
it difficult to swim to safety. Not only did the fallen hoplite have to struggle with the
weight of his armour in the water, he might also be assaulted with arrows, stones, and
javelins being thrown from the men on the deck of the enemy ship.117 The hoplite leaping
to another ship also had to contend with these projectiles. Further, if the area of contact
between the two ships was minimal (such as when a ship was rammed at a 90 degree
angle), the hoplite would have to leap directly into the enemy hoplites since they would
guard the point of contact between the two triremes. Thus, it was ideal to be able to hop
onto the enemy trireme when the ships were parallel to each other. This was possible if
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multiple grapnels were used to hook the enemy trireme. If the attacking hoplites could
defeat the enemy hoplites as well as the archers and javelin men, there was little to stop
the boarding hoplites from acquiring the ship. The oarsmen (especially in the summer
months) were likely wearing only a loin cloth,118 and it seems rare for them to have been
armed.119 Therefore, the oarsmen could be quickly slaughtered while attempting to
escape the ship if they did not manage to flee before their own comrades on the deck of
the ship were overcome. If the trireme was hooked by grapnels and was never rammed
during the battle, the hoplites could gain a trireme in perfect condition for their own
navy.120 Otherwise, the ship could be towed to shore and repaired by the naupegos.121
Since boarding did not require highly trained oarsmen capable of engaging in complex
tactical maneuvers, it was the preferred method of naval combat for most Greek navies.
The Athenians had the advantage of employing professional oarsmen who trained with
their fellow rowers,122 and thus were skilled enough to rely on pure ramming combat. The
oarsmen of other Greek and barbarian navies generally did not have this skill level, and
thus it was better for them to engage in infantry combat, a fighting style with which the
men of a Greek polis would be very comfortable. It is important to note how fortunes
could quickly change in a naval battle. Even after a successful ramming, the attackers
could be overcome by the hoplites on the rammed trireme if the hoplites on the ramming
ship failed to defend the deck, and they did not manage to back water and get away
quickly enough.

118

Fields (2007), 7.
Hanson (2005), 242.
120
Hanson (2005), 243.
121
Fields (2007), 18.
122
Fields (2007), 13.
119

37

Forced Beaching
There is one other strategy that a navy might have used to gain an advantage,
although it did not require any actual contact with the enemy ship. This tactic was forced
beaching. This method was important for the Battle in the Great Harbour because it was
used by the Syracusan navy against the Athenians (Thuc. 7.70.1). To perform a forced
beaching, two or more ships surrounded an enemy ship. If the ship did not dare to
engage, owing to the odds against it or because the ship had taken too much damage and
could not afford to be rammed, and it tried to escape, it could be forced toward the shore
by the other ships. If a ship was forced to beach, its crew could escape unharmed, but the
ship would be removed from battle for some time. Either the crew would have to push the
boat back out to sea or if the ship beached in friendly territory, the comrades on the shore
could push the boat back out to sea. It was far more advantageous to force an enemy ship
to beach in one’s own territory. In this circumstance, the men on the shore could either
kill the men on board, or prevent them from getting the ship back into the water,
effectively removing the trireme from combat. If the men on the ship somehow managed
to fight off the men on the shore, the ship was still greatly delayed and thus no help to its
allies. If the men on the shore could take over the ship, they could acquire a new ship for
their own navy.

Before the Battle
In early 414 BC, the Athenians successfully blockaded Syracuse by both land and
sea and besieged the city (Thuc. 6.103.3; Diod. 13.7.5; Plut. Nic. 18.4-5). The Syracusans
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were very close to suing for peace (Thuc. 6.103.3; Plut. Nic. 18.4),

but the Spartan

commander, Gylippus, arrived in Sicily with a small force and collected allies throughout
Sicily (Thuc. 7.1; Diod. 13.7.7; Plut. Nic. 19.4). A Corinthian fleet came to Syracuse’s aid
124

as well (Thuc. 7.2.1; Diod. 13.8.3).

Nicias sent a letter to Athens asking for troops and

money and for himself to be relieved from duty because of a kidney problem (Thuc. 7.14125

15; Diod. 13.8.6).

The Athenians decided to send Demosthenes and Eurymedon with a

large number of troops and ships (Thuc. 7.16; Diod. 13.11.1). In 413 BC, the Athenians
attempted a night raid at Epipolae, but failed owing to a limited knowledge of the terrain
and the confusion caused by the darkness (Thuc. 7.43.6-45; Diod. 13.11.3-6; Plut. Nic.
21.5-9). The Athenians postponed their escape from Sicily, due to an eclipse (Thuc. 7.50.4;
Diod. 13.12.6; Plut. Nic. 23.1). Advised by the soothsayers, Nicias proclaimed that the
troops needed to wait 27 days before making any attempt to escape (Thuc. 7.50.4).

126

Once

the Syracusans had become aware that the Athenians were going to remain in Sicily, they
attacked the Athenian ships in a naval battle and were victorious (Thuc. 7.52.1-54; Diod.
13.13.1-13.8; Plut. Nic. 24.1-2). Eurymedon was killed in the battle (Thuc. 7.52.2; Diod.
13.13.3; Plut. Nic. 24.2).
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Preparations
With the reinforcements sent in early 413 BC, the Athenians were still unable to
win the war. However, owing to the eclipse, the Athenians sat around for too long. By the
time the decision was made to sail home, the Syracusans had become emboldened by
their recent victories and wanted to prevent an Athenian escape and to destroy the
Expedition Corps. Ultimately, the Syracusans looked to encircle the Athenians and entrap
them within the Great Harbour and the small area of land which they still held beside the
harbour.127 In the Battle in the Great Harbour, the Athenians were engaging in a battle of
breakthrough. The goal was to break out of the Great Harbour of Syracuse and to escape.
The Syracusans made the opening maneuver by blockading the harbour with merchant
ships and triremes along with smaller ships (Thuc. 7.40.5). The Syracusans attached the
128

ships together with chains and planks (Thuc. 7.59.3; Diod. 14.1-2).

The exit of the

harbour was completely blocked off except for a small gap in the very middle (Thuc.
7.59.3).129
At this point, the morale of the Athenians and their allies was dangerously low.
Soon after the arrival of Demosthenes and Eurymedon, the Athenians had lost a land
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battle during the night (Thuc. 7.43-45; Diod. 13.11.3-6; Plut. Nic. 21.5-8).130
Furthermore, the Athenians had been defeated in an earlier naval battle, which was an
embarrassing outcome for the preeminent navy of the Greek world (Thuc. 7.52-55.1;
Diod. 13.13.1-8; Plut. Nic. 24.2). In that battle, the Athenian general Eurymedon had
been slain (Thuc. 7.52.2; Diod. 13.13.3-4; Plut. Nic. 24.2), and the Athenians had lost 18
131

ships (Thuc. 7.53.3; Diod. 13.13.8).

This was especially damaging to the psyche of a

navy which thought it was invincible. Conversely, the Syracusans gained a massive
morale boost for having defeated such an imposing naval force (Thuc. 7.67.1). When this
lack of confidence was combined with the illness (Plut. Nic. 22.4) and hunger that was
running through the Athenian army, the Athenians were in dire need of a morale boost.
Nicias attempted to cull the negative attitudes that were present in the army in two
speeches.
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He appealed to the emotions of the Athenians and their allies by inspiring

fear for their families in their various homelands (Thuc. 7.64.1). He also warned them of
the consequences for their own lives should they not escape the present situation
133

successfully (Thuc. 7.64.1; Diod. 13.15.1-2).

However, in terms of their preparations

for the impending battle, he assured the navy by pointing out the changes that had been
made that he felt would give them a competitive advantage in combat.
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However, the

The Athenians attack Epipolae during the night. There is great confusion owing to the darkness. This is
compounded because the fresh troops that travelled to Sicily with Demosthenes are unfamiliar with the
terrain. (See Rhodes (2010), 145).
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changes were a massive departure from the tactics that were generally used by the
Athenians. Normally, the Athenians relied on their superior maneuverability in the water
on account of their highly trained oarsmen.135 For this battle, since the harbour would
constrain the movement of the ships, Nicias adopted the strategy of the Syracusans,
which had been highly successful in the preceding naval battle (i.e. boarding rather than
ramming). Thucydides repeatedly uses words that reference the narrowness of the battle
area, such as στενοχωρία (Thuc. 7.70.6). Thus, the new plan was to fill the decks with
hoplites and bowmen and javelin throwers, whereas the normal Athenian method was to
include roughly 10 hoplites and 4 archers. The javelin throwers and bowmen could harass
the hoplites on the enemy ships, and the hoplites could board the opposing ships and
effectively commandeer them.136 The less experienced navies of the Greek world tended
to put more hoplites on deck with the intent of boarding.137 Nicias chose to use grapnels
in order to make the boarding of ships more effective (Thuc. 7.62.3). The strategy was to
get close to another ship, and then the grapnels could be used to latch on to the enemy
ship in order to make it easier for the hoplites to board. Moreover, Nicias informed the
troops that they had taken the proper counter-measures to combat the thickness of the
enemies’ catheads, which he claimed had the most devastating effect in the previous
battle (Thuc. 7.62.3). A cathead is a device used to lower and raise anchors in order to
keep the anchor from damaging the ship by keeping it sufficiently far away from the ship
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proper. Thick catheads helped to strengthen the prow of the ship.138 The specific countermeasures taken by the Athenians are difficult to discern.
While Nicias’ assurances were able to coerce the Athenians and the allies to
engage in a final effort to escape Sicily, there were a few issues with his plan. First, the
Athenian navy lacked experience in this form of naval warfare. As the Spartan
commander, Gylippus, states in his speech to the Syracusan troops:
Concerning their close imitation of our preparation, it (the
army) strains in our manner and we will be well-prepared
against each of them, when there are many hoplites upon
the deck – contrary to their established method – many
javelin men, Acharnanians and others who are men of the
land so to speak, having got on board on a ship, they will
not even discover how it is possible to discharge a missile
while sitting. How will they not make the ships unsteady,
all will be confused amongst themselves, moving forth in a
manner that is not their own? (Thuc. 7.67.2)139
Here, Gylippus questioned the Athenians’ ability to engage in battle in a manner in which
they were not familiar. Most important is the statement that the javelin throwers would
not be able to figure out how to effectively hurl their weapons (Thuc. 7.67.2). Barry
Strauss uses this passage as proof that javelin throwers were required to be seated to
throw their weapons “because standing would cause the ship to roll and upset the
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oars.”140 However, I argue that this cannot be the case. The javelin throwers may remain
seated before engaging, but a seated man would not be able to throw effectively a javelin
with a sufficient amount of force. Instead, Gylippus should be regarded as engaging in
laconic wit rather than making a factual statement concerning naval warfare. This relies
on the interpretation of οὐδέ in this passage. The οὐδέ should be taken to mean ‘not even’
instead of simply meaning ‘not’.
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In this way, the fully expressed thought behind

Gylippus’ witty statement is meant to be “the Acharnanians, being land people, will not
be able to discharge their weapons while standing; they will not even be able to do it
while sitting.” Certainly, standing on the ship would be more difficult than sitting, and
Strauss is correct to point out the dangers of rolling the ship. However, sitting in order to
discharge missiles was certainly impossible. If we consider the crowding on the decks of
the ships, where would the javelin men even sit in order to discharge their weapons?
They certainly could not sit in the middle of the deck, as their line of sight would be
blocked by the hoplites in front of them. The only possibility was that they would sit on
the edge of the deck, but this would cause other problems. First, there was the potential to
fall off the deck especially if the ship rolls, and second, the javelin men were wearing
little armour, and their shields would be difficult to manipulate in a sitting position and
therefore, sitting on the edge of the deck would put them in an extremely dangerous
situation. Thus, it is quite possible that the javelin throwers remained seated until they
were in a position to engage, and then they stood up. Gylippus’ point is that the
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Athenians and their allies would not be able to do this effectively given their lack of
experience.
Another issue was the introduction of the grapnels. The Syracusans saw the
Athenians preparing their ships and took measures to counteract the grapnels (Thuc.
7.65.2). The Syracusans placed animal hides over the prows and a considerable portion of
the upper works of the ships (Thuc. 7.65.2)142 which helped to prevent the grapnels from
successfully grabbing hold of the ships. The hides were also used to block arrows, which
was a common tactic.143 It would make sense for the Syracusans to take this precaution
after having seen the Athenians increasing the number of archers and javelin throwers on
their triremes (Thuc. 7.67.2). It is difficult to interpret what exactly Thucydides means by
the ‘upper works’ (Thuc. 7.65.2). Thucydides could simply mean the railings (outrigger)
along the side of the boat. In the Battle in the Great Harbour, it is unknown whether the
Athenians had access to animal hides or canvas to protect the thranitai and to prevent the
triremes from being hooked by grapnels. It is possible that when the Athenian storehouse
was captured, the Athenians had lost such items,144 and therefore, the thranitai of the
Athenian triremes were in far more danger than their Syracusan counterparts. In
conclusion, the Athenians were given a boost to their morale through Nicias’ appeals and
with his assurances regarding their changes to strategy. However, because they had failed

142

Diodorus mentions the use of grapnels in his account (13.16.1), however, it is not clear which army is
using the grapnels. It is implied that it is both navies. He fails to mention the countermeasures taken by the
Syracusans; namely, applying animal skins to their outriggers in order to prevent the hooks from
successfully grasping their ships.
143
Fields (2007), 13-14.
144
Diod. 13.9.4 says that there was much naval equipment, money and other equipment, but he does not
specify what exactly was contained in these storehouses.
45

to make these changes in secrecy, their perceived advantages were nullified. Furthermore,
their lack of experience in naval boarding put them at a disadvantage against the
Syracusans who tended to fight in such a manner.

Nicias’ Tactical Decisions
In this section, I will argue that, regardless of the outcome of the battle,
Nicias made the best possible tactical decisions. Nicias’ fault was that he was
reactive to the movements of the Syracusans rather than proactive. He was
largely responsible for the delay in the decision to sail home and for giving in to
the soothsayers after the eclipse, as we have seen. Nicias did not attempt to escape
at the earliest possible moment. However, once the Syracusans had blockaded the
harbour with ships (Thuc. 7.58.3; Diod. 13.14.1-2; Plut. Nic. 24.3), the Athenian
strategy to escape by ship was sound. It was necessary that the Athenians break
out, since they had told Catane to stop delivering supplies even before the eclipse
145

(Thuc. 7.62.2),

and thus, the Athenians would eventually starve should they not

take action. The risk for the Athenians would have been much higher if they
attempted to escape by the land as they would not have had a clear contingency
plan to escape the island. Moreover, travelling across Sicily would do little to help
the Athenians. In this circumstance, the Athenians would have had to burn all of
their ships or to surrender all of their ships to the Syracusans. On land, the
Athenians could forage for food, but their journey back to mainland Greece
would rely on the kindness of strangers and their allies to provide them with
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ships. Therefore, it was better for the Athenians to attempt to break the blockade
and arrive at Catane. This would have allowed them to acquire food from Catane
and also keep their navy. Regardless of their defeat in the preceding battle, the
strength of the Athenians still lied in their navy. The Athenian side still had
more ships than the Syracusans.146 Nicias made massive changes to the general
Athenian tactic of ramming, as he had decided to fight on the terms of the
Syracusans, where there was a greater reliance on boarding enemy ships. He
decided to emulate the other navies of Greece in this way, and to focus on
boarding (Thuc. 7.67.2) for a few good reasons. While the Athenians were not
well versed in this form of naval combat, it was the best method given their
situation. The Athenian navy shone in the open water. Their triremes were able
to out-maneuver their foe owing to their lighter weight and their more
experienced rowers.147 Further, the Athenians were superior at rowing in the
rougher waters that are present in the open sea.148 However, in the Great
Harbour, the space was narrow and the water was calm. Thus, the Athenian
rowing advantages were nullified to a degree. Another issue for the Athenians
was that their ships were waterlogged (Thuc. 7.12.4-5). Usually, a navy would
beach their ships after a day of sailing in order to let them dry. However, the
Athenians had left the triremes in the water in case of a quick Syracusan attack
(Thuc. 7.12.4-5). A waterlogged ship was heavier and therefore, more sluggish
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in the water and not able to perform difficult maneuvers. Furthermore, the ships
could not receive proper maintenance by the naupegos.149 The Athenians might
still be able to maneuver their boats more efficiently owing to their experience,
but the actual area of combat made this advantage negligible.
In the previous year (414BC), Gylippus captured an Athenian naval
storehouse which had been filled with equipment for repairs (Thuc. 7.23.1; Plut.
Nic. 20.2).150 Therefore, their ships were in bad shape for the upcoming fight
and it was especially important for the Athenians to avoid being rammed since
they may not have had sufficient materials to repair the ships during and after
151

combat.

Generally, a trireme kept roughly 30 extra oars as replacements for

the rowers.152 If some of these oars were kept in the naval storehouse, the
Athenian rowers had to be very careful with their oars. Shattered oars could
leave a trireme immobile. Based on this, the Athenians made the reasonable
decision to focus on avoiding ramming and being rammed and to rely on
grapnels to attach their ships to enemy triremes (Thuc. 7.62.3). If the Athenians
could capture a boat with the grapnels and pull it parallel to their own ships, they
would have a large boarding area. This would allow the large number of hoplites
on the trireme to leap onto the enemy ship simultaneously, making it more
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difficult for the Syracusans to prevent the attack. Since the Athenians happened
to have a large number of hoplites on this campaign, they might as well use
them for fighting on board the ships rather than have them sit and watch the
battle from the shore. While the Athenians were less familiar with this type of
combat, it was the most effective way to achieve victory given their current
circumstances.

The Will to Combat
What was the impetus for the Athenians and their allies to stake everything on a
naval battle with the Syracusans at this particular point in the conflict? The Athenians
were moved largely by necessity and fear. At this point in the war, the Athenians were
dealing with sickness among the ranks of the army (Thuc. 7.50.3; Diod. 13.12.4; Plut.
Nic. 22.4).153 It stands to reason that the rate of illness among the troops would increase
owing to a lack of provisions (Thuc. 7.60.2). The Athenians had informed Catane not to
send them any more provisions because they had expected to leave before the eclipse
postponed their departure (Thuc. 7.60.2). Thus, the Athenians were hungry and tired with
no hope of obtaining food unless they made an excursion inland which would bring them
into collision with hostiles. To add to the Athenian plight, the Syracusans were
attempting to block the Athenians in the Great Harbour of Syracuse, preventing them
from receiving provisions and supplies by sea and forcing them to travel inland. If the
Athenians were to make it to Catane,
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they would either have to break the blockade or

Also, the sick are mentioned again at 7.60.2.
See Figure 11: The distance between Syracuse and Catane.
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attempt to travel across the island on foot. The Athenians chose to rely on their naval
ability since they still felt that they held an advantage (although they had lost the previous
naval engagement with the Syracusans (Thuc. 7.55.1)).155 However, Nicias was able to
alleviate the damage done by the previous defeat by unveiling what he felt to be a
winning strategy. Nicias impelled the Athenians and their allies to fight by instilling in
them the fear of the consequences of failure. He appealed to the Athenians by informing
them that if they were to lose and fail to escape Sicily, the consequences for their families
back at Athens would be dire. He said:
And to those of you who are Athenians, I remind you
again, that you left behind no other ships in your docks that
are equal to these ships here nor did you leave behind any
hoplites fit for military service, and if anything shall
happen other than for you to prevail, our enemies here will
sail straightaway to there (Athens), and those of us
remaining in that place (Athens) will be unable to ward off
those enemies that are present and those coming upon them
(Thuc. 7.64.1).156

Thus, Nicias made an emotional plea to the Athenians to think about the potential
repercussions that might come upon Athens should their forces fail to escape. Further, he
invoked ancestors and reminded the Athenians of their great deeds in battle (Thuc.
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7.69.2). Nicias managed to put similar fear into the hearts of the Athenian allies as well.
He said:
And the rest of you (Sicilians) will come under the
Syracusans straightaway, you yourselves know with what
sort a purpose you came upon them, and those who are
there (from the Greek mainland) will come under the
(compulsion of) the Lacedaemonians (Thuc. 7.64.1).157
Here Nicias instilled the troops with the fear of enslavement or the loss of independence
(Thuc. 7.64.1). He implied that the troops knew that they came against the Syracusans
with the intention of conquest and enslavement (Thuc. 7.64.1). Should the Athenian
alliance fail to ward off the Syracusans, the Syracusans would be likely to retaliate in
kind. Those who lived in mainland Greece would be punished and enslaved by the
Spartans and the Peloponnesian League.
Another fear for the Athenians was that if they failed to break out of the harbour and
were forced to retreat into Sicily, it would be necessary to burn their ships in order to
prevent the enemies from acquiring the armada for themselves (Thuc. 7.60.2). The ships
would be lost for the Athenian state and the Athenians would be left at Syracuse with
even less hope of fleeing the island.
At the time of the battle, the Athenians still held a beach head (Thuc. 7.60.2; Diod.
13.16.6). While other parts of the harbour were controlled by the Syracusans, the
Athenians still maintained a wall (although they had pulled back from it) and commanded
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a small portion of land (Thuc. 7.60.2).158 The break out from the harbour needed to be
attempted as soon as possible while the Athenians had troops on the ground and before
the land army could come under assault. Moreover, if the naval battle were unsuccessful,
the Athenians still would have an opportunity to safely land their troops on the beach
among friends. If the Athenians were forced to swim or land ships on a hostile shore, the
troops would likely be cut down before they could gain a foothold.
Therefore, the Athenians and their allies were driven to fight by both necessity and
fear. The illness that was inhibiting the troops would only become further compounded
by the lack of provisions available to support the army. Further, the sick Athenians being
in close quarters with others would spread illness amongst the troops. Moreover, the
swampy terrain would bring a greater chance of widespread infection. They must move
against the Syracusan blockade in order to obtain supplies and escape Sicily. The
Athenians still held some portion of the Great Harbour, but it was not something that
could be maintained forever owing to the aforementioned lack of provisions and the
ailments among the troops. Being pushed from the beach would leave the Athenians with
only the option to retreat to safety on the much more risky march over land to Catane if
they failed to break the blockade or to destroy the Syracusan fleet. Thus, the longer the
Athenians delayed, the worse the situation on the ground would become. Nicias
compelled both the Athenian and allied troops by reminding them of the potential
consequences should they fail either to crush the Syracusan navy or to run the blockade.
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We can reasonably assume that this fear compelled the Athenian alliance to fight with
zeal against the enemy even though they had become discouraged by the previous naval
defeat. Essentially, each passing moment weakened the chance of victory, so the
necessity of the situation forced the Athenians into action.

The Battle
Thucydides’ narrative paints a picture of mass confusion. Neither side seemed to
know which side is winning the battle. Thucydides notes the differing reactions of
various Athenians watching the battle from the shore. People looking at different areas of
the Great Harbour had diverse opinions regarding either the plight or the success of their
navy. There is little information in the narrative that provides evidence as to why the
Athenians were defeated. Therefore, it is important to attempt to recreate the battle using
the scant details that we have regarding the flow of battle. Using the Face of Battle
approach, it is possible to give an explanation for the outcome. In the next sections, I will
account for the Athenian defeat by analyzing the various roles of the different classes of
troops on the triremes, and their experience of this battle.
In John Keegan’s seminal work, the battles that are analyzed are infantry
battles.159 Therefore, it is simple to organize the recreation based on the different lines of
battle engaging in steps (archers, cavalry, and infantry). However, in a naval battle,
especially one as chaotic as the Battle in the Great Harbour, it is not apparent how the
recreation is best organized. Therefore, the battle must be broken into artificial divisions.
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Hornblower, following Rutter, notes that Thucydides divides the narrative into groups of
three.160 First were the “initial efforts of the rowers, the steersmen, and the soldiers on
board.”161 Next, we learn of the “activities of the same three groups in reverse order
(soldiers fighting hand to hand, steersmen attacking and defending simultaneously,
sailors unable to hear orders).”162 Finally, Thucydides elucidates the reactions of those on
the shore who were viewing the battle. These men are broken into three groups. There are
those who were viewing a part of the harbour where their side was winning, those who
were viewing a part of the harbour where their side was being overcome, and those who
were viewing a part of the harbour where the battle was inconclusive.163 This is the
manner in which I reconstruct the battle.

Initial Charge
After loading the ships, the Athenians made a run at the blockade with 110
triremes (Thuc. 7.60.4).164 First, the Athenians had to pass the Corinthian ships that were
blocking the way to the line of merchant ships. Thucydides reports that the Athenians got
the better of the Corinthians and were able to arrive at the blockade itself (Thuc.
7.70.2).
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They reached the wall of ships and attempted to break the chains and escape

(Thuc. 7.70.2). The Athenian triremes likely sailed out in rows of ships abreast. The
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Syracusans, who probably had their ships in the water already, launched their ships from
the parts of the harbour that they controlled, which seem to have been both the north and
south sides of the harbour and the battle proper commenced (Thuc. 7.70.1).166 The
Syracusans and their allies launched 76 triremes, and were thus disadvantaged in terms of
pure numbers (Thuc. 7.52.1).167 It seems that the Syracusans were hoping for the
Athenians to become bogged down at the barricade, where the Syracusans would be able
to encircle the Athenians and to batter their ships with their strengthened prows.
Once the Syracusan ships headed towards the Athenians, the Athenians were in a
very dangerous predicament. Since the Syracusans were coming πανταχόθεν (from all
sides) (Thuc. 7.70.2), the Athenians were effectively surrounded. Now, the Athenians
needed to turn their ships to face the enemy. Those on the left flank turned left to face the
Syracusan ships coming from the north part of the harbour, and the triremes on the right
flank turned right to face the ships attacking from the south of the harbour. The Athenians
would most likely have maneuvered their ships into a modified kuklos formation. There
would have been ships that were still attempting to break the barricade, but the ships in
the rear would have turned either left or right to create a semi-circle.
These commands would have been carried out by the oarsmen by order of the
kubernetes with assistance from the keleustes. The helmsman (kubernetes) was the de
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facto captain of the ship.168 He was an experienced sailor.169 He controlled the steering of
the ship with two steering oars.170 The steering oars, and thus the helmsman himself,
were at the stern of the ship.171 The kubernetes had the greatest responsibility on the ship
and could be credited with victory or defeat based on his reactions to the circumstance of
the battle. The helmsman stood in a vulnerable position and could be struck by enemy
missiles, and therefore, he was protected by other troops.172 The boatswain, called
keleustes, was another assistant to the helmsman. It was his duty to manage the rowers.173
His exhortations were intended to maintain the morale of the oarsmen.174 A disheartened
and tired rowing crew would make a trireme very ineffective. Thus, it was necessary to
make sure that the spirits of the rowers remained high. The keleustes was also a
communications medium between the helmsman and the oarsmen.175 This would be
especially necessary in the din of battle, where the shouting of soldiers and the clashing
of ships could drown out the voice of the helmsman (Thuc. 7.70.6; Diod. 13.16.5).176 He
likely spent most of his time under the deck with the oarsmen,177 but sometimes he may
have popped up above the deck in order to clarify commands from the helmsman.
Xenophon notes the negative effect of a bad boatswain, suggesting how important this
man was to the morale of the rowers. Xenophon says:
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As for example on a trireme, it is said, when they cross the
sea, and there is need for the sailors to travel a day voyage,
some of the boatswains are able to say and do such things
so that they sharpen the souls of the men to work hard
willingly, while others are senseless in this way, so that
they accomplish the same voyage more than in double the
time. The former boatswain and rowers when they
disembark perspire and applaud each other, while the latter
boatswain and rowers arrive slowly, the rowers hating the
boatswain and being hated by him (Xen. Oec. 21.3).178

While this passage refers simply to making a voyage, a particularly incompetent keleustes
would certainly have a similar impact on oarsmen in battle. Since the orders would have
been able to be heard clearly at this point, the rowers should have been able to turn
roughly 90 degrees rather quickly in order to form a kuklos. For example, the triremes on
the left flank would turn left by having the rowers on the port (left) side row backwards
and those on the starboard (right) side rowing forwards. The kubernetes would likely
assist the starboard side by pushing the left rudder outwards. The ship could pivot and
turn. However, this left the Athenian ships with no forward momentum while the
Syracusan ships were barreling towards them. This was extremely troublesome for the
Athenians owing to the strengthened catheads of the Syracusan ships (Thuc. 7.62.3). The
Syracusans could simply ram the Athenians directly in the bows of their ships and cause
massive damage. If Nicias’ claim that the Athenian ships were properly outfitted to
counteract the power of the prows of the Syracusans was correct, the damage to the
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Athenian prows may have been lessened (Thuc. 7.62.3). The Athenians were
disadvantaged either way, because they likely suffered a lack of supplies to repair their
ships owing to the capture of the Athenian storehouse by Gylippus (Thuc. 7.23.1-2; Diod.
13.9.4). The carpenter of the ship (naupegos) made repairs to the ship. Morrison argues
that the carpenter spent most of his time below the deck, where there would be a place for
him to store his tools.179 He would attempt to make immediate repairs during sail,180 and
when the ship was beached, he would perform further maintenance.181 On the other hand,
the Syracusans, having come from the city, were fully supplied and capable of fixing
holes in the hulls of the triremes.

Missile Infantry
Once the Syracusan ships approach the Athenian triremes,
The men attacked the opposing ship plentifully with darts
and arrows and stones from the decks of their ships (Thuc.
7.70.5).182
In this moment, the javelin throwers, bowmen, and likely also the deckhands were
engaging. The bowmen (toxotai), like the hoplites, were on the ship for offensive and
defensive purposes. On an Athenian trireme, there were usually four archers.183 The
archers stood at the stern of the ship in order to protect the helmsman.184 When their own
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hoplites attempted to board an enemy ship, the archers could fire arrows toward the
enemy in order to assist the hoplites in boarding. Conversely, the archers could send
volleys at hoplites who were attempting to board their own ship. If an enemy ship failed
to cover the outriggers of the ship, archers could attack the thranitai.
In the naval battle that preceded the Battle in the Great Harbour, the Syracusan
navy was able to strike the thranitai with projectiles (Thuc. 7.40.5).185 Not only did this
create panic amongst the oarsmen, it also could throw off the balance of the rowers
because there would be a disparity in the number of rowers on each side of the ship if
enough oarsmen were incapacitated. Also, a dead or severely injured oarsman could
impede other rowers if his oar was in the way of the other oars, or if the oarsman should
collapse onto other rowers. In the Battle in the Great Harbour, it seems that the Athenians
placed more archers than usual on the ship, which gave the helmsman more protection,
and also allowed the Athenians to overwhelm the enemy decks with projectiles.

the helmsman other than essentially being human shields is a topic for debate. The best that they could do
was keep a watchful eye and shoot at potential attackers.
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It seems that the Syracusans used much smaller boats to achieve this. Thucydides calls them ‘light ships’
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javelins into the outrigger and thus incapacitate some of the thranitai. Diodorus says that the Syracusans
attacked the men on the decks with javelins, but makes no mention of the specific targeting of oarsmen
(Diod. 13.10.5).
59

The deckhands, of which there were normally ten, seem to have been broken into
two parties.186 One group followed the orders of the helmsman, while the other group
obeyed the bow officer.187 Thus, half of the deckhands were stationed at the stern and the
other half were stationed at the bow.188 On voyage, the deckhands were responsible for
raising and lowering the two sails of the trireme.189 The deckhands could also be used as
spare oarsmen, bailing water from the ship, and taking control of the rudder when
necessary.190 In this part of the battle, the deckhands were certainly throwing stones at the
enemy. The javelin throwers were a new addition to the Athenian ships. As Gylippus
pointed out, these men had no experience fighting on a naval vessel (Thuc. 7.67.2). Their
throws would have certainly suffered from inaccuracy. The missile troops had the same
issues that the Athenian hoplites had in this battle. The mass of men on the trireme deck
would have made it more difficult to position oneself in a way that was conducive to
one’s needs, since the Athenian archers were not used to this level of crowding on their
triremes. Unlike the hoplites and rowers, archers did not need as much energy to function
effectively, and thus the lack of provisions was far less damaging to them. The deckhands
should have been roughly as effective as they normally were. They were used to walking
about a trireme, and had likely thrown rocks from the deck of the ship in the past. An
issue that was unique to the missile troops involved their equipment. The Athenians did
not have an unlimited supply of javelins, arrows, and stones. Since the Athenians had
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completely changed their tactics in this particular battle, it is possible that they were illprepared to engage in missile attacks for a prolonged period of time. Once these men ran
out of missiles, they became a detriment to the trireme. Their added weight made the
trireme more sluggish. Additionally, their movement on the ship caused the oarsmen to
have greater difficulty in regard to efficient rowing. Further, they took up large amounts
of space which the hoplites would require to defend the ship.

Hoplites
Once the ships came into close contact, both sides began to attempt to board and
commandeer the enemy ships. This duty was left to the hoplites on board. The hoplites on
the ship were used as either a boarding party or to prevent enemies from boarding their
own ship. While the oarsmen were rowing, the hoplites remained seated in order that the
ship did not roll.191 The Athenians usually kept around 10 hoplites on board while other
Greek navies tended to have around 40 of them.192 The Athenians used fewer hoplites for
a few reasons. First, less weight meant that the ship was lighter and therefore easier to
maneuver.193 Second, the Athenians focused on ramming rather than boarding, so the
hoplites on board were only necessary for defending the ship from enemy boarding
parties in case their ship became stuck after a successful ram.194 Since the hoplites wore
their full armour, falling into the water was incredibly dangerous. The weight of the
armour would make it difficult for the hoplite to swim to safety. In the Battle in the Great
Harbour, the Athenians more likely had 40 hoplites on board, much like their Syracusan
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counterparts, since they intended to fight in the same manner as the other navies of
Greece. It is quite possible that only 10 of the hoplites on each of the 110 Athenian
triremes had any experience as marines (epibatai) when it came to fighting on ships.195
Regardless of the actual general training and skill of the hoplites, it seems that around 3/4
of the Athenian hoplites had no boarding experience.196 We can infer from Xenophon that
Athenian hoplite training was particularly lax. Xenophon wrote:
(When) will the Athenians train (just as the Spartans do),
(the Athenians) who not only neglect good health, but
mock those who cultivate their bodies? (Xen. Mem.
3.5.15)197
Later, Xenophon’s Socrates says:
Because the city does not train (men) publicly for war, on
account of this, one ought not to be negligent in private, but
rather to take care (of his training) not any less (Xen. Mem.
198
3.12.5)
This is not to say that the Athenians did not have skilled hoplites, but if the men were not
training fully for land combat, the expectation that they would be acclimated to naval
combat is quite unlikely. This would certainly lead to an increase in mistakes on the
Athenian side. Some men would fail to board the ship properly and fall into the sea.
Unless the soldier fell near the shore, his fate was surely sealed. Other hoplites who did
successfully board the enemy ship were still disadvantaged. Those without experience

195

As per standard Athenian custom. See Fields (2007), 14.
If we assume that the Athenians had put 40 hoplites on the deck, and the Athenians usually only used 10
hoplites per trireme, it stands to reason that 30 out of the 40 hoplites have had little to no naval experience.
197
Xen. Mem. 3.5.15. σωμασκήσουσιν οὕτως, οἳ οὐ μόνον αὐτοὶ εὐεξίας ἀμελοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν
ἐπιμελομένων καταγελῶσι;
198
Xen. Mem. 3.12.5. χρή, ὅτι οὐκ ἀσκεῖ δημοσίᾳ ἡ πόλις τὰ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἀμελεῖν,
ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ἧττον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι.
196

62

were not used to fighting on an unstable platform. The stability of the ship would become
even more compromised when there were a number of hoplites attempting to board
simultaneously. The inexperienced hoplites might lose their balance and simply fall to the
deck, putting them in a dire situation, or fall off the trireme entirely and perish.
Another issue was the ineffectiveness of the grapnels used by the Athenians. Since
the Syracusans witnessed the Athenians preparing grapnels, they equipped their ships
with animal hides. This made it more difficult for the grapnels to hook onto the outrigger
of the Syracusan triremes. Thus, boarding the enemy ship became a more hazardous
affair. The Athenians had to rely on the boats being locked together by ramming.
Thucydides never clarifies whether the Athenians used animal hides to protect their own
outriggers and the thranitai. In the previous naval battle, the Athenians did not have this
protection (Thuc. 7.40.5). After the capture of the storehouse, it stands to reason that the
Athenians were not using animal hides. If the Athenians did not have animal hides, this
means that the Syracusans could use their grapnels and link to the Athenian ships on their
terms.
A final issue for the Athenians, which would likely have the greatest effect on the
hoplites and oarsmen, was the lack of provisions. The famous maxim that “an army
marches on its stomach”199 was no less true here. Fatigue would set in quickly and the
troops would be less effective overall. Conversely, the Syracusans were almost certainly
well fed, and thus they would not suffer fatigue as quickly. From the trials of the
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Olympias, we have learned that the rowers would drink roughly 1 litre of water per hour
of rowing.200 However, this amount could be reduced if sodium was included in the
water.201 It is possible that the ancient triremes kept salt on board for this purpose.202
Owing to the dire position of the Athenians, it is unknown whether they would have been
able to supply their rowers and other troops with sufficient amounts of water. It is almost
certain that the Syracusans would have had far more access to safe drinking water, and
would be less likely to become dehydrated. Thus, the longer the battle continued, the
more disadvantaged the Athenians became. Both Thucydides and Diodorus point out that
the battle raged for a very long time (Thuc. 7.71.5; Diod. 13.16.17). The Athenians were
attempting to win a quick victory in order to escape the harbour. The Syracusans simply
needed to block the Athenians from succeeding to obtain their objective. With the
Athenians’ lack of provisions, they would quickly begin to suffer the effects of
dehydration, and their effectiveness as a fighting unit would degrade. On the other hand,
the well fed Syracusans could certainly maintain their energy for a longer period of time.
After describing the efforts of the hoplites on the deck, Thucydides writes a
perplexing sentence:
In many places, it happened that – on account of the narrow
space to ram against others, and on the other hand, to be
rammed by others, two ships and – and it is possible that it
is more than two ships – become entangled around one ship
by constraint. And it is for the helmsmen to attend to guard
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here and attack there, not in one place, but rather in many
places from all sides (Thuc. 7.70.6).203

How are we supposed to imagine this? The statement illustrates the absolute chaos
unfolding in the harbour. However, the actual mechanics described in this sentence are
quite confusing. Triremes would certainly become entangled during combat. It seems that
hoplites on a single trireme were both boarding another ship while having their own ship
boarded. Utter confusion would take hold of hoplites who were inexperienced with
respect to boarding enemy ships. It is difficult to determine whether this would have been
a greater issue for the Athenians or the Syracusans. However, I would argue that the
Athenians would have come off worse from these confrontations. For the Athenians,
since their hoplites were used to defending against boarding parties, they might have had
more success preventing their ship from being overtaken. On the other hand, the vast
majority of Athenian hoplites were unfamiliar with boarding an enemy ship, and many
had no experience fighting on a trireme at all. These men would be in a state of confusion
and may have even been more of a detriment to the Athenian cause than a benefit. The
Syracusans, living in Magna Graecia, would be used to both the attacking and defending
in this form of naval combat. Their overall experience in this form of warfare would lead
to a more organized and thus a more effective force.
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Thuc. 7.70.6. ξυνετύγχανέ τε πολλαχοῦ διὰ τὴν στενοχωρίαν τὰ μὲν ἄλλοις ἐμβεβληκέναι, τὰ δὲ αὐτοὺς
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περιεστάναι.
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The Din of Battle
Next, Thucydides points out that:
The great din from many ships crashing together caused
consternation and at the same time caused a deprivation of
the hearing of orders which the helmsmen uttered (Thuc.
7.70.6).204
Therefore, it became an exercise in futility for the oarsmen to follow orders because they
were unable to hear the commands. It is possible that the other members of the ship who
were not engaged in battle became message runners for the helmsman. The only people
left on the ship who were not actively involved in either repairs, fighting, or maneuvering
were the trierarch, bow officer and the double-pipe player; these men could be used as
messengers for the kubernetes. The trierarch was the man who paid for the maintenance
and outfitting of the ship.205 This was a liturgy and thus the trierarch was of the Athenian
elite.206 While the name trierarch suggests that he was the legitimate commander of the
ship, this was not accurate. The helmsman was the individual who was really in control
of the trireme. The trireme double-pipe player (auletes) was used to keep timing for the
rowers.207 However, Aristophanes mentions that the oarsmen also kept time with their
own chants, specifically ‘o op op op op’ (Aristoph. Frogs, 208) and ‘rhyppapai’
(Aristoph. Frogs, 1073). Thus, well-trained rowers could function under the orders of the
thranitai who could still see the water. The auletes was essentially an assistant to the
helmsman, and kept time based on the decisions of the helmsman. He would likely
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remain under the deck with the rowers.208 The bow officer (prorates referring to the bow
of the ship, not the archery weapon) was a lookout while the ship was sailing.209 A
vase210 shows the prorates looking sternwards, which suggests that he kept in
communication with the helmsman, in order to keep him informed of potential dangers
(both from enemies and nature).211 It stands to reason that these men could also
communicate with each other through hand signals, not unlike soldiers in a fire fight in
modern times. Thus, even when the sounds of battle were at their loudest, orders could
still be followed. One can assume that either side had a particular natural advantage in
this situation. The Athenians’ better trained rowers could still perform their duties to
some degree owing to their sailing experience. The Syracusan hoplites could act
autonomously because of their knowledge of boarding. Also, the ability to hear orders
was likely more difficult for rowers due to their position in the confined hull of the ship.
On the other hand, the hoplites standing in the open air had a better chance of hearing
direct orders. Thucydides says that the men could not hear the orders of boatswains
(Thuc. 7.70.6; Diod. 13.16.5).
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This suggests that he means that particularly the rowers

had trouble hearing commands, since it was the duty of a boatswain to be a medium
between the helmsman and the rowers. The rowers were in a semi-enclosed space and
thus the sound of the water splashing, the crashing of ships, and the various yells of men,
allied and hostile, would have merged into a grand cacophony that would have drowned
out any clarity of orders. Since the Great Harbour did not allow for advanced naval
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maneuvers owing to space constrictions, any advantages that the Athenian oarsmen might
have had were nullified. Though the Athenians were more likely to be able to keep time
while rowing, it was not really important when collision with other ships was a certainty
in such a small space.

Generals
Thucydides mentions the actions of the generals of either side (Thuc. 7.70.8).
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He states:
Moreover, the generals of either side, if they were to see
any ship anywhere backing water not by necessity, calling
again and again the trierarch by name, the Athenian
generals asked if they withdraw, because they believe the
land to be of the most hostility now more their own than the
sea which Athens procured for itself through no little toil.
On the other hand the Syracusan generals asked if the men
knew clearly that the Athenians were eager to flee in any
manner, they would flee these ones who were fleeing
214
(Thuc. 7.70.8).
The exhortations of the generals played a large role in the overall morale of the troops, as
well as enforcing bravery. While the remarks are generic encouragement that would
persuade the soldiers to carry on the fight, I think the aspect of shaming was far more
important for the battle. When a general saw his own ships being routed, he called out the
name of the trierarch and chastised him for cowardice (Thuc. 7.70.8). Calling out the
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φεύγουσιν.
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name of the trierarch was simply a way to identify the ship in question. We know in
Greek society that shaming someone was the primary means for maintaining social
control and cohesion.215 When a trierarch was shamed, by extension the bravery of every
man on the ship was questioned. Thus, the men were compelled to continue fighting lest
they dishonoured themselves and the other men aboard the ship in the eyes of the other
allied ships. While shaming undoubtedly stopped ships from being routed, there was a
limit to how long a crew could fight in losing circumstances. Eventually, no amount of
shaming or encouragement would prevent a crew from refusing to follow orders.

Troops on the Shore
The troops on the shore seem to have provided the same benefits to the triremes at
sea as the generals, but at the same time, could also be damaging to morale. Thucydides
reports that the men on the shore shouted statements of joy when they saw their side
winning (Thuc. 7.71.3). On the other hand, when the men on the shore witnessed their
side faring badly, they started to proclaim that all hope was lost (Thuc. 7.71.3). Surely,
this would have had a negative effect on the morale of the men on the trireme. Again, it
must be questioned whether the men on the ships could hear the laments and cheers of the
men on the shore. One could conjecture that the men on the decks could hear but the
rowers would be oblivious to any comments owing to the aforementioned din that
drowned out the sound.216 Thucydides’ statement at 7.70.6 suggests that it was only the
rowers who could not hear anything. The men on the shore provided other benefits
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though. As stated in the Forced Beaching section, the men could push friendly triremes
back into the water. They could also attack enemy ships that beached near them. This
gave the Syracusans a distinct advantage. The Syracusans controlled a larger section of
the harbour, and based on that information alone, it was more likely that ships would
beach in areas that they control. Since the Syracusans held the mouth of the harbour and
the areas closest to the mouth, and the Athenians only possessed the area farthest from
the mouth of the harbour, some assumptions can be made. The battle began at the mouth
of the harbour where the blockade had been established and the Corinthian, Pythen, was
in position with his triremes and it moved back into the harbour as time progressed
(Thuc. 7.70.2). It was far more likely that ships would beach in areas that were occupied
by Syracusan forces. We can conclude that there was a higher instance of ships beaching
in Syracusan territory, and the advantages that came with this gave the Syracusans an
edge in regard to the outcome of battle.

Unanswered Questions
The Athenian objective, while seemingly clear, was actually quite troublesome
and was never actually spelled out in our sources. At the most basic level, the Athenians
intended to escape the Great Harbour of Syracuse and to come to the port of Catane.
However, what was planned for the troops who remained on the shore at Syracuse? The
distance from Syracuse to Catane is between 60 and 70 kilometers.217 Thus, even at a full
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sailing speed, the journey would take at least 4-5 hours.218 However, when we factor in
the added weight of the extra troops on the deck, the weakened state of the oarsmen, and
the waterlogged ships, the progress would have been much slower. It seems that the best
course of action would be to collect the Athenians on the shore before the triremes left
the Great Harbour, provided that the Athenians did not plan to abandon the troops to a
grizzly fate. To do this successfully, the Athenians would have had to obtain a total
victory. They would have needed to keep as many ships in working order as possible to
transport the troops. They must have hoped to break the blockade and hold the entry of
the harbour open. They must have planned to win a decisive victory and control the entire
harbour which would have allowed ships to come to the Athenian controlled section of
the Great Harbour and load up the troops to sail away.

Conclusion
While one cannot say for certain why the Athenians lost the battle in the Great
Harbour, I believe that using the Face of Battle approach, I have given a reasonable
explanation for the defeat. When the battle ended, the Athenians still had more triremes
than the Syracusans, but the rate of loss was far higher for the Athenian navy. The
Athenians saw that there was no chance to reach the objective of breaking the blockade
and controlling the Great Harbour. If the battle had continued, it is safe to assume that the
Athenians would have been utterly destroyed. Certainly there are many issues that can
never be resolved simply because we do not have the necessary source material. Yet,
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when we bring to bear the knowledge that we have regarding ancient naval warfare, it
becomes clearer how the preeminent navy of Greece was soundly defeated by the
Syracusans. The Athenians were disadvantaged by a few factors. First, the narrow space
of the harbour nullified the superior ability of the Athenian oarsmen. Second, the
Athenians were forced to fight in a manner that went against their standard practice.
Third, the lack of provisions left the Athenians in a weaker state. Fourth, the quick
modifications made by the Syracusans counteracted the Athenian preparations. Finally,
when ships were beached by the enemy, there was a greater chance that a ship would land
on an area of the shore controlled by the Syracusans. When we consider these factors, it
is clear why the Athenians were completely outclassed by the Syracusans.
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Chapter 3: The Athenian Retreat
Οὐδεὶς γὰρ οὕτω ἀνόητός ἐστι ὅστις πόλεμον πρὸ εἰρήνης
αἱρέεται· ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῇ οἱ παῖδες τοὺς πατέρας θάπτουσι,
ἐν δὲ τῷ οἱ πατέρες τοὺς παῖδας (Hdt. 1.87).

Aftermath of the Naval Defeat
The Athenians were utterly demoralized after the crushing victory of the
Syracusans in the Great Harbour. The decision was made to march through the Sicilian
hinterlands (Thuc. 7.72.5).219 However, they did not arrive at this decision easily.
Demosthenes thought it would be best to man the ships immediately and reattempt to
escape the harbour (7.72.3). In Thucydides’ account, Nicias agreed with Demosthenes,
but the troops refused the orders (Thuc. 7.72.4).220
At this point, the Athenian oarsmen were about to mutiny. Jordan argues that the
fleet mutinied, but not the army.221 However, I would think that it would be more than
sailors that were refusing the orders. Since the triremes were packed with hoplites and
light infantry, it stands to reason that these men would be weary of attempting to flee by
ship a second time as well. Ultimately, the threat of a mutiny was enough to convince
Nicias that the soldiers must march inland. Hornblower makes the astute observation that
sailors were considered to be anarchic and prone to mutiny, citing Thuc. 8.84.3, where
Thucydides says the following:
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The multitude of the soldiers, when they saw, just as sailors
(do), they rushed, dashing forth toward Astyochos so as to
throw (missiles at him).222
This suggests that sailors are perceived to be more mutinous than other unit types. This
might, of course, simply reflect the bias of the aristocratic Thucydides against the lowerclass oarsmen. The other issue to consider is that the Athenians were using a multinational force, and thus there are bound to be problems - especially from men who had
lost faith in the Athenian cause and were forced by the Athenians to join the expedition in
the first place. This is also important when we consider the retreat, as some men had
essentially become hostile to the Athenians, and thus would have been less likely to assist
an Athenian when necessary.
The historian, Diodorus, claims that the blockade had been broken, and thus it
was simply a matter of sailing through the harbour and avoiding enemy ships. However,
if the Syracusans saw the Athenians outfitting their ships once again, they would have
certainly followed suit, and the Athenians would have been forced to engage in another
naval battle where the numerical advantage that they previously maintained would have
been largely diminished. The Athenians would have had 60 ships and would have come
against nearly 50 Syracusan triremes. In the Battle in the Great Harbour, the Athenians
had outnumbered the Syracusans 110 to 76 in terms of the number of triremes and were
still soundly beaten. It stands to reason that if another naval battle had ensued, the
Athenians would again have suffered defeat.
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Thuc. 8.84.3 τὸ δὲ πλῆθος τῶν στρατιωτῶν ὡς εἶδον, οἷα δὴ ναῦται, ὥρμησαν ἐκραγέντες ἐπὶ τὸν
Ἀστύοχον ὥστε βάλλειν·
74

The decision to march, however, forced the Athenians to destroy their ships or to
cede them to the Syracusans, which greatly lessened their chances of ever escaping Sicily
and returning to the Greek mainland. The sick and injured begged not to be left behind by
their comrades (Thuc. 7.75.3-4; Plut. Nic. 25.3).223 This fact can help to explain why the
Athenians spent the entire day after the battle at the shore. Men did not want to abandon
their wounded comrades and relatives.224 The issue was that the Athenians could not
afford to carry the wounded for the entire march. As Sternberg notes, their number of
pack animals and carts were likely severely limited because the attack on Sicily began as
a naval expedition.225 Therefore, animals or carts could not really be used to carry the
injured at an acceptable pace, especially when the rough terrain ahead was considered. It
is certainly possible that some of the sick or wounded pushed on and travelled with the
retreating army. Further, the dead were not collected from the harbour (Thuc. 7.75.3;
Plut. Nic. 25.3).226 The standard Greek practice was to send a herald to ask the victors to
allow the defeated to collect their dead (Thuc. 4.44.5).227 A comparison can be made with
this situation and the events at Athens during the plague. Thucydides says:
For, the plague pressing exceedingly heavily, the men
turned themselves toward indifference to religious customs
and sacred things alike, not having control of what would
come to pass. All customs concerning burial which they
used before were thrown into disorder and they buried the
dead as they were able. Many, by lack of necessary (means
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of burial) on account of many of their own that had died
already, turned toward shameful methods of burial. For
having first come toward pyres which belonged to others
who heaped it, they, having placed the corpse of their own
upon (the pyre of another), light it from underneath. Having
cast the body - which they carried - of their own from
above upon the other one that was burning, they departed
(2.52.3).228
Thucydides paints this event at Athens as a disgrace to Athenian moral character. He
notes that people became greedy and dishonourable (Thuc. 2.53.1). It indicates that
improper treatment of corpses was a sign of decline both during the plague and after the
Battle in the Great Harbour. Ultimately, it speaks to the complete demoralization of the
Athenian troops.
Both Thucydides and Diodorus recount that the Athenians delayed their march
due to a trick employed by the Syracusans (Thuc. 7.73.3-4; Diod. 13.18.3-5).229 The
Syracusans, specifically Hermocrates, sent men to the Athenian camp and told them not
to march because the Syracusans were already blocking the roads. Hermocrates had
insisted that the Syracusans begin to fortify the major roads immediately, but his request
was denied with the explanation that the Syracusan soldiers would refuse (Thuc. 7.73.12). We see the Syracusans and Athenians on opposite ends of the spectrum – one group
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Thuc. 2.52.3. ὑπερβιαζομένου γὰρ τοῦ κακοῦ οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὐκ ἔχοντες ὅτι γένωνται, ἐς ὀλιγωρίαν
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drunken with victory, the other group utterly depressed in defeat – but both unwilling to
follow orders. The Athenians were fooled into believing that the men sent by
Hermocrates were friends of Athens and were speaking with the best interest of the
Athenians in mind. In reality, the Syracusans were engaged in a drunken revelry to
celebrate Hercules and also their recent victory in the Great Harbour (Thuc. 7.73.2).
Diodorus claims that the Athenians would have escaped safely had the deceit not taken
place.
This statement may seem exaggerated when we consider some of the factors.
Diodorus states that the Athenians were heading towards Catane, north of Syracuse. In
order to reach Catane, the Athenians would have to march west and then head north
either through or around Monte Climiti to avoid Syracusan detection. If they attempted to
march directly north, the Athenians would pass directly beside Syracuse. The path
directly north would have required a march that is greater than 50km. Can one expect that
the Athenians could have made such a march in the darkness in any reasonable length of
time? The Athenians were hungry, some were sick, and the soldiers were weary from the
naval battle. Xenophon’s Anabasis claims that a march of 360 stades is a three day
journey. Depending on the measurement used, this is roughly 60 km. Thus, an army
would travel around 20 km per day. The Athenians would require 3 days of marching
simply to reach Catane. One would think that the Syracusan cavalry would have been
able to catch up and harass the Athenians long before they could reach their destination.
The Syracusan cavalry could harass the Athenian troops in order to slow their progress.
This would have allowed infantry units to catch up to the fleeing army. While these
factors make it seem unlikely that the Athenians could have avoided the Syracusans
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completely, there are a few reasons why Diodorus may be correct in his claim. First, the
Athenians would have begun their march during the night while the Syracusans were
celebrating in a drunken revel. We know that on the fifth night of the retreat, the
Athenians were able to escape during the night and left the Syracusans completely
unaware. Thus, if the Athenians had left on the evening of the naval battle with due care,
they might have been able to march without Syracusan detection. Further, the geography
of Sicily provides some advantages for the Athenians. If they could have made it to the
Acraean heights, they would have found themselves on a plateau that was difficult for
cavalry to access without traveling far north of Syracuse and then heading east and south.
The Syracusans would have had their speed advantage somewhat negated by this.
Moreover, the Athenians would have become more difficult to track. An early start may
have provided unforeseen advantages in the days to come. As we will see on the first day
of the march when the Athenians came into contact with Syracusan hoplites who had
already drawn up into battle and thus presumably in a phalanx, their progress was
delayed (Thuc. 7.78.3). If the Athenians had left during the night, would they have been
able to bypass this confrontation entirely? To compound matters, the Athenians remained
at the harbour for two more days, which gave the Syracusans time to set up defensive
points along strategic routes. The delay was for a few reasons. While Hermocrates’
successful ruse was what prevented the Athenians from leaving during the night, the
entire next day and evening were wasted by the Athenian army. Thucydides lays out the
issues quite clearly.
First, it is evident that the Athenians feared what was ahead, knowing that the
march would involve fighting their way through Syracusan forces (Thuc. 7.75.4; Plut.
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Nic.26.3), and thus would have had feelings of despair considering how the Syracusans
had completely turned the tides of the war after the arrival of Gylippus. Second, many
soldiers did not want to abandon friends or relatives who were not physically able to join
the retreat (Thuc. 7.75.3-4; Plut. Nic. 26.3). Third, the Athenians were in great need of
food (Thuc 7.75.5; Plut. Nic. 26.3). Thucydides focused on the mourning of the
Athenians in regard to the loss of their comrades (which certainly played a large role in
the collective mental state and furthers Thucydides’ concentration on pathos). However,
the lack of provisions is the most damning for the Athenians. Considering that the
hoplites would have to march in full gear because of the necessity to be prepared for
Syracusan assaults, they would be marching in the hot Syracusan sun, which would
require a great amount of energy, especially when the hoplites had to attack and defend.
Further, the Athenians were forced to watch the Syracusans gather the Athenian ships
(Thuc. 7.74.2), and saw that the corpses of their companions lay unburied on the shore.
Thucydides explains that the Athenians were so distraught by their defeat that they did
not even bother to ask for permission to bury their corpses (Thuc. 7.72.2). Both of these
events would have certainly increased the despair of the army, since the loss of ships
made it clear that the Athenians’ chances of escaping Sicily were limited, and the
unburied dead were an affront to Greek religious sensibilities.

Athenian Troop Numbers
The main point of this section is to gain a better understanding of what the actual
body of men would look like marching through the Sicilian hinterlands. To do this,
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however, we need a solid estimate of the number of hoplites, since the hoplites were the
troops within which the rest of the men were contained. Thucydides writes:
The army marched, ordered in a hollow rectangle, the army
of Nicias leading and the army of Demosthenes following.
The hoplites held the baggage-carriers and the majority of
the throng within (Thuc. 7.78.2).230
The size of the 2 hollow boxes is tied to the body of hoplites which create the ‘outside’ of
the box.
At the beginning of the march, Thucydides claims:
They looked like nothing other than a city either having
been forced to surrender or having retreated, and this was
not a small city, for the number of the whole throng that
was marching was no less than 4 myriads (40 000) (Thuc.
7. 75.5).”231
While Thucydides is rather thorough in terms of the original expeditionary corps sent in
415 BC, he is not straightforward in regard to the number of casualties, the number of
camp followers, the number of slaves, or the number of troops gathered as Athenian allies
in Sicily. Thucydides concerned himself with actual combatants rather than the massive
number of support personnel that would be required to assist the combat force. This has
been an issue that has troubled scholars, and I have attempted to come to a suitable
figure.232 First, it is necessary to tally the number of troops that joined the expedition
according to Thucydides, while subtracting the number of casualties that are provided.
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After this point, all numbers become conjecture, but some estimates can be made. In
Appendix A, I have noted a figure of 34179 men for the retreat plus the uncounted light
armed troops , hoplites, cooks, masons, carpenters, merchant ship crews, merchants and
traders that may have become trapped with the Athenians, minus the unaccounted
number of light armed and cavalrymen casualties, deserters, captives and deaths caused
by illness. Of course, large amounts of conjecture are required. However, many scholars
fail to include the vast number of men required to support such a large body of troops. It
seems quite possible that the number of troops could have ranged between 30 and 40
thousand.
To begin, even in the most recent commentary on book VII of Thucydides, 233
there is no attempt to include the number of men for the 130 ships and the uncounted
merchant ships that sail with the expedition (Thuc. 6.44.1). The crews of the ships as well
as the cooks, masons and carpenters must be included. While certainly most merchants
would have left long before the situation became so dire, it is possible that some
merchants remained stuck with the Athenians and were forced into the retreat.
Second, the number of slave runaways seems to be exaggerated. Thucydides says
that attendants had abandoned the Athenians before the Battle in the Great Harbour, and
the majority after the defeat (Thuc. 75.5). However, there are no clear numbers for
desertions. Moreover, Thucydides’ account can be interpreted to mean that the majority
of those who deserted left at this time (during or after the naval defeat), not necessarily
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that the majority of attendants had fled. It is clear that hoplites and cavalry still had slaves
since directly before mentioning the desertions, Thucydides reports that:
The hoplites and cavalrymen, contrary to their custom,
(carried) their own food, some for lack of attendants, and
others for distrust of their attendants. (Thuc. 7.75.5)234
Thus, it is clear that some hoplites and cavalry men still had attendants. I would assume
that many of the slaves that fled had been owned by hoplites who died in the Battle in the
Great Harbour or who were engaged in the naval battle. During this time, the slave could
have planned his escape and ran away. However, the Athenians still had many hoplites on
the shore, and these men would have certainly tried to prevent their own slaves from
abandoning them, and might also have helped to prevent the slaves of others from
fleeing. It is apparent that nearly every hoplite would have travelled with at least one
slave in order to carry his arms.235 Thucydides (3.17.3) says that each hoplite in the
garrison at Potidaea was paid two drachmae; one for himself and one for his servant. This
suggests that each hoplite had an attendant and this was standard Athenian practice. If
each hoplite and cavalryman had an attendant on the Sicilian Expedition, there would be
more than 10000 slaves in Sicily, and it is very difficult to believe that the vast majority
of these slaves completely disappeared from the Athenian camp.

236

Further, trierarchs,

being of the Athenian elite, would certainly have had a slave and likely more than one
slave.
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Thuc. 7.75.5. οἱ ὁπλῖται καὶ οἱ ἱππῆς παρὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς αὐτοὶ τὰ σφέτερα αὐτῶν σιτία ὑπὸ τοῖς ὅπλοις, οἱ
μὲν ἀπορίᾳ ἀκολούθων, οἱ δὲ ἀπιστίᾳ·
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Another issue with the troop estimate is the argument in regard to exactly how
many men could fit on either a fast trireme or a troop trireme. The general argument is
that troop-carrying triremes were probably triremes that were undermanned in terms of
rowers.
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I agree with this idea. Beloch believed that these triremes would have used 60

oarsmen. I argue that 62 oarsmen would have been used (a full set of thranitai), and in
this way, the top level of the hull would have been filled with rowers who would have
been able to see the water. The estimated number of hoplites that could have been carried
on these troop carrying transports varies from 30238 to 85239 to 100240 men. If the trireme
was only manned by thranitai as oarsmen, there would have been 108 available seats
inside the trireme alone.
I think the one issue with these interpretations in regard to the Sicilian Expedition
is that scholars would like to have every man seated comfortably. The Athenian objective
was not to sail in comfort, but rather to get as many boots on the ground in Sicily as
possible. Thus, it would be reasonable to have men on the deck that were not part of the
standard crew. There were already 10 hoplite marines who were stationed on the deck at
all times, so it is certainly feasible that other hoplites could have shared this burden.
Further, other soldiers could have been sent on some of the other 130 ploia that sailed
along with the triremes (Thuc. 6.44.1). Hornblower claims that 40 000 is “close to the
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maximum which could have been conveyed on the 220 or so triremes”241 However, this
fails to account for the allies gathered in Italy and Sicily and also he does not seem to
include the vast number of deck crews that were involved. Essentially, each ship had 16
men that are not accounted for by Hornblower.242 I would think that even the fast trireme
with a full complement of oarsmen (170), would still have added hoplites on the deck.
There is no reason why each trireme could not have been carrying around 250 men
(either citizens or slaves). This is likely how many men were on the ships in the Battle in
the Great Harbour, and that was with the expectation of being rammed. When the
Athenians were sailing to Sicily, they traveled near to the coasts in order to avoid rough
waters. Thus, they sailed north up the eastern side of the Adriatic Sea, then west to the
western side of the Adriatic Sea. Then, they would have sailed down the east coast of
Italy in order to arrive at Sicily. Thus, the chances of men falling off the ship were quite
low. Further, when we consider the attendants of the hoplites, there is no way that all of
these men could have been sailing in comfort. Ultimately, I conclude that when we
attempt to account for all of the variables, the total number of the men involved in the
march could indeed have been between 30000 and 40000 men.243
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Logistics of the March
How are we to imagine the sight of such a massive force wandering through the
roads and fields of Sicily? First, it is necessary to reflect on standard Greek marching
procedure in order to see how the Athenian marching formation differed. Generally, the
Greeks kept their forces split by unit type.244 However, what troops were in the van and
in the rear was dependent upon the situation. For night marches, the troops tended to be
organized from slowest to fastest, in which case, the hoplites would have led.245 In any
situation, regardless of what troops led the army, baggage carriers tended to be kept
between formations of armed men.246 In the Athenian retreat, we are dealing with a mob
that was larger than the citizen population of most Greek poleis. The force was composed
of hoplites, bowmen, slingers, javelin men, oarsmen and other naval units, slaves, and
other miscellaneous units such as cooks and masons. When the Athenians were marching
without fear of attack, the soldiers would have traveled in a loose formation that still
allowed for quick maneuvering into a defensive formation. Thus, the largely unarmed
oarsmen, other naval units, and slaves (baggage carriers) would have marched in a box of
hoplites. This was standard military practice, where the weaker troops were surrounded
by the stronger troops (Thuc. 7.77.2). Brasidas, in 423 BC, was the first general to use
this formation (at least in out written records).247 Brasidas placed the hoplites on the
outside of the box with his light armed troops within the box. He then had his youngest
and fastest men charge out at the enemy when the enemy neared the ranks (Thuc.
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4.125.2-3). Any hoplite was a stronger soldier, as he was one of the few with proper arms
and armour. Much like Brasidas, the Athenians would certainly have kept their light
armed troops closest to the hoplites with the rest of the throng enclosed within the box
formation. The other men had limited or no protection and had to rely on the hoplites for
their safety.
The army was split into two contingents; the van led by Nicias and the rear
headed by Demosthenes. However, this formation was not conducive to fighting against
cavalrymen armed with javelins (or in fact any highly maneuverable troops armed with
missiles) since it was difficult for the hoplites to engage with these fast moving troops.
On the other hand, it was much better than marching in a thin column or having the men
split up by unit type. In that case, the baggage carriers could have been targeted and
harassed, making survival even more difficult. While the danger of quick javelin
throwers, slingers, and archers is apparent for a squadron of heavy armoured hoplites (as
the Spartans learn at Leuctra in 372BC), it is especially apparent in an army that was
largely composed of men with improper defensive equipment. Javelins that were thrown
over the heads of the defending hoplites would wreak havoc on the men in the centre of
the box formation.
First, we must consider the number of hoplites that were involved in the march.
Overall, 10950 hoplites joined the expedition along with an unspecified number of
Thourian and Corcyrean hoplites and Sicel infantry.248 Using Ray’s numbers, 3375

248

See Appendix A
86

hoplites were killed in land engagements.249 In the first 3 naval battles of the war, if we
assume that the 10 epibatai were killed on each ship that was destroyed, 280 men were
lost.250 However, in the Battle in the Great Harbour, if we suppose that there were 40
hoplites upon each ship and every hoplite on a destroyed ship was slain, there would have
been 2000 Athenian hoplite casualties.251 There were also an unspecified number of
casualties caused by illness. In terms of the numbers however, there were 5655 hoplite
deaths.
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Thus, the Athenians would have been marching with roughly 5295 hoplites.

Now, since these men were said to have formed two boxes, if each box employed the
same number of hoplites, the number can be cut in half, with one half representing one
hollow box. Thus, each box was composed of roughly 2647 hoplites. If I use the lower
estimate of total troops on the march, there were 30000 men. Now, the number of
hoplites must be subtracted, leaving 24705 men inside the boxes. Demosthenes had a
greater number of men in his formation (Thuc. 7.80.4), so it is possible that Nicias’
contingent had roughly 11500 troops while Demosthenes’ formation held the rest. If the
box is imagined to be 100 men wide, some assumptions can be supposed.
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For Nicias’

group, his 11500 miscellaneous troops would have taken up exactly 125 rows.254 It is
likely that the entirety of the box would have had hoplites stacked a few men deep. I am
going to suppose that the Athenians would have kept 8 rows of hoplites at the front and
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rear.255 Thus, in each box, 1600 hoplites can be counted in the front and rear. This still
left roughly 1000 hoplites to cover the flanks of the box. If the sides were also covered by
4 columns of hoplites, the men in the middle would have had uniform coverage (as it
would require about 1000 men to cover the 125 rows of men). Now, if we assume during
normal marching that the men kept roughly two metres of both breadth and depth
between them, each box would have been roughly 200 metres wide.256 In terms of depth,
Nicias’ contingent would have been roughly 282 metres in length. Demosthenes, on the
other hand, needed to fit 13205 non-hoplites in his formation. Again, the width of the box
would have probably been 100 men with 2 metres of breadth between each one. The
depth of the formation would have probably included 8 rows of hoplites at the front, 8
rows of hoplites at the back and roughly 144 rows of men inside the box. Demosthenes’
box would have needed 1152 hoplites to guard the side, which would have left him about
100 men short of uniform coverage. Demosthenes’ contingent would have thus been
roughly 200 metres wide by 320 metres deep. Once a threat was perceived, each box
would have closed in a way that would leave 1 metre of space in circumference around
each man. Thus, each box was effectively cut in half. Thus, each box would have been
roughly 100 metres wide. Nicias’ formation would have been 141 metres deep and
Demosthenes’ would have been 160 metres deep. What I have described is one
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possibility. Since Thucydides and our other sources do not provide any specific
information regarding either the width or the length of the boxes, this is strictly a
conjecture. Ray believes that the two boxes combined would cover roughly 1km while
marching.257 Imagining any sense of normal military order seems useless given the
Athenian situation. At this point, the Athenians were simply trying to survive, so the box
formations should be viewed as more of a mob than a disciplined military unit. Either
way, such a vast mass of men would have been an impressive and intimidating sight.
How much food and water would have been required to nourish the retreating
army? Ultimately, each man would have probably required roughly 2 litres of water per
day in order to prevent dehydration. Thus, between 60 and 80 000 litres of water would
have been consumed by the army on a daily basis. Water could be gathered at the rivers
that the Athenians often pass (Anapus, Cacyparis), and also collected during the rain.
The amount of food required is a little bit tricky. Given the lack of supplies, the
Athenians would likely be marching on a starvation diet. I think the amount of food
offered by the Syracusans in the stone quarries is a good starting point. In the quarries,
each man was given a pint of grain per day (Thuc.7.87.2). This seems to be the absolute
minimal amount required. Thus, the Athenian army would consume 30 to 40000 pints of
grain per day at the very minimum. When the Spartans were captured at Sphacteria, they
were given 2 quarts (4 pints) of food per day (Thuc. 5.15.1). I think the Athenian diet
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would be somewhere between these numbers. Food would be collected by foraging and
by requisitioning supplies from houses and farms in Sicily.

Syracusan Strategy
For the Syracusans, the main goal was to either destroy or capture the Athenians.
However, the latter was preferred because, in this way, they would encounter less risk
and would profit from selling captives. In order to achieve this, the Syracusans simply
needed to hinder the Athenians from reaching their destination through both shows of
force and general harassment. The desired effect was to delay the Athenians until the
point of starvation so that they would surrender. In this way, the Syracusans could obtain
victory at low risk to their own lives. The Syracusans could not leave the Athenians to
their own devices since this would have put their city in danger. If the Athenians arrived
at a friendly polis, such as Catane, they could have potentially resupplied and attempted
to besiege the Syracusans once again. Seeing how the Syracusans had been nearly forced
to capitulate before the arrival of Gylippus because of the Athenian siege, the Syracusans
must have realized that it was not in their best interest to allow a massive group of
enemies to wander throughout Sicily. Thus, the only real options for the Syracusans were
either to destroy the Athenian army or to force it to surrender. In terms of a cost-benefit
analysis, the hardships and loss of life for the Syracusans would be greater bear if they
were forced to engage with a refreshed Athenian coalition. Keeping these general
strategies in mind, I will now lay out the essentials of land combat.
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Essentials of Land Combat
In this section, I shall provide the information that is necessary to understand the
engagements that take place during the Athenian retreat. Therefore, I intend to focus on
the general equipment and tactics of hoplites, cavalry, and missile troops. Furthermore, I
aim to elucidate the concerns that both armies would have in the current situation.

Hoplites
The hoplite panoply generally consisted of a breastplate, helmet, greaves, a spear,
a shield, and a short sword.258 The actual make-up of the panoply differed in practice.
Since hoplites were required to purchase their own gear, there would have certainly been
differences in quality.259 The breastplate could be composed of either bronze, leather, or
linen reinforced with leather and hides.260 The bronze breastplate was created by making
a front half and a back half and then binding these two pieces together.261 The breastplate
provided suitable protection of the chest and stomach - and in some variations the groin but seems to have left the neck largely exposed.262 The purely bronze breastplate could
have weighed over 15 kg depending on the materials added to reinforce the bronze.263
Not only was this cumbersome, but it caused increased heat in the summer and decreased
warmth in the winter.264 On the other hand, the bronze breastplate was essentially
impenetrable by any weapons employed on the battle field when we assume a thickness
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of 2mm.265 Since the other breastplates were made of materials that decompose, it is
impossible to know accurately the weight or protective capacity. However, it is safe to
assume that the leather and linen cuirasses weighed less but provided less protection.
The hoplite shield (the hoplon or aspis) was a circular shield roughly 1m in
diameter.266 The shield was made of thin wooden planks that were lathed and bound.267
The wood was generally covered with a thin layer of bronze (ca. 0.5 mm) in order to
prevent the wood from splitting.268 Moreover, the bronze was effective for both stopping
and deflecting arrows, especially with the concave nature of the shield. Much like the
breastplate, the hoplon was basically impossible to pierce with conventional Greek
weaponry.269 The soldier rested the shield on his arm and shoulder through two bands of
bronze.270 One band was placed in the middle (porpax) while the other was placed on the
far right (antilabe) of the shield in order to maximize control.271 The shield likely
weighed between 8 or 9 kg.272
The helmet was made of bronze.273 Some helmets provided some protection for
the sides of the neck and face (such as the Corinthian helmet),274 while others were more
like a metal cap (such as the Spartan pilos).275 The roundness of the helmet caused
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weapons to glance off, and thus, the helmet did not need to be as thick as the breastplate.
The helmet weighed between 1 and 2 kg.276
The greaves weighed between 1.2 and 2.2 kg.277 The bronze was so thin that it
was simply bent and placed around the shin with no need for binding.278 Some greaves
only covered the shins while others covered the knees as well.279 The flanges of the
greave would nearly meet at the back of the calf.280
The main offensive weapon of the hoplite was the spear (dory).281 It had a spear
head and a butt spike.282 In this way, if one side of the spear were to shatter, the spear
could simply be turned and used. Spears seem to have ranged from 6-10 feet283 and
weighed less than 2.5 kg.284 The spear could be wielded in either an overhand or
underhand fashion.285 Performing an underhanded stab provided less force, but the area
of unprotected flesh was larger.286 The attacker would have attempted to pierce the
enemy in the thigh or groin. This injury could very quickly lead to death. 287 An overhand
thruster would have tried to stab the enemy in the neck, which would have certainly been
fatal.288
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A hoplite also carried a small sword used for slashing.289 The sword would have
been used if the hoplite lost or broke his spear. A sword-wielding hoplite would have
been at a great disadvantage against a man with a spear which had a much greater range.
One can see that the hoplite presented a nearly impenetrable front. However, the
flanks and the backs of the hoplite provided larger areas of flesh to attack. Further, the
weight290 of the hoplite armour made the hoplite incredibly slow in comparison to light
armoured troops and also impeded his maneuverability. Thus, during the general
harassments that took place during the Athenian march, the hoplites were most effective
in providing defense by use of their shield, but in terms of offense, failed to impact the
enemy in any meaningful way.
A scholarly debate rages regarding the fighting style of the Classical hoplite
formation. The traditional orthodoxy has been that the hoplites fought in an extremely
close formation with shields nearly touching or overlapping which essentially created an
impenetrable wall of shields.291 However, this description of combat has come under
attack by scholars such as Hans van Wees, who questions how these mechanics could
actually work while providing sufficient room for the hoplites to wield their weapons
effectively.292 In the traditional view, hoplite battles were largely decided by the
‘othismos’ (shoving).293 Here, the hoplites in close formation would push with their
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shields against the back of the man in front of them and try to push the enemy back and
break their balance, eventually forcing the enemy to retreat.294 Van Wees questions this
with a few observations. First, he wonders how a deep formation could ever have been
defeated by a shallow formation.295 If the shoving was the most important aspect of a
hoplite battle, then the side with the greatest mass would always have had more force and
thus would have been able to push the enemy army with ease. The Thebans used
formations that ranged between 25 and 50 men deep.296 If this is the case, then how could
they be defeated by Spartans in a rank that was 12 shields deep?297 On the other hand,
why would a deep formation be used at all? Since the men in the backs of the ranks
would have been essentially useless in battle, it makes sense that they would have been
pushing the men in front of them.
Goldsworthy argues that the use of deep formations was mainly for marching
purposes.298 He argues that a shallow formation would have covered exceptionally wide
tracts of land that would have negatively affected the phalanx’s attempt to march at the
same pace.299 On the other hand, the use of deep formations could also have been used
for intimidation purposes. A long column of hoplites might seem impenetrable to the
enemy, and thus, have a psychological factor. Hanson, in The Western Way of War,
concludes that the concavity of the hoplite shield was conducive to the idea of shoving
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the enemy army.300 Goldsworthy rebuts this by stating that the Macedonians did not use
these concave shields. However, Polybius states that the back ranks in these armies
pushed (Plb. 18.30.4).301 Krentz concludes that the term ‘othismos’ is taken too literally
and should be considered more metaphorical in sense.302 Goldsworthy also argues that
the ‘pushing’ of the rear rank should be regarded as a use of force to keep the weaker
forces in the middle from attempting to flee the battle.303
Recently, Matthew has argued that the stance of the hoplite should not be thought
of facing forwards or sideways, but rather, standing at a 45 degree angle. In this way, he
is able to strike a middle ground between scholars who favour the ‘othismos’ and those
who prefer the looser formation.
For the Athenian retreat, it is apparent that both interpretations of hoplite warfare
could apply. The Athenians used a tight formation and the men in the back rows of the
phalanx provided psychological ‘weight’. The battles could have certainly ended in a
shoving match. However, in the beginning of combat, enough room must have been
provided for the hoplites to wield their weapons freely in the first 4 ranks. Athenians
would have used the phalanx to force fords and in the attempt to break through the
Syracusan defences at the Acraean Heights.

300

Hanson (1989), 66.
Goldsworthy (1997), 12.
302
Krentz (1985), 55.
303
Goldsworthy (1997), 12-13.
301

96

Cavalry
Horses seem not to have been used as a primary fighting force, but rather in
support roles such as scouting, attacking flanks, pursuing fleeing hoplites, protecting their
own hoplites while in retreat and harassing marching columns. This is largely because a
cavalry rush against a line of prepared hoplites would have ended in disaster for the
cavalry.304 A phalanx was equivalent to a line of pike men during the medieval period.
Further, a horse would have instinctively avoided charging into a solid phalanx as John
Keegan has argued convincingly in regard to the Battle of Agincourt in AD 1415.305
Nevertheless, cavalry remained effective for attacking the flanks of an enemy as well as
for pursuing fleeing combatants.
First, it is necessary to note the importance of cavalry in terms of the geography
of Sicily. While the centre and northeast of Sicily are largely mountainous, the remainder
of the island is filled with large plains.306 These areas were conducive to the fast
movement afforded by horses. Thus, cavalry did not need be forced into narrow passages
or rocky crags, but rather, could engage the enemy on smooth ground and used to their
full advantage. However, “hilly or rough ground had the potential either to damage the
horse or to reduce the security of the rider’s seat.” 307
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The ancient Greek horse was protected by light cloth over the face, thighs, and
chest.308 There were no stirrups,309 so the rider could not use a lance or stand up for
greater leverage when hurling projectiles.310 Further, in antiquity, horses were not shoed.
Xenophon recommended that a horse trainer has the equine step on small rocks to round
the hooves (Xen. Cav. 1.16). However, like modern horse-riding, the ancient horse was
outfitted with a saddle, albeit made of cloth.311
The rider wore a helmet, a breastplate, and knee-high boots.312 The cavalryman
forwent a shield, but carried a sword, a spear, and javelins.313 The shield, being between 7
and 9 kg, would likely have made it too difficult for a soldier to be able effectively to
employ their weapons while also controlling the reins. The lack of stirrups compounded
this issue since it required greater leg strength in order to maintain balance. The javelin
could be used as a missile weapon, while the cavalryman also had a shorter spear to use
as a lance.314 However, when using a spear as a lance, the rider had to let go of the spear
upon impact in order to prevent himself from falling off of his own horse due to the
impact. This was because of the lack of stirrups which would have allowed the rider to
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remain firmly in place. The sword was meant for close-quarters combat, where the rider
could slash an enemy from the flank or from behind.315
Rarely, Greek armies contained horse archers.316 One can imagine the difficulty
of attempting to draw a bow and fire an arrow accurately while riding a horse without
stirrups. Only a highly trained horseman would have been capable of such a feat unless
the horse came to a complete stop, which is unlikely. Halting the horse would have made
the cavalry an easier target as well.
While pursuing the Athenians through Sicily, the Syracusan cavalry excelled at
the harassment of Athenian forces. Since each cavalry unit only had a few javelins, their
main effect was the causation of panic and delay since they were not able to attack the
Athenians head-on and could not cause mass casualties owing to their limited projectiles.
Further, cavalry was highly effective in terms of preventing the Athenians from
foraging.317 The Athenians could not split into small gathering parties because of the
threat of cavalry (Thuc. 7.78.7). Small groups out of formation would be cut down by
cavalry. Those who fell behind the main group of Athenians would also suffer a cruel fate
at the hands of the cavalry. Thus, the Athenians were forced to remain in a relatively
close formation. This in turn, made it difficult for the army to feed itself and allowed the
Syracusans to easily keep track of the enemy.
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The Syracusans maintained roughly 1200 cavalry units,318 but none of our sources
state how many cavalrymen would be sent out on these missions. Regardless, we know
that the Syracusans were able to keep the Athenians at bay in Catane by the mere threat
of the cavalry during the early stages of the war.319 It was only through trickery (and by
sea) that the Athenians were able to approach the city of Syracuse (Thuc. 6.64.1).
Later, the Athenians were sent 250 cavalrymen from Athens as well as money to
purchase horses in Sicily (Thuc. 6.94.4).320 The Athenians managed to acquire between
600 and 800 horses.321
At this point in Greek history, the effective use of horses in combat had not quite
been perfected. While the Thessalians had been effectively training cavalrymen and
employing them in combat,322 the rest of Greece was using horses as either defensive
troops, as flanking troops, or as pursuers of routed hoplites.323 Therefore, cavalry usually
remained to the sides of the hoplite battle lines in order to protect their own flanks.
During combat, the side with the superior cavalry (or any cavalry) could attack the flanks
of hoplites that had engaged.324 Finally, if the enemy hoplites were routed, the cavalry
would be used to chase them down quickly and either capture or slaughter fleeing troops.
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The Syracusan cavalry, like that of most other Greek poleis, probably tended to
use rectangular formations both while marching325 and while fighting.326 Depending on
the space available, the Syracusans would use an 8 X 10 or a 16 X 5 formation.327 A
squadron leader marched in front of the rectangle in both formations. The 8 X 10
formation would have had three file leaders in a row at the front of the column of the
formation and a troop leader would be adjacent to him.328 From the 8 X 10 formation, the
squadron could quickly form into the 16 X 5 formation where the section leaders would
move up to the front of a column and alternate with the file leaders.329 The 16 X 5
formation would have taken up roughly 31 yards in length and 27 yards of depth,
allowing nearly 6 feet for each horse in width and slightly more than 16 feet per horse in
terms of depth.330 Conversely, the 8 X 10 formation would have taken up roughly 47 feet
in width and 162 feet in depth.331 Here, we see that these cavalry squadrons were more
malleable than hoplite formations and could quickly change their positioning as the
situation required.332
Not only were the horses more flexible than the hoplites in terms of formation,
but also in combat as they possessed both missiles and hand-to-hand weapons.333 For
cavalry charges at the flanks, the Syracusans would have wanted to use the wider
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formation in order to cause as much chaos and damage in the enemy units. Further, the
formation had less depth, and the horses in the back rows would not have been able to
force themselves against the enemy flanks anyways. When marching, the shorter width
was preferable, so that the horses could march on the roads. When the cavalry squadrons
would reach the Athenians during the march, it seems that they would have broken
formation in order to attack from all angles. Upon hurling their javelins, they would have
retreated into a standard formation. Our sources do not mention the Athenian cavalry
during the march. It is possible that the Athenians ate the horses owing to their lack of
provisions.
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This suggests that cavalry numbers were so few as to be ineffective in

combat. In the grand scheme of Classical Greek warfare, the cavalry must be regarded as
an afterthought for most Greek poleis. The main focus of combat was the hoplite.

Peltasts
The peltast was a javelin throwing soldier.335 He was named after his shield, the
pelte.336 The pelte was a crescent shaped shield of Thracian origin that was likely
composed of wicker covered with skins.337 While this shield did not provide the level of
protection provided by the hoplon, it did not have the same function. The hoplon had to
contend with both hurled weapons, the thrusts of opposing hoplites, and pushing. The
peltast, as an auxiliary troop meant for harassment and ambushes, was not meant to come
into direct hand to hand combat with the enemy (though some did carry a small sword in
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case of such a circumstance).338 Thus, the shield was meant to deflect missiles, of which
it was surely capable. The advantage of this smaller shield was that it was lighter than a
hoplon which allowed the peltast greater mobility. The greater speed of the peltast
ensured that he could avoid direct conflict with the superior armoured hoplites.
The peltast spear had a throwing strap which gave a hurled spear better accuracy
and power owing to the spin provided.339 Generally, the peltast would have carried two
javelins. 340 However, in the Syracusan assault on Athenian troops, I would conjecture
that the peltasts carried more spears or perhaps slaves would have been used to carry
more spears so that the peltast could have carried on an assault for a greater amount of
time.
Peltasts, like the cavalry, tended to stay at the flanks or rear of the hoplite
phalanx. They usually skirmished with their opponents while both phalanxes
deployed.
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Peltasts, while obviously not as fast as cavalry, held some advantages. First,

the peltast was not inhibited by rough terrain.342 As we will see in the Battle at the
Acraean Bald, the peltasts were able to harass the Athenians from high above on a
rock.343 Second, a horseman was at the will of the horse. A horse might react
unexpectedly to various stimuli that would not have hindered a peltast with complete
bodily autonomy. The modus operandi of the peltast was to assault the enemy quickly
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and - if the enemy approached – to retreat. When the enemy hoplites stopped the chase
and began to withdraw, the peltast moved in to attack again.344 Thus, like cavalry, these
troops excelled at harassment and demoralization.
Ultimately, the peltast could not stand toe to toe with the hoplite, and thus the
tactics of the peltast reflected this. Since the peltast was the only unit other than the
hoplite that carried a shield, it was likely that the peltast would have marched directly
behind and beside the hoplites in the Athenians’ hollow box formation that they
employed during the retreat because the Athenians would have positioned the box from
the most well-protected men to the least protected men in the middle.

Archers
The archer was a light armoured soldier and possibly wore no armour at all.
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The necessity of using two hands to draw and fire a bow meant that the Greek archer did
not carry a shield. However, the use of tension in the bow permitted a greater effective
range than that of the peltast’s javelin and thus he stood further away from the enemy.
Therefore, the archer did not require the same protection as a peltast. Like the peltast and
cavalry, the archer did not fight with hoplites head on. The shield and armour available to
the hoplite made it difficult for an enemy arrow to be lethal. Instead, the archer attacked
the flanks of a hoplite formation. Upon the approach of the enemy, the archer retreated
and attacked when the enemy turned away in the same manner as the peltast. Another
major use of archery was to combat other missile troops. The archer could fire an arrow
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up to 150 m,346 which was certainly farther than a peltast could hurl a javelin. However,
the lack of a shield or armour made the archer susceptible to other archers and of course
any other missile troop provided that the enemy could bring within range of the bowman.
Also, archers were especially vulnerable to cavalry. The Greek archer used a composite
bow.347 Composite bows are easily damaged by submersion which could be a factor when
the Athenians crossed fords.348 An issue that arose for both the peltasts and archers (at
least on the Athenian side) was that there was a limit as to how many projectiles were
available for use. Eventually, the men would run out of arrows and become another
unarmed unit during the Athenian march.

Slingers
The sling consisted of a leather pouch attached to two strings made of sinew on
either side.349 The slinger loaded a projectile which could be a ball of lead or a rock or
even clay.350 Then, the slinger held both strings and spun the pouch horizontally.351 When
the slinger was ready, he let go of one of the strings and the projectile was hurled a great
distance owing to the momentum acquired by the spinning of the pouch.352 It is claimed
that a trained slinger could hurl a projectile farther than an archer could fire an arrow
(200 m vs. 150 m).353 The slinger could not engage hoplites from the front. Thus, the
slinger was another harassment soldier who engaged the enemy in the same way as
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archers. The slinger needed a greater amount of space than the other missile troops in
order to use his sling properly so that he did not injure his own men.354 The advantage of
the sling was its simplicity. Ammunition could be acquired nearly anywhere. So, unlike
the cavalry and the other missile troops, the slinger could maintain an assault for as long
as necessary.

Non-Military Forces of the Athenians
The unarmed men in the Athenian retreat includes slaves, oarsmen who were
unable to arm themselves with any weapon, cooks, masons, carpenters, and men who
played a role on the ships that were unnecessary for infantry combat such as the
deckhands and the keleustes. These men would have had little or no protection and would
have had to rely on the other forces for their safety. However, this does not imply that
they had no way to attack. They could gather rocks and hurl them at the enemy, much
like the deckhands would in a naval battle.355 A large number of this group would have
essentially been carriers of supplies. However, by this point there were little provisions to
be carried. As Thucydides states, these men were kept within a box formed by the
hoplites (Thuc. 7.78.2). This way, the Athenians could keep their supplies safe from
cavalry harassment. The major issue with such a large body of men who did not
necessarily contribute to the Athenian advance was their use of resources on the march.
The men needed to eat, and those who could not contribute offensively simply became a
hindrance to the overall survival of the force.
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The Athenian March
The Athenian march took place over 8 days (Thuc. 7.75-86), ending with the
complete surrender of all Athenian forces who had survived the persistent attacks during
the march and the slaughter at the River Assinarus. In the ensuing sections, I, following
Thucydides, separate the narrative in terms of daily events,356 starting with the affairs
immediately following the defeat of the Athenians and their allies in the Battle in the
Great Harbour.
Diodorus merely summarizes the march (13.19.1-3). He notes that the Athenians
were attempting to reach Catane. He claims that the Syracusans harassed the Athenians
over three days and successfully blocked a direct route toward Catane. This slightly
contradicts Thucydides, wherein the Athenians attempted the direct route to Catane on
the fourth day and a slightly less direct route on the fifth day. Similarly, Plutarch gives
scant details regarding the march (27.1-5); however, this is reasonable given that his topic
was the life of Nicias. Thus, Plutarch focuses on the energy displayed by Nicias at the
beginning of the march in order to give confidence to his troops (26.4-6). Then, he states
how the Athenians were constantly assaulted (27.1). His main attention is placed on the
eventual surrender of Nicias (27.3-5), which he suggests was caused by of the surrender
of Demosthenes (27.1-2). Notable differences in accounts will be noted in the appropriate
sections of this thesis as those differences arise.
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Day One
On the first day of the march, which was the second day after the Battle in the
Great Harbour, the Athenians began the march from the western side of the harbour,
heading west.357 The army was extremely disheartened by the recent setbacks. The men
were roused by a speech from Nicias (Thuc. 7.77). In the speech, Nicias argued that the
situation could not possibly get any worse, for the gods must take pity on the Athenians
(Thuc. 7.77.3).358 He also claimed that the Sicels had been contacted (likely by cavalry)
and told to meet the Athenians with supplies (Thuc. 7.77.6). This is the first time that it is
mentioned that another group had already been contacted to resupply the Athenians. The
last instance of the Athenians sending messages to Sicilian allies was to tell the men of
Catane before the eclipse not to bring further provisions because the Athenians would
have already departed (Thuc. 7.50.2). Athenian food supply was limited and was carried
by the baggage handlers in the middle of the hollow box formations made by the
Athenian hoplites (Thuc. 7.78.2). Contrary to standard practice, some hoplites and
cavalry carried their own provisions, which Thucydides claims was because the hoplites
and cavalry were lacking attendants, or the baggage carriers were not to be trusted (Thuc.
7.75.5). This is because the Athenians had lost many servants through desertion during
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the campaign, but especially after their defeat in the Great Harbour (Thuc. 7.75.5).359
Thus, the cavalry and hoplites did not want to entrust their minimal supplies to a person
who may very well have abandoned them and took their provisions. It is reminiscent of
the breakdown of morale after the defeat at the Great Harbour. While some men on the
shore ran to help their comrades, others simply ran to the remainder of the Athenian wall.
These men, according to Thucydides, were only thinking of themselves (Thuc. 7.71.6). In
the present situation, essentially, every man was thinking only of himself, and this was
dangerous for an army that had to act as a cohesive unit. Further, this lack of trust in the
army was damaging to morale and overall performance. Xenophon states that:
A disorderly army…is most confused and easiest to master
for enemies and most useless and inglorious thing for
friends to witness – donkey, hoplite, baggage carrier, lightarmed troop, cavalry, and chariot together – for how could
they march, if they should hinder each other in this way,
one walking while another runs, one running while another
stands still, chariot interfering with cavalry, ass with
chariot, baggage carrier with hoplite? (Xen. Oec. 8.4)360
Distrust and animosity in the ranks of the army could have startling repercussions for
both the speed in which the army could travel, and even their effectiveness in combat.
Moreover, there was another complication posed by a lack of trust for attendants or a lack
of attendants in general. If a hoplite was forced to carry his own gear, he could be
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carrying up to 31 kg of gear for the entire day.361 However, with this mass of men, it was
pertinent that the Athenians eventually foraged for resources.
Thucydides reports that the Athenian army came into contact with the enemy at
the Anapus river (Thuc. 7.78.3), which was directly west from the Athenian camp. Here,
a minor skirmish ensued. If Thucydides’ distances are accurate, the point of contact must
have been at or near the modern ponte di Capocorso, which crosses the Anapus river
about 6 km from Syracuse.362 Since the Syracusans were forced to consider many
possible trajectories for the Athenian forces, they had to split their troops up in order to
guard the various passageways. However, it would have required a massive force to
defeat the Athenian army completely because it was so large. This Syracusan detachment
had to fulfill two functions.
The first purpose was to provide intelligence for the Syracusans in order to predict
the intended path that would be taken by the Athenians. This would give the Syracusans
the opportunity to shift troops to areas where they would be more effective. The second
was to slow down the Athenian march by forcing them to engage.
This would allow the Syracusan cavalry and light armed troops to catch up to
them. Thucydides summarizes the battle in a single line, saying “having routed them
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(Syracusans) and having held sway over the ford, they marched forth (Thuc. 7.78.3),”363
so it seems that the Syracusan resistance was easily countered. Perhaps the Syracusans
were routed without even fighting, given that the vast numbers of Athenians made the
resistance futile. Regardless, the presence of Syracusan troops would have given the
Athenians pause and slowed their march. Having crossed the river, the Athenians were
assaulted by Syracusan cavalry and light infantry (Thuc. 7.78.3). This would be the
modus operandi of the Syracusans for the majority of the march. It seems likely that the
Syracusans who had been guarding the river crossing sent a messenger to inform the
other Syracusan troops where the Athenians were located. Then the Syracusans hurried to
that location in order to harass the Athenians. We are given some information in other
sections of Thucydides’ work about how the light infantry engaged the enemy in these
situations. Narrating a battle between the Aetolians and the Athenians in 426 BC, he says:
They (The Aetolians) withdrew a little and stationed
themselves upon a hill above the city, for the city was on a
high spot, about 80 stades away from the sea. The
Aetolians (who were already near to Aegytion, having
come to their aid), running down from the hills from one
place or another, struck against the Athenians and their
allies and they hurled javelins, and when the infantry of the
Athenians would come upon them, they retired, but when
the Athenians withdrew, they attacked. The battle was such
for a long time – pursuit and withdraw, and in both
pursuing and withdrawing, the Athenians were the weaker
party. But as long as the Athenian archers had arrows and
were able to use them, they withstood (for the Aetolian
men, being light armed, withdrew when being shot at with
arrows. When the captain of the archers was slain, the
archers dispersed, but the soldiers were worn out,
struggling for a long time with the same exertion and the
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τρεψάμενοι αὐτοὺς καὶ κρατήσαντες τοῦ πόρου ἐχώρουν ἐς τὸ πρόσθεν·
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Aetolians pressed hard and threw many javelins at them, in
this way, the Athenians fled. Having been routed, and
falling into gullies without outlet, and into the regions of
which they were inexperienced, they perished… The
Aetolians, hurling javelins, seizing many men in the rout on
foot and the Aetolians being swift-footed and light armed
destroyed the Athenians utterly (Thuc. 3.97.2-98.2).364
The engagements with the light infantry during the retreat seem to have followed this
same pattern. The men would approach the Athenian hoplites, hurl their weapons and
retreat if they were approached. Once the Athenian pursuers attempted to return to their
ranks, they would be harassed again. A similar event occurred in 425 BC at Sphacteria,
but this time, the Athenians were on the winning side and the Spartans were
overwhelmed by missiles (Thuc. 4.32.2-35.1).
Thucydides and the other historians do not tell us exactly how these skirmishes
unfolded in regard to the cavalry, but we can make some assumptions based on our
knowledge of Greek military tactics. Thucydides notes:
Syracusans, riding alongside, and the light infantry, hurling
javelins at them, pressed them hard (Thuc. 7.78.3).365
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τοξάρχου ἀποθανόντος οὗτοι διεσκεδάσθησαν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐκεκμήκεσαν καὶ ἐπὶ πολὺ τῷ αὐτῷ πόνῳ
ξυνεχόμενοι, οἵ τε Αἰτωλοὶ ἐνέκειντο καὶ ἐσηκόντιζον, οὕτω δὴ τραπόμενοι ἔφευγον, καὶ ἐσπίπτοντες ἔς τε
χαράδρας ἀνεκβάτους καὶ χωρία ὧν οὐκ ἦσαν ἔμπειροι διεφθείροντο· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἡγεμὼν αὐτοῖς τῶν ὁδῶν
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κατὰ πόδας αἱροῦντες ἄνθρωποι ποδώκεις καὶ ψιλοὶ διέφθειρον.
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The Syracusan cavalry would break from their standard formations (an 8 X 10 or 16 X 5
rectangle) and form in a line. Upon the approach of the enemy, the Athenian hoplites
would gather closely in order to provide as much protection with their shields as possible,
both for themselves and their comrades.366 Meanwhile, the Athenian light infantry would
hurl their weapons from within the ranks in an attempt to cause casualties on the
Syracusan side. The less disciplined of the hoplites might step forward and attempt to
engage the light infantry or cavalry. This would have been advantageous for the
Syracusans. The Athenian hoplite simply could not match the speed of the Syracusan
light armed troops or cavalry. When the Athenians broke their ranks in order to chase the
light infantry or cavalry, it was possible for the Syracusan light armed troops and cavalry
to pick off the men who had become separated from the main mass of troops. Since the
Athenians were being assaulted from every side, both confusion and panic would have
taken hold. Inexperienced hoplites would have had great difficulty in holding their
position. The Syracusan cavalry and light infantry could not expect to cause massive
casualties among the Athenians. For certain, many projectiles would miss their mark or
be blocked by the shield of a hoplite. Further, the number of missiles that each man had
was limited,367 so the offensive could only be maintained for a short time, but many light
wounds would have resulted regardless.
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However, it seems unlikely that the march comes to a complete halt. Instead, the marching becomes
slower as the Athenians become bunched together. I posit that Thucydides would mention if the army
completely stopped, since he says this when Demosthenes makes his final stand on the sixth day of the
march (Thuc. 7.81.4).
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And yet, these harassments allowed the Syracusans to control the pace and
direction of the Athenian march, while also demoralizing the Athenians. The only way
for the Athenians to avoid confrontation with the cavalry was to travel into rocky regions
which were not suitable for horses.368 This would not prevent the assault from light
infantry, but the lack of cavalry support would have made such an attack manageable for
the Athenians and riskier for the Syracusans. The lack of horseshoes made the movement
of cavalry troublesome on uneven terrain.
Thucydides informs us that the Athenians managed to travel 40 stades (between
5.2 and 6.8 km)369 and encamped on a hill (Thuc. 7.78.4). Presumably, this was a hill that
was not suitable for cavalry to climb and was easily defensible. The camp was almost
certainly protected by palisades built upon arrival.370 We can infer from other instances
that building palisades was common practice. The Athenians built similar defences in a
few places; at their camp at Catane (Thuc. 6.64), and in front of their ships (Thuc. 7.38.2
and again 7.53.1).371 It seems that these palisades would have been carried during the
march and quite possibly taken from their fortifications at the Great Harbour.

Day Two
On the second day, the Athenians continued their march beginning early in the
morning (Thuc. 7.78.4). The Athenians were granted a reprieve since the Syracusans
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chose not to confront them, but instead had decided to forge ahead in order to make a
wall within the upcoming pass at the Acraean Bald (Thuc. 7.78.5). Thus, the Athenians
were able to take the time to gather supplies which they required from the houses in the
area (Thuc. 7.78.4). This suggests that the Athenians both foraged in farmers’ fields and
took food from the houses in the area. The Athenians seem to have picked this area for
encampment because of the houses and farms that would provide easy access to
provisions. Therefore, the Athenians were reenergized to some degree. They had
collected water from the river which would prevent dehydration in the blazing Sicilian
sun (Thuc. 7.78.4). Meanwhile, the Syracusans were fortifying the pass at the Acraean
heights (Thuc. 7.78.5). We are told that the Athenians had travelled 20 stadia (2.6 to 3.4
km) (Thuc. 7.78.4). Green suggests a location for the camp roughly 3km NNE from
modern Floridia based around the Anapus River in a valley.372 Directly north of the
Athenian position was a pass through a mountain (the Acraean Bald). This pass was the
next objective for the Athenians. If the Athenians could travel through the pass, they
would arrive on a plateau that would allow them to march without cavalry harassment
since the ancient cavalry had much difficulty moving on rough terrain.373 While this
would not grant complete safety for the troops, it would greatly increase their chances of
arriving at Catane,374 since the army would only have to contend with Syracusan hoplites
and light armed troops.
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Day Three
The location of the ‘Acraean Bald’ has been a matter of scholarly debate.
However, the reigning communis opinio is now that this site is on the southwest side of
Monte Climiti.375
Earlier, many scholars felt that the Acraean Bald must refer to an area that is near
modern Acrae, 20 km west of Syracuse.376 However, there is nothing in the area that
accurately represents the topographical requirements as set forth by Thucydides.377
According to Thucydides, the area in question had a steep hill with a ravine on either side
of the hill (Thuc. 7.78.5). Second, the distance required to reach Acrae is too far to be
consistent with Thucydides’ narrative. At this point, the Athenians had travelled 10.2 km
at the absolute maximum378 which is roughly 10 km short of Acrae. Monte Climiti on the
other hand is 12.8 km northwest of Syracuse.379 When we consider that the Athenians
first headed almost directly west and then north, the distances stated by Thucydides are
essentially accurate. Thus, Green’s finding is the most likely candidate for the Acraean
Bald. Green has identified the pass as Cava Castelluccio.380 One problem with this
identification is that it seems to contradict Thucydides’ statement that the army was
marching in the direction of Camarina and Gela (Thuc. 7.80.2). While Gela is almost
exactly west of Syracuse, Camarina is southwest of Syracuse. After the failure to take the
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pass, the Athenians, according to Thucydides, decided to march in the opposite direction.
Thucydides continues with the following sentence:
ἦν δὲ ἡ ξύμπασα ὁδὸς αὕτη οὐκ ἐπὶ Κατάνης τῷ
στρατεύματι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ἕτερον μέρος τῆς Σικελίας τὸ
πρὸς Καμάριναν καὶ Γέλαν καὶ τὰς ταύτῃ πόλεις καὶ
Ἑλληνίδας καὶ βαρβάρους.
The entire way for the army was not [no longer] toward
Catane, but rather toward the other part of Sicily, toward
Camarina and Gela and to cities either Greek or Barbarian
(Thuc. 7.80.2).381
Many scholars have taken this sentence as an explanation of the previous line of march
(i.e. the original objective of the march was toward Camarina and Gela).

382

Their

interpretation of this sentence rests largely on the meaning of ‘οὐκ’. We would expect
‘οὐκέτι’ to give a meaning of ‘no longer’. However, just before this, Thucydides employs
the word ‘μηκέτι’ and thus the ‘οὐκ’ used here is meant to be inferred from the earlier
line as meaning ‘no longer’.
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The original plan, had the Athenians won the Battle in the

Great Harbour, was to head to Catane (Thuc. 7.60.2), so it would be bizarre if the plans
for the land march had changed and Thucydides did not inform the reader. When the
Athenians later attempted to avoid the pass at the Acraean Bald and to go around Monte
Climiti, they would have essentially been heading west.384 The interesting implication of
Green’s finding that the Acraean Bald is Monte Climiti is the confirmation that the
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original goal of the Athenian march was to reach Catane, as Diodorus states (Diod.
13.18.6).
This raises the question as to where the Sicels were to whom Nicias had sent a
message. It is possible that these Sicels were people that were living south of Leontini in
the mountainous regions rather than peoples living further east near Gela. While the
attempt to force a way through the pass was daring and bold, the potential reward was
huge. The Syracusan cavalry would have been rendered ineffective and the territory on
the plateau above contained Sicels who were hostile to Syracuse.385 It would become
difficult for the Syracusans to maintain their assault on the Athenians and their allies.
They most certainly would not have had the freedom to harass the Athenians and control
their movements without their cavalry.
On the third day of the march, the Athenians headed toward the pass. First, the
Athenians had to cross the Anapus where there is a ford directly at the elbow of the
river.386 While crossing, the Syracusans set upon them with their standard tactics. The
Syracusan cavalry and light armoured troops rushed alongside the Athenian columns
while hurling javelins into the ranks (Thuc. 7.78.6-7). Since the Syracusans had a full day
to prepare themselves for the Athenians, their assault was far fiercer than at the river
during the first day of the march and probably included a greater number of both cavalry
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and light armed units.387 The Athenians were contending with a flurry of missiles while
attempting to march into the pass. Casualties were certainly high, and only the most
battle-hardened troops would be able to maintain their composure under such
circumstances. Eventually the Athenians gave up and retreated to their camp from the
previous day (Thuc. 7.78.7). The Athenians failed to even make it into the pass where the
Syracusans’ main defensive position was located and, thus, where the staunchest
resistance would have been found. This suggests that the Athenians had little chance of
actually breaking through the ravine, given that the Syracusans had built fortifications
which the Athenians would have struggled to dislodge. This setback must have been
devastating for the Athenians. Not only would the Syracusans have been able to send
more forces into the area to assist with the defence, but it forced the Athenians to use up
their recently acquired provisions without traveling farther. Thucydides claims that the
Syracusan cavalry made it unsafe for the any Athenian troops to split from the main body
of the army to forage for food (Thuc. 7.78.6).

Day Four
On the fourth day of the march, the Athenians attempted to force the pass again
(Thuc. 7.79.1). One must question the decision of Nicias and Demosthenes. Considering
that the army had been forced to retreat before even entering the ravine on the day before,
it seemed nearly suicidal to try the same tactic a second time. It suggests that the benefit
of making it to the plateau in order to avoid enemy cavalry and reach Catane was so
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important that it seemed worth every sacrifice. The level of desperation in the Athenian
camp must have been at its utmost. To further complicate matters, Gylippus was
marching with troops toward the Athenian rear.388 If Gylippus could make his way
around behind the Athenians, not only would the Athenians be effectively surrounded,
they would also have to enter into a hoplite engagement with enemy troops on both sides.
The Athenian march passed through the valley with little incident and climbed up
the pass. Here, they encountered Syracusan hoplites protected by a make-shift wall
(Thuc. 7.79.1). Given that the troops were in a ravine, it is likely that the wall was
composed of rocks stacked upon one another. The wall would have been high enough to
make it difficult to step over, but low enough that the Syracusans could still use their
spears and shields efficiently.389 Since the Athenians were coming from below, the wall
was valuable for protecting the feet and legs of the Syracusan hoplites. The narrowness of
the ravine allowed the Syracusans to be stacked many shields deep, making it even more
troublesome for the Athenians to eject them (Thuc. 7.79.1-2).390 The Athenian hoplites
would have marched into the ravine while the camp followers stayed near the entrance
with a rear guard of hoplites to protect them from potential attacks.391 Further, the rear
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guard prevented the front-line men from becoming trapped in the ravine and crushed on
both sides.392
When the Athenians had travelled a fair distance into the pass and began to
engage with the Syracusan hoplites, the trap was sprung. Light infantry such as slingers
and archers appeared from the heights above the ravine and began to pelt the Athenian
army relentlessly (Thuc. 7.79.2). The height advantage and proximity to the enemy
presented the opportunity for the Syracusan missile infantry to bombard the Athenians
ruthlessly with great accuracy and with impunity. It was not impossible that the
Athenians would have succeeded in this battle had it not been for the missile infantry of
the Syracusans. The Athenians had proven themselves to be superior to the Syracusans in
hoplite warfare in the earlier stages of the war.393 However, in the current situation, the
Athenian hoplites were simply overwhelmed by missile infantry, and the use of the stone
wall cemented the Syracusans in position. The Athenians in the first two or three rows
were holding their shields in front desperately trying to dislodge the Syracusans from
their position. Those in the rear must have been holding their shields above their heads in
order to defend against the shower of missiles. It was unlikely that even the most well
trained troops could have prevented themselves from panicking. Again, casualties on that
day must have been extraordinarily high. What is more - albeit a more gory detail - troops
that were killed or otherwise wounded would quite possibly have fallen into the men
behind them, causing these soldiers to lose their balance. At this point, while the
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Athenians were withdrawing, it began to rain (Thuc. 7.79.3). Thucydides relates that the
soldiers became even more depressed (Thuc. 7.79.3). However, the rain provided both an
advantage and a disadvantage. On the one hand, it allowed the Athenians to collect water
in pots or possibly helmets, which would have allowed the men to quench their thirst. On
the other hand, the muddy ground would have made marching more difficult, and wet
feet could cause ailments for the men. Eventually the Athenians again retreated a short
distance (Thuc. 7.79.2), probably just outside the pass in order to rest and regain their
composure. At this point, Gylippus arrived from the rear with a small party and attempted
to build a wall in order to shut in the Athenians (Thuc. 7.79.4). The rear guard of the
Athenians (which, like the front-lines of a hoplite army, held experienced troops) moved
quickly to prevent this from happening (Thuc. 7.79.4). Again, the Athenians retreated to
level plains and encamped for the evening (Thuc. 7.79.5).

Day Five
Nicias was still set on making it to Catane, but decided to take a slightly different
approach. Instead of marching into the same pass and ending up in the same quagmire as
on the day before, he decided to march northeast, south of Monte Climiti, but north of the
Anapus River in a northwest direction.394 Here, the land is very flat and thus an ideal
location for cavalry attacks.395 The Athenians must have been trying to find another way
to gain access to the plateaus above. The Athenians began their march in the morning,
and again the Syracusans assaulted them from all sides with cavalry and missile troops
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(Thuc. 7.79.5). On this day, the Syracusans were particularly elusive. Thucydides relates
that whenever the Athenians advanced against the enemy, the enemy retreated, but when
they went to return to the main army, they were again attacked (Thuc. 7.79.5). Gylippus
focused especially on the rear of the enemy in hopes that he could capture Athenian
supplies, pick off stragglers, and create panic throughout the entire army (Thuc. 7.79.5).
The army stopped their march after 5 or 6 stadia (less than a kilometer) (Thuc. 7.79.6).
The Syracusans withdrew to their own camps as well (Thuc. 7.79.6). The Syracusan
withdrawal allowed the Athenians to perform a trick that would help them escape from
their current situation (Thuc. 7.80.1).
Nicias and Demosthenes decided that it was no longer feasible to travel to
Catane.
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In order to escape under the cover of night and without arousing suspicion, the

Athenians kindled many fires in their camps (Thuc.7.80.1). The Syracusans would
certainly have kept watch on the Athenian camp from a distance, so a lack of fire or noise
in the camp would have caused the Syracusans to investigate and to find that the
Athenians had left. Ray makes the reasonable suggestion that some men were left behind
to stoke the fires and to create noise that would suggest that the Athenians were still
encamped.397 Thucydides points out that there were many injured men in the Athenian
camp (Thuc.7.80.1). Much like the men who were left behind after the battle in the Great
Harbour, it seems reasonable that those who were too injured to keep pace with the army
would have been abandoned. These men would then have been useful to carry out the
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illusion that the entire Athenian army was remaining in the camp.398 Either, the men
stoking the fires would have left before daybreak and escaped or were captured, or, more
likely, they remained in the camp and were eventually killed or taken prisoner by the
Syracusans. If they managed to flee and were never caught, they might have very well
have made it to safety in Catane or in some other friendly territory. This is probably
wishful thinking. If the soldiers in the camp were too injured to travel with the Athenians,
it is unlikely they would have been able flee very far. This is especially clear given that
the 300 men who rushed away on the night of the seventh day of the march were caught
by the Syracusans the next evening (Thuc. 7.85.2). However, Thucydides says that many
men who had fled both during the retreat and also after being in a state of servitude,
found refuge in Catane (Thuc. 7.85.4). Therefore, there is the possibility, albeit unlikely,
that some of the men who were stoking fires on the Athenian camp evaded the
Syracusans and eventually reached Catane. On the other hand, if they were captured,
either away from the camp or in the camp itself, they would have likely been taken as
private slaves. Some would have been sold for profit while others would have been kept.
Of course, this is simply conjecture since Thucydides does not mention if men were even
left at the camp, but the ability to successfully carry out the ruse and the mention of the
injured men suggests that some men likely remained in the camp. Regardless, the main
body of the army marched out of the camp late at night.

398

Ray (2009), 231.
124

Day Six
The Athenians changed their direction. Instead of heading northwest, the troops
headed in a southeast direction. The exact course is difficult to determine, but Thucydides
provides some geographical features that allow us to get a general idea of the path taken.
The army marched out in their customary two groups with Nicias in the van and
Demosthenes commanding the rear (Thuc. 7.80.4). The march was taking place during
the night, and the columns became separated (Thuc. 7.80.4). Earlier in Thucydides, we
learn of the mass confusion that took place when the Athenians attempted to seize the
heights of Epipolae at night (Thuc. 7.43). Demosthenes was delayed because he had
inferior troops as well as injured soldiers traveling in his column.399 What is more, the
food and water supplies of the men were low, so the soldiers were not properly fed
(Thuc.7.80.1). It had been 4 days since the Athenians had resupplied their rations from
the farms and houses on the second day of the march. Also, because the army was
marching during the night, the Athenians were deprived of sleep. All of these factors
would have had a negative effect on the marching speed of the troops. The columns
marched back across the Anapus and likely travelled back southeast. The path likely
started north of modern Floridia, and led down the Strada Monesteri to the Strada
Spinagallo and passed through modern Cassibile. Thucydides claims that the men
reached the sea (Thuc. 7.80.5), which must mean just south of Syracuse, and they
followed the ‘Elorine Road’ (Thuc. 7.80.5), which still exists today. Thus, the men would
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have marched south toward the Cacyparis river (modern Cassibile),400 which is just under
2 km north of modern Gallina. Here, at dawn, Nicias’ troops encountered a Syracusan
guard blocking a ford (Thuc.7.80.6). The Syracusan guard had made a wall and a palisade
(Thuc.7.80.5). The palisade, in Greek fashion, probably consisted of large wooden stakes
that were placed slightly apart, while the wall was probably a short stone wall like the
Syracusans employed at the Acraean Bald. Thucydides summarizes the battle in 3
words,401 and thus it is likely that Athenians and Syracusan casualties were low and more
in line with a minor skirmish. The Athenian troops likely uprooted the stakes of the
palisade and quickly assaulted the Syracusan guard. The vast number of Athenians
overwhelmed the Syracusans quickly and forced them to retreat. Following the Cacyparis
River inland, the Athenians continued to head south. Thucydides says that this is because
the guides told them to take this route (Thuc.7.80.7). Hornblower wonders if the guides
were intentionally misleading the Athenians, or if there was another reason for this choice
of direction.402 Going south would have made the Athenians miss the meeting spot with
the native Sicels,403 which went against the Athenian plans. Green theorizes that Athenian
scouts had informed the Athenians that the path ahead (along the Cacyparis River) was
heavily guarded;404 however, there is no information in Thucydides to suggest that this
was the case. On the other hand, it is likely that the Syracusans would have guarded the
routes along this river in order to intercept the Athenians from combining forces with
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native Sicels.405 Of course, the guides might have simply known an easier way to travel
to their intended location either in terms of geography, or in terms of food and water that
could be found along the route.
At this point, the Syracusans awoke near Cava Castelluccio and realized that the
Athenians had already left the camp (Thuc.7.81.1). Gylippus was accused of purposely
allowing the Athenians to escape (Thuc.7.81.1), which probably delayed matters further.
The Syracusans followed the route that the Athenians had taken (Thuc.7.81.1).
Thucydides relates that the Syracusans were able to catch up to Demosthenes’ rear guard
by dinner time which is a testament to the speed of the Syracusan vanguard.
(Thuc.7.81.1).
Thucydides claims that Nicias’ column was about 50 stades ahead of
Demosthenes’ unit (Thuc.7.81.3). While this seems exaggerated, and De Voto would like
to read 30 stades,406 the distance is plausible. Nicias’ army would have been between 6.5
km and 8.5 km ahead of Demosthenes. This suggests that Demosthenes’ troops were
either of a much lower quality than Nicias’ or that Demosthenes was simply ineffective at
keeping his troops on the move or perhaps the men in Demosthenes’ contingent were
more tired or encumbered. If we assume that at this point, Nicias’ troops had crossed the
river Erineus and were waiting for Demosthenes’ troops to arrive at their new
encampment, the distance between the two armies would mean that Demosthenes’ army
was around Gallina.
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When the Syracusans approached the rear of Demosthenes’ column, Demosthenes
decided that it was best to make a stand rather than attempt to march while being
assaulted as the Athenians had been on several occasions during the retreat (Thuc.7.81.4).
407

Demosthenes positioned his army in a walled area within an olive grove

(Thuc.7.81.4). It is said that this was the estate of Polyzelus at some time in the past
(Plut. Nic. 27.1).408 If we consider the area to the direct east of modern Gallina, there are
a large number of olive trees still standing today.409 It is likely that this was the place of
battle and it strengthens the argument that Nicias’ troops were in fact 50 stades ahead.
The walls and the trees would have helped Demosthenes’ men avoid projectiles from the
Syracusans. Regardless, the Athenians could only try to hold their ground and to protect
themselves. Slowly, casualties would have started to mount. The Syracusans avoided a
direct assault and instead surrounded the walls and hurled missiles at Demosthenes’ men
(Thuc.7.81.5). The Syracusans would have employed both cavalry and light infantry to
carry out this assault.
After the Athenians had become wearied from the attack, Gylippus attempted to
break the army apart. He offered the islanders (the allies of the Athenians who were from
the islands in the Aegean Sea) freedom if they were to come over to the Syracusan side
(Thuc.7.82.1). Surprisingly, only a few states abandoned the Athenians (Thuc.7.82.1).
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When we consider that many Sicilians left after the defeat of the Great Harbour, it
suggests that the islanders did not trust Gylippus, especially since they were starving,
sick, and tired. On the other hand, it is possible that the islanders maintained a great level
of loyalty to the Athenians. A more cynical explanation is that the islanders did not defect
from the Athenians out of fear. If word were to get to Athens that certain subject states
betrayed the Athenians, the Athenians may have exacted vengeance on these islands.410 I
think the reactions of the various islanders would have followed one of these lines of
thinking.
Soon after, Demosthenes succeeded in gaining a conditional surrender under the
terms that if the Athenians and their allies should give up their arms, then no man in
Demosthenes’ army would suffer death by violence or imprisonment or by deprivation of
the bare necessities of life (Thuc.7.82.2). Gylippus agreed to these terms (Thuc.7.82.2),
but these conditions were not satisfied by the Syracusans. The Athenians placed all of
their money in overturned shields (Thuc.7.82.3), and were marched back to Syracuse
(Thuc.7.82.3) on the Elorine Road. Thucydides says that 6000 men were captured by the
Syracusans on this day (Thuc.7.82.3). Meanwhile, Nicias’ army encamped on a hill just
south of the Erineus (Thuc.7.82.3), (likely a river just north of the Fiume di Noto).411
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This is hardly unreasonable given the manner in which the Athenians had treated the Melians in 416BC,
where all men were put to death and the rest of the population was sold into slavery. The Athenians voted
to do the same to the Mytilenians in 429 BC but the Athenians had a change of heart the next day. The
Athenians sent to carry out the punishment were stopped just before they were to perform the executions.
411
Green (1970), 330, on the other hand argues that the Erineus is in fact the modern Fiume di Noto.
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Day Seven
On the seventh day of the march, the Syracusans managed to catch up to Nicias’
troops (Thuc.7.83.1). The Syracusans informed Nicias that Demosthenes had already
surrendered (Thuc.7.83.1). Nicias was in disbelief and obtained a truce so that he could
send a cavalryman to confirm the surrender (Thuc.7.83.1). When the messenger returned
and affirmed that Demosthenes’ men had capitulated, Nicias attempted to negotiate a
conditional surrender under quite unrealistic terms for his men (Thuc.7.83.2). Nicias
requested that his army be allowed their freedom, and in return he would have the
Athenians reimburse the Syracusans for every talent they had spent on the war
(Thuc.7.83.2). As collateral, Nicias would provide hostages, one man for each talent
owed to Syracuse (Thuc.7.83.2). Not surprisingly, the terms were rejected by Gylippus
and the Syracusans (Thuc.7.83.2).412 Gylippus might have been against the terms because
they conceded no benefit to the Spartans. Further, many battle-hardened soldiers would
have returned to Athens who would have been able to continue to wage war against the
Spartans on mainland Greece. The Syracusans likely rejected the conditions owing to
their enmity with the Athenians and would accept nothing less than a complete surrender.
Further, the Syracusans might have been suspicious that they would ever actually be paid
if they allowed the Athenians to leave freely. The Athenians had left many wounded
behind after the battle in the Great Harbour, so there was also the chance that the
Athenians would – in a similar way – abandon the hostages to their death and refuse to
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This is completely reasonable on the part of Gylippus. Nicias’ suggestion does not provide enough
collateral for the Syracusans. For Nicias’ treaty to work, he would have to exchange enough men so that if
the Athenians were to fail to pay, then the Syracusans could sell the captives into slavery in order to
recover their debts. Further, the Syracusans could instead capture an even greater number of men. In that
way, they could recover the costs of the war and possibly make a profit.
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pay. Ultimately, the best Nicias could hope for was the same treatment that Demosthenes
had received, and thus his offer must have seemed insulting to the Syracusans. When the
conditions were rejected, battle commenced (Thuc.7.83.2).
Unlike Demosthenes’ army, Nicias’ men had at least had some rest, but were
certainly weary owing to the lack of provisions. Moreover, unlike Demosthenes, Nicias
did not make a final stand, but decided to keep marching at all costs until the Athenians
could reach safety. Nicias’ men were of higher quality than Demosthenes’, and thus it
would take a greater amount of effort to force them to surrender. The Syracusans hurled
projectiles at the Athenians from all sides, while the Athenians continued to march
(Thuc.7.83.2). While the panic in the Athenian ranks would have been high, casualties
probably remained low, as the Athenians had become used to Syracusan tactics at this
point and they would have concerned themselves with their own defence by creating a
wall of shields rather than trying to launch an offensive. Eventually, the Syracusans gave
up the attack and retreated for the evening. Nicias attempted to use the same ruse as he
had on the fifth night of the march by escaping the area during the night (Thuc.7.83.4).
However, the Syracusans had been keeping an eye on the Athenian camp and
immediately raised the paean for battle when they witnessed the Athenians preparing to
march (Thuc.7.83.4). The Athenians, realizing that the plan would fail, dropped their
arms and returned to camp (Thuc.7.83.5). Three hundred men of the Athenians did not
put down their arms and fled, forcing their way through the guards (Thuc.7.83.5). These
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men were rounded up the next day and taken into captivity.413 The Athenians and
Syracusans rested in preparation for the next day.

Day Eight
Nicias’ army continued to march south under constant missile harassment from
the Syracusans (Thuc.7.84.1). The Athenians eventually reached the river Assinarus
(Thuc.7.84.2). The identification of this river has been troublesome. The most obvious
explanation is that the river Assinarus is the modern Asinaro, yet Green proposed that the
river changed its name and that the Assinarus River is the modern Tellaro River. Pais
points out that the locals of Noto call the Tellaro River the Attidatu and believes that this
is a corruption of Assinarus.414 This is not a satisfying conclusion.415 Today, the River
Asinaro is also called the Fiume di Noto,416 and must be the Assinarus. However, there
are a few other possible explanations.
The first is that Thucydides’ distances are incorrect, and Nicias’ army was not 50
stades ahead of Demosthenes’ troops. The second is that Thucydides measurements are
correct, and Demosthenes’ troops had yet to cross the Cacyparis and the estate of
Polyzelus was farther north. The third option is that the Erineus was a waterway that no
longer exists in its expected form. What is attractive about this hypothesis is that we
know that the Athenians were desperate for water when they reached the Assinarus River.

413

A nice narrative technique employed by Thucydides. Instead of mentioning straightaway that the 300
men were captured, he gives the reader hope that these men may have successfully escaped and only later
does he mention their capture as an afterthought.
414
Pais (1894), 225. This is also the feeling of Green who surveyed the areas of the march in Sicily.
415
Hornblower (2010), 729.
416
Hornblower (2010), 729.
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If the Erineus River was the modern Asinaro, it seems that the Athenians would have
been able to resupply their water, since this is a rather large waterway. However, if the
Erineus was a waterway that does not have a heavy flow, it would explain why the
Athenians were so overcome by thirst. Dover has identified the Erineus as the ‘Cava
Mammaledi’ but he notes that there are no less than seven possible candidates that could
be the Erineus.417 However, this is an issue that cannot easily be settled. I would like to
argue the most obvious solution that the Assinarus is in fact the modern Asinaro (Fiume
di Noto). Another possibility is that the Erineus was very close to the Assinarus (within a
kilometre) so in this way, the distance mentioned by Thucydides would still be accurate.
We have seen that under heavy assault, the Athenians failed to make much progress. For
example, on the fifth day of the retreat, the Athenians failed to travel more than a
kilometer. To conclude this discussion, the modern Asinaro makes the most sense of
being the Assinarus based on the name. However, in order to vindicate Thucydides’
explanation, we must assume that the Erineus was a river that was near the Assinarus and
no longer exists in any noteworthy form today. For the rest of these events, when I refer
to the Assinarus River, I will be speaking of the modern Asinaro rather than the Tellaro.
It is unfortunate that Thucydides does not give the reader the marching distance for the
day, as this would easily resolve this issue. For example, if Thucydides noted that Nicias’
army had travelled 5 km over day 7 and 8, we could be sure that the Assinarus was in fact
the modern Tellaro. Unfortunately, this problem must be left to conjecture.

417

Gomme (1970), 456.
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Regardless, the Athenians continued to march, having defied the expectations of
the Syracusans. The Athenians approached the River Assinarus, and here we see how
great the desperation of the Athenian really was. Thucydides narrates it as follows:

418

And the Athenians pressed hard toward the Assinarus
River, partly because being constrained on all sides from
the assault of many cavalry and of another mob of soldiers,
partly from their distress and their yearning to drink, they
think that it would be somewhat easier for them if they
should cross the river. When they come upon it, they rush
upon the river, no longer in order, but rather, everyone was
wishing for himself to be the first to cross and now the
enemy, pressing upon them, was making it difficult for
them to cross. For since they were being forced to advance
crowded together, they fell upon one another and were
trampled underfoot. Some were destroyed straightaway,
transfixed by their own spears and equipment and others,
having become entangled, were swept down the river. The
Syracusans, having stood on the other bank of the river
(which was precipitous), from above, struck the Athenians;
many of whom were greedily drinking and were in disorder
in the hollow riverbed. And the Peloponnesians, going
down against them, slaughtered them, especially those in
the river. The water was spoiled straightaway, but they
were drinking the water not at all less, and though it had
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Many have questioned how realistic this passage is. Thucydides seems to be exaggerating the brutality
of the slaughter. Pseudo-Longinus in On the Sublime, claims that this is a narrative technique by
Thucydides and has little to do with the actual reality. Instead, he uses this passage as an example of
hyperbole (38.3). Of course, Thucydides may be relying on eye witness testimony of captured Athenians
who managed to return to Athens. If this is the case, Thucydides account may be truthful, but based on the
exaggerations of another party. It is certainly not impossible that the events that Thucydides describes are
accurate. In the dash to the river hoplites may have fallen and gored themselves on their own spears,
especially given that the hoplite’s spear had a point on both ends. We should not read the account as
completely false. However, the suggestion that many men were accidentally killing themselves by falling
on their own weapons is likely exaggerated, but quite possibly some men did. Connor (2004) sees echoes of
Orphic fragments in regard to the thirst for water. Hornblower (2010), 734 states that Thucydides account
should not be dismissed as narrative flourishing. Plutarch’s account tones down Thucydides narrative.
Though far less vivid than Thucydides’ report, it provides a more reasonable narrative that shows no signs
of hyperbole (Plut. 27.3-4).
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become bloodied and loaded with mud, it was being fought
over by most (Thuc. 7.84.2-5). 419
Here, Thucydides clearly outlines the effect of dehydration on the Athenian soldiers
(Thuc. 7.84.2). They failed to defend adequately themselves in any serious manner while
being heavily assaulted by Syracusan missile infantry (Thuc. 7.84.4). Thucydides says
that the corpses of Athenian men were heaped upon one another in the river (Thuc.
7.85.1), while others who managed to cross the river were cut down swiftly by the
Syracusan cavalry waiting on the opposite bank (Thuc. 7.85.1). The width of the ford
must have been quite narrow, and this is why the Athenians became so heaped together,
for if they were to go out of the shallows, they were swept away by the current. At this
point, witnessing such carnage, Nicias was willing to surrender in order to stop the
slaughter (Thuc. 7.85.1). Nicias chose to surrender himself to Gylippus, apparently
trusting him more than the Syracusans (Thuc. 7.85.1). This was because he felt that
Gylippus would be less harsh with him because he was the man who procured the peace
with the Spartans in 421 BC and helped to release Spartan prisoners at Sphacteria (Thuc.
7.86.4). Nicias told Gylippus to do with him what he wished, but to stop the killing of his
men (Thuc. 7.85.1). Many Athenians and their allies were taken as private slaves (Thuc.
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Thuc. 7.84.2-5. καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἠπείγοντο πρὸς τὸν Ἀσσίναρον ποταμόν, ἅμα μὲν βιαζόμενοι ὑπὸ τῆς
πανταχόθεν προσβολῆς ἱππέων τε πολλῶν καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου ὄχλου, οἰόμενοι ῥᾷόν τι σφίσιν ἔσεσθαι, ἢν
διαβῶσι τὸν ποταμόν, ἅμα δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ταλαιπωρίας καὶ τοῦ πιεῖν ἐπιθυμίᾳ. ὡς δὲ γίγνονται ἐπ' αὐτῷ,
ἐσπίπτουσιν οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ ἔτι, ἀλλὰ πᾶς τέ τις διαβῆναι αὐτὸς πρῶτος βουλόμενος καὶ οἱ πολέμιοι
ἐπικείμενοι χαλεπὴν ἤδη τὴν διάβασιν ἐποίουν· ἁθρόοι γὰρ ἀναγκαζόμενοι χωρεῖν ἐπέπιπτόν τε ἀλλήλοις
καὶ κατεπάτουν, περί τε τοῖς δορατίοις καὶ σκεύεσιν οἱ μὲν εὐθὺς διεφθείροντο, οἱ δὲ ἐμπαλασσόμενοι
κατέρρεον. ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ θάτερά τε τοῦ ποταμοῦ παραστάντες οἱ Συρακόσιοι (ἦν δὲ κρημνῶδες) ἔβαλλον
ἄνωθεν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, πίνοντάς τε τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀσμένους καὶ ἐν κοίλῳ ὄντι τῷ ποταμῷ ἐν σφίσιν
αὐτοῖς ταραςσομένους. οἵ τε Πελοποννήσιοι ἐπικαταβάντες τοὺς ἐν τῷ ποταμῷ μάλιστα ἔσφαζον. καὶ τὸ
ὕδωρ εὐθὺς διέφθαρτο, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἧσσον ἐπίνετό τε ὁμοῦ τῷ πηλῷ ᾑματωμένον καὶ περιμάχητον ἦν τοῖς
πολλοῖς.
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7.85.4), while only about 1000 troops were captured to join Demosthenes’ 6000 troops at
Syracuse. At this point, other than some men who had fled, the entire Sicilian Expedition
Corps had been killed or captured.

Aftermath of the Capture
Upon the surrender of Demosthenes and Nicias, there was a debate as to what
should be done with the two generals.420 Ultimately, Nicias and Demosthenes were put to
death (Thuc. 7.86.2). The captives of the Athenians and the allies were put in the stone
quarries at Syracuse (Thuc. 7.86.2).421 The particular quarry is the modern Latomia dei
Cappuccini. Here, the 7000 captives were huddled together and forced to defecate,
urinate, sleep, and eat in the same place (Thuc. 7.87.2). What is more, men who died in
the quarry were simply stacked on top of one another (Thuc. 7.87.2). Illness spread

420

This ‘debate’ has the greatest inconsistencies between our extant authors in terms of the final phase of
the Sicilian Expedition. Thucydides does not say much about this debate. In his account, Gylippus wanted
Nicias and Demosthenes alive to take them to Sparta. However, the Syracusans and Corinthians refused,
fearing that Nicias’ immense wealth would allow him to escape Syracuse via bribery (Thuc. 7.86.2-4).
Diodorus, on the other hand has a lengthy debate at Syracuse as to what should be done with the generals
and the captives. A Syracusan statesman, Diocles, demands that the generals be executed and the captives
are thrown in the quarries (Diod. 13.19.4). Diocles’ speech essentially follows Thucydides’ account of
events. However, Hermocrates says that it would be best to treat the captives with moderation (Diod.
13.19.4). Then, Nicolaus, an old man who had lost 2 sons during the war, gives an incredibly lengthy
speech. He feels that treating the Athenians inhumanely is barbarous, and acting without mercy would
show a decline for Syracuse. He pleads for Nicias to be spared, declaring him a man who had shown
goodwill to Syracuse. (Diod. 13.20-27). Gylippus responds to Nicolaus’ speech, by appealing to the people
who had lost sons in the war. He reminds the Syracusans of the crimes of the Athenians and concludes that
they must be shown no mercy (Diod. 13.28-32). The crowd, although nearly having been swayed by
Nicolaus, approves Gylippus’ speech and adopts the plan of Diocles. In Plutarch’s account, Eurycles, a
statesman, proposes that the Athenians and their close allies are sold into slavery and the Sicilian Greeks
who had joined them be sent to the stone quarries. He felt the generals should be put to death. Hermocrates
attempts to persuade the Syracusans to show clemency, but is shouted down. Gylippus, like in Thucydides’
account, wants the generals to be taken to Sparta, but is abused by the Syracusans. Plutarch further claims
that Nicias and Demosthenes committed suicide, because Hermocrates had got a message to them in secret
that the Syracusans were going to have them killed. Plutarch says that this account is from Timaeus, but in
Philistus and Thucydides, the Syracusans had them executed (Plut. Nic. 28.2-4). This event provided later
historians with a great opportunity for dramatic set speeches, likely invented, and also showing bias. This
would explain the large amount of inconsistency in this pivotal moment for the Expedition Corps.
421
This is quite possibly the first recorded concentration camp.
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throughout the quarry (Thuc. 7.87.1). Further, the Athenians were only given a half-pint
of water and a pint of food each day (Thuc. 7.87.2). Thucydides reports that this amount
of rations lasted for 8 months (Thuc. 7.87.2), and it seems that after this the size of the
rations was increased. I question how many men would still have been alive at this point.
They also had no shelter from the heat of the sun or the cold weather that would come
during the nights or in the winter (Thuc. 8.87.1). After 70 days, Thucydides says that all
peoples except the Athenians, Sicels, and Italians, were sold into slavery (Thuc. 87.3).
This seems to be a roundabout way of saying that the Greek islanders and Peloponnesians
were sold.

Athenian Troop Numbers Revisited
With only 7000 men taken to the quarry as property of the Syracusan state, how
can we explain the loss of men from the beginning of the retreat until the final surrender
of Athenian forces? Based on my estimations, we must account for between 23 and
33000 men. Thucydides states that:
The (number) of the army having been collected into the
common stock was not many, the (number) stolen and
dispersed (by the army) was large, and all Sicily was filled
with these men, inasmuch as they were not part of a treaty
such as those having been taken with Demosthenes. Also,
not any small number had been slain; for this greatest
slaughter (at the River Assinarus) was not in any way lesser
than any in this war in Sicily. And in the other attacks in
the march, which came to pass often, not a few men (but
rather many) were killed. Nevertheless, many men fled,
some at the time (during the march), others, afterwards,
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having become slaves and escaping; for these men, the
place of retreat was Catane (Thuc. 7.85.3-4).422
We learn a few things from this passage. First, while there were 7000 men taken as state
slaves, a greater number than this was taken as private slaves. This accounts for a number
greater than 14000. Further, Thucydides notes that casualties were constant and high
throughout the march.423 Finally, many men had fled during the march and managed to
escape to Catane. These would likely have been small groups of men who felt that the
retreat was hopeless and left in small parties, probably taking a roundabout way to reach
their destination in order to avoid capture by the Syracusans. Thus, it seems plausible that
over the eight days of marching that a body of 30 to 40000 men were reduced to a mere
7000 men captured and taken to Syracuse.

Conclusion
In this chapter, it has become clear that the Athenians were hindered by a few
factors. First, the delay after the Battle in the Great Harbour was extremely costly for the
success of the retreat because it provided the Syracusans with the time to make adequate
preparations. Second, distrust amongst the ranks was allowed to fester. Third, the lack of
provisions for the Athenians was absolutely devastating and led to the desperation and
slaughter at the River Assinarus. Fourth, the Syracusans’ effective use of cavalry and
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Thuc. 7.85.3-4. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἁθροισθὲν τοῦ στρατεύματος ἐς τὸ κοινὸν οὐ πολὺ ἐγένετο, τὸ δὲ διακλαπὲν
πολύ, καὶ διεπλήσθη πᾶσα Σικελία αὐτῶν, ἅτε οὐκ ἀπὸ ξυμβάσεως ὥσπερ τῶν μετὰ Δημοσθένους
ληφθέντων. μέρος δέ τι οὐκ ὀλίγον καὶ ἀπέθανεν· πλεῖστος γὰρ δὴ φόνος οὗτος καὶ οὐδενὸς ἐλάσσων τῶν
ἐν τῷ [Σικελικῷ] πολέμῳ τούτῳ ἐγένετο. καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις προσβολαῖς ταῖς κατὰ τὴν πορείαν συχναῖς
γενομέναις οὐκ ὀλίγοι ἐτεθνήκεσαν. πολλοὶ δὲ ὅμως καὶ διέφυγον, οἱ μὲν καὶ παραυτίκα, οἱ δὲ καὶ
δουλεύσαντες καὶ διαδιδράσκοντες ὕστερον· τούτοις δ' ἦν ἀναχώρησις ἐς Κατάνην.
423
This is not surprising. Consider the Massacre of Elphinstone’s Army in 1842 where a combined British
and Indian army was almost completely destroyed by Afghani forces while making a 90 mile retreat from
Kabul to Jalalabad. See Macrory (2002), 197-237.
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light armed infantry both slowed Athenian progress and lessened casualty rates in the
Syracusan ranks by avoiding hoplite engagements whenever possible. This is seen most
clearly in the final engagement with Demosthenes’ column where the Syracusans simply
pelted the Athenians with projectiles, but never actually engaged with the Athenian
hoplites. Finally, the disastrous difference of pace between the contingents of
Demosthenes and Nicias made it possible for the Syracusans to surround each formation
individually and force both generals into submission. When these issues are combined
with the lack of resources available to the Athenians both in terms of weapons and food,
it is clear why the Athenians failed to make the retreat to Catane or any other city that
was friendly to the Athenians.
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Chapter 4: Conclusions
In my reading of Thucydides’ account of the final phase of the Sicilian
Expedition, I was amazed that Thucydides does not really answer how and why the
Athenians failed to complete their objectives in both the Battle in the Great Harbour and
in the retreat through Sicily. Thus, I set out to explicate Thucydides’ narrative by
combining his emphasis on the psychological state of the Athenians with Greek military
tactics which he tends to gloss over. I have suggested that Thucydides passes over the
more minute details of both naval and infantry combat since his readers would certainly
be familiar with the mechanics of warfare.
In order to explain the failure of the Athenians, I applied the Face of Battle
approach to the final phase of the Sicilian Expedition which I felt was suitable to answer
the question of how and why the Athenians were unsuccessful in their goals. The Face of
Battle approach gave me the opportunity to reconstruct the Battle in the Great Harbour
and the ensuing Athenian retreat with a close consideration of the experience of
individual units in these engagements. In this investigation, I found that the Athenian
troops were outclassed by the Syracusans at nearly every level, which is not apparent in
Thucydides and would not be clear in a more general military history.
I used Thucydides as my primary source and complemented his account with the
later sources of Diodorus Siculus and Plutarch. Though scholars have questioned the
reliability of Thucydides (and all other Greek historians), I have made the case that
Thucydides is a trustworthy source. It is clear that Thucydides had literary ambitions
based on the stylistic techniques that he employed. I agree that Thucydides uses various
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narrative techniques in his writing, but I have argued that Thucydides necessarily
employed the narrative techniques established by his predecessors (Homer, Hesiod,
Herodotus) for crafting a linear historiographical account of complex historical realities.
Further, the agonistic nature of Greek society also permeated Greek historiography, and
thus, Thucydides would have used the narrative techniques of his predecessors and tried
to surpass them with his prose. Ultimately, I concluded that Thucydides had literary
goals, but at the same time, his account can be considered reliable. There does not need to
be a dichotomy between literature and fact.
In investigating the sources available to Diodorus and Plutarch, I found that both
authors had access to Philistus, either his original work or through the lens of Ephorus or
Timaeus. Since Philistus was a Syracusan who was contemporary to the events, and our
later sources do not contradict Thucydides’ narrative on any major points, I think that it is
safe to conclude that Thucydides’ account is fairly accurate.
In my reconstruction of the Battle in the Great Harbour, I discovered several
reasons for the Athenian defeat. The Athenian failure to confront the Syracusans
immediately while the Syracusans were building the blockade was the first mistake. The
very area in which the battle took place was not conducive to general Athenian naval
strategy. The narrow space did not allow the Athenians to take advantage of their
superior oarsmen. Thus, the Athenians decided to mimic the fighting styles that the other
navies of Greece employed. However, the Athenian hoplites were unfamiliar with
engaging on a ship, and, therefore, were overcome by the Syracusan heavy infantry.
Furthermore, the modifications that the Athenians made to their ships were not made in
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secrecy and were successfully counteracted by the Syracusans. This lack of secrecy led to
the Syracusans using of animal hides which they attached to their outriggers. These hides
protected their rowers from missiles and prevented Athenian grapnels from hooking onto
Syracusan triremes. Moreover, the Syracusans controlled a larger portion of the harbour –
and most importantly – the areas around the exit. Because of this, when a ship was forced
to beach, it was more likely to land at an area of the shore that was occupied by
Syracusan heavy infantry. If it was an Athenian trireme, the men would be slaughtered. If
the ship was Syracusan, it would be pushed back into the water to continue the fight. The
lack of provisions for the Athenians caused the Athenian troops to be less effective than
their Syracusan counterparts who certainly came to the battle well-fed. Another factor
was that the Athenians were forced to leave their ships in the water because of the fear of
Syracusan attack and limited space in the Athenian stockade. Therefore, the Athenian
triremes were waterlogged and therefore sluggish in the water, which further nullified
any advantages the Athenians would have had in terms of maneuvering their triremes.
Finally, Gylippus’ capture of the Athenian storehouses at Plemmyrium left the Athenians
without proper supplies to make repairs to their ships either before or during the battle.
When all of these issues were considered, it became clear how and why the Athenians
failed to defeat the Syracusans in the Battle in the Great Harbour and escape Sicily.
In my reconstruction of the Athenian retreat, I again applied the Face of Battle
approach. First, I argued that it was possible for the Athenians to make it to a safe haven
in Sicily by citing the accomplishment of Xenophon as described in his Anabasis.
Second, I have shown that Thucydides statement that 40 000 men were involved in the
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final march is plausible. Again, I uncovered several reasons for the total annihilation of
the Athenian Expeditionary Corps. First, the Athenians delayed their march after their
defeat in the Great Harbour The delay was at first caused by the trick employed by
Hermocrates, but was extended because of the sorry state of the Athenian army. The
delay gave the Syracusans the opportunity to set up defences along the major marching
routes so that they could hinder Athenian progress. The mutiny of the oarsmen and the
abandonment of the army by Sicels and slaves caused the soldiers to become distrustful
of one another and hindered the hoplites and cavalrymen because they were forced to
carry all of their own gear. Similar to the Battle in the Great Harbour, the Athenians were
lacking provisions, which made the Athenians less effective in battle, and furthermore,
led to the disastrous encounter at the River Assinarus. The Syracusans used their cavalry
and light-armed troops in a very effective manner. The Athenians were constantly slowed
by Syracusan assaults, and these attacks caused far more casualties for the Athenians
since the Syracusans did not openly engage the Athenians in hoplite combat except when
trying to block fords and passages. Not only were the Athenians delayed by these
constant attacks, their inability to counteract the Syracusans was certainly damaging to
the morale of the army. Finally, Demosthenes’ slow march on the 6th day of the retreat
had devastating consequences. Since Nicias had gotten so far ahead, it was impossible for
his contingent to march back and relieve Demosthenes’ men in the battle at the estate of
Polyzelus. Thus, both Demosthenes’ and later Nicias’ forces could be singled out and
surrounded by the Syracusans and forced into surrendering. The disadvantages faced by
the Athenians were simply insurmountable, and it becomes apparent why the Athenians
failed to make the journey to Catane. After the complete Athenian surrender, I explained
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how it was possible for the Athenians to have so many troops on the march, but end up
with only 7000 men in Syracusan captivity. I argue – based on Thucydides’ description –
that more men were taken as private slaves, many men actually did escape during the
retreat and made their way to Catane, and finally, Athenian casualties were high during
the retreat, especially during the attempt to seize the Acraean Heights, Demosthenes’
final stand, and the slaughter at the River Assinarus.
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Figures
Figure 1: Map of the Great Harbour and the position of the Syracusan walls.

Source: Rhodes (2010), 142.
Figure 2: The reconstructed trireme, Olympias.

Source: Morrison (2000), 232.
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Figure 3: The position of the ram on the bow of an Athenian trireme.

Source: Gardiner (1995), 49.
Figure 4: The standard interpretation of the periplous.

Source: Anglim (2001), 228.
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Figure 5: Whitehead's interpretation of the periplous.

Source: Whitehead (1987), 181.
Figure 6: The diekplous.

Source: Nelson (1973), 56.
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Figure 7: The kuklos

Figure 8: The position of the seats for the oarsmen

Source: Morrison (2000), 194.
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Figure 9: The position of the rudder (and thus the position of the kubernetes) at the
stern of the ship.

Source: Morrison (2000), 208
Figure 10: An Attic Black Figure vase showing the position of the helmsman and the
bow officer.

Source: Morrison (2000), 113.
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Figure 11: The distance between Syracuse and Catane.

Figure 12: The Corinthian helmet.

Source: Schwartz (2009), 58.
Figure 13: The Pilos helmet.

Source: Schwartz (2009), 58.
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Figure 14: Syracusan cavalry formations

Source: Worley (1994), 101.
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Figure 15: Map of the Athenian Retreat

Legend:
AC: Athenian Camp (Starting point of the march)
1: Athenian Campsite at the end of the first day of the march
2: Athenian Campsite at the end of the second and third day of the march
4: Athenian Campsite at the end of the fourth day of the march
5: Athenian Campsite at the end of the fifth day of the march
6: Athenian Campsite at the end of the sixth day of the march (Nicias’ contingent only)
7: Athenian Campsite at the end of the seventh day of the march (Nicias’ contingent only)
A: Battle at the Anapus River crossing (Ponte Di Capocorso) (Athenian victory)
B: Battle at the Acraean Bald (Syracusan victory)
C: Battle at the Cacyparis River (Athenian victory; only Nicias’ forces)
D: Battle at the Estate of Polyzelus (Syracusan victory; Demosthenes surrenders)
E: Battle at the River Assinarus (Syracusan victory; Nicias surrenders)
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Figure 16: The Greek hoplite

Figure 17: Peltast
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Figure 18: Peltast

Figure 19: Archer

Figure 20: Slinger
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Appendices
Appendix A: Athenian Troop Numbers
At the beginning of the retreat, Thucydides mentions that there were no less than
40 000 men among the Athenians and their allies (Thuc. 7.75.5). Hornblower claims that
such a number is impossible and states further that Thucydides has become “carried away
by the emotion.”424 Rubincam states that the number of 40 000 must be a rough
estimate.425 I agree with Rubincam, but I believe that the number is probably closer to
40 000 than Hornblower admits. Much like our own estimations, Thucydides must make
a guess in regard to the number as it is impossible to keep track of various casualties and
deserters. Thucydides gives a summary of the troops sent from the Greek mainland to
Sicily in 415 BC. He states:
After these things, the Athenians, having gone under sail,
sailed from Corcyra toward Sicily in sufficient preparation
with 134 triremes in all, and 2 Rhodian fifty-oared ships (of
which 100 (triremes) were Athenian, of these there were 60
swift ships and the others were troop carrying ships, the
other part of the fleet were from Chios and the other allies),
and with 5100 hoplites all together (and of these, 1500
were from the Athenians themselves from the register and
700 thetes as marines, but the rest of the allies shared in the
expedition, some of these men were subjects of the
Athenians, but 500 Argives also, and 250 Mantineians were
serving for pay (mercenaries), and with 480 archers in all
(of these, 80 were Cretans), and with 700 Rhodian slingers,
and with 120 light-armed Megarian exiles, and with 1
horse-transport ship, carrying 30 cavalry (Thuc. 6.43.1).426
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Hornblower (2010), 714.
Rubincam (1979), 85.
426
Thuc. 6.43.1. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοσῇδε ἤδη τῇ παρασκευῇ Ἀθηναῖοι ἄραντες ἐκ τῆς Κερκύρας ἐς τὴν
Σικελίαν ἐπεραιοῦντο, τριήρεσι μὲν ταῖς πάσαις τέσσαρσι καὶ τριάκοντα καὶ ἑκατόν, καὶ δυοῖν Ῥοδίοιν
πεντηκοντόροιν (τούτων Ἀττικαὶ μὲν ἦσαν ἑκατόν, ὧν αἱ μὲν ἑξήκοντα ταχεῖαι, αἱ δ' ἄλλαι στρατιώτιδες,
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So, looking at this catalogue of troops, an initial count can be made. There are 5100
hoplites which include 2200 Athenians, 500 Argives, 250 Mantineians, and the remaining
2150 hoplites were provided by the subjects of the Athenian empire. Further, there were
480 archers, 700 slingers, 120 light armed Megarians, and 30 cavalrymen. The total so far
is 6420 troops. However, now the rowers must be included. The 2 Rhodian penteconters
would add 100 oarsmen. The 60 fast Athenian triremes would add 10200 rowers
(assuming each ship was powered by the standard170 oarsmen). In addition, there would
be the standard 30 support units on each one of these ships (i.e. 10 hoplite marines, 4
archers, a helmsman, a flute player, a trierarch, a bow officer, a boatswain, a ship
carpenter, and 10 deckhands). However, the archers and hoplites must be subtracted from
the total so they are not counted twice. Each fast trireme would include 10 hoplites and 4
archers, leaving 16 support units a helmsman, a flute player, a trierarch, a bow officer, a
boatswain, a ship carpenter, and 10 deckhands) that are added to the total number of
troops. Thus, there are 960 men accounted for on the fast triremes. The 40 troop carriers
are more difficult to nail down in terms of the number of rowers. Certainly, the number of
rowers was reduced on these ships in order to make space for a greater amount of

τὸ δὲ ἄλλο ναυτικὸν Χίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων), ὁπλίταις δὲ τοῖς ξύμπασιν ἑκατὸν καὶ
πεντακισχιλίοις (καὶ τούτων Ἀθηναίων μὲν αὐτῶν ἦσαν πεντακόσιοι μὲν καὶ χίλιοι ἐκ καταλόγου,
ἑπτακόσιοι δὲ θῆτες ἐπιβάται τῶν νεῶν, ξύμμαχοι δὲ οἱ ἄλλοι ξυνεστράτευον, οἱ μὲν τῶν ὑπηκόων, οἱ δ'
Ἀργείων πεντακόσιοι καὶ Μαντινέων καὶ μισθοφόρων πεντήκοντα καὶ διακόσιοι), τοξόταις δὲ τοῖς πᾶσιν
ὀγδοήκοντα καὶ τετρακοσίοις (καὶ τούτων Κρῆτες οἱ ὀγδοήκοντα ἦσαν) καὶ σφενδονή ταις Ῥοδίων
ἑπτακοσίοις, καὶ Μεγαρεῦσι ψιλοῖς φυγάσιν εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατόν, καὶ ἱππαγωγῷ μιᾷ τριάκοντα ἀγούσῃ
ἱππέας.
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hoplites. However, how great the reduction is a matter of debate. In terms of hoplites, of
the 5100, 600 are included on the 60 fast triremes. Therefore, 4500 hoplites, 240 archers
(240 archers are on the fast triremes), 700 slingers, and 120 light armed troops must have
a space on the remaining 74 triremes and 2 penteconters. Thus, not including the rowers
or the support troops, 5560 soldiers are on 76 ships, leaving an average of roughly 73
soldiers per ship. However, it is impossible to ascertain how many of the 34 ships
provided by the allies would be fast triremes or troop transports. Thus, for the sake of
calculation, I split the number of triremes in half, so there are 17 fast triremes and 17
troop transports. This would add 3944 oarsmen and 544 crewmen. The penteconter
seems to have had the same number of crew on deck as the fast trireme, so another 60
men are counted. What seems attractive is that only the top row of the trireme was
composed of actual oarsmen. Thus, there would be 62 rowers per transport trireme.427 If
this is correct, all of the soldiers could be sitting comfortably in the seats of the absent
rowers. In this way, only the standard number of soldiers needs to be on the deck of the
ship. Of course, these ships will also have the 16 men involved in the running of the ship.
The remaining ship is the horse transport. This ship would include probably 62 rowers
(top row), the 30 horses, the 10 hoplites, the 4 archers and the 16 deck crew, plus a few
men to care for the horses during sail. In terms of certain numbers, we obtain the
following totals: 5100 hoplites, 480 archers, 700 slingers, 120 light-armed troops, 30
cavalrymen, 16786 oarsmen (10200 on fast triremes [170 men X 60 triremes], 2480 on

427

Beloch believed that there were 60 rowers on a troop transport. I think that this is nearly accurate, but I
would presume that the top level of oar stations would be filled, making it 62 rowers per ship. This way, the
legitimate oarsmen can also see the water. This is not to say that the additional men sitting in the zugioi and
thalamioi seats did not provide assistance in the rowing, but they would certainly not have the expertise as
the other oarsmen.
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troop carriers [62 men X 40 triremes], 3944 men provided by the allies, 62 men on the
horse transport and 100 men on penteconters [50 X 2], and 2192 miscellaneous naval
units (deckhands, etc.). For the slaves, we can make a rough estimate. If we assume that
each hoplite had one slave attendant and each trierarch had 2 slaves,428 the total number
of slaves would be 5372. This gives a total of 30780 men, not including the number of
army support units such as cooks or engineers. Now, this number covers the first segment
of the expedition. However, the Athenians gain allies amongst the Italians and Sicilians.
We are told that there were 3 Etruscan penteconters (Thuc. 6.103.3), 300
Egestaian cavalrymen, 100 Naxian and Sicel cavalrymen (Thuc. 6. 98.1), and 800
Campanian cavalrymen (Diod. 13.44.1) and an unspecified number of Sicel troops (Thuc.
6.103.3). The penteconter crew and rowers would add 198 men. Thus, 1398 men are
added to the Athenian ranks, plus an unspecified number of Sicels. In the spring of
414BC, the Athenians decided to send cavalry troops to Syracuse which the
expeditionary corps desperately needed (Thuc. 6.94.4). I assume that these men were sent
in 4 troop transports. This adds 368 men from the ship crews plus 250 cavalrymen and 30
mounted archers.
In the winter of 414/413 BC, Eurymedon arrived with 10 triremes in order to tell
the expeditionary corps that a new contingent was being sent (Thuc. 7.16.2). I assume
that the Athenians used fast triremes for this purpose so that Nicias could receive the

428

Sargent (1927), 273-74. Hanson (1989), 62. Pritchett (1971), 49-51.
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news as quickly as possible. Thus, there would be a grand total of 2000 men being sent
(assuming the standard 200 men per trireme).
Finally, in 413 BC, Demosthenes’ navy arrived with 73 triremes (which includes
Eurymedon’s original 10 triremes). With Demosthenes were 60 Athenian triremes and 5
Chian triremes (Thuc. 7.20.2). Here, I have used a 50/50 split in terms of fast triremes
and troop transports. Thus, there would be 37 fast triremes and 36 troop transports, but
with 10 fast triremes missing in order to assist Naupactus (Thuc. 7.31.5). However, 15
more triremes are added by the Corcyrans (Thuc. 7.31.5) and 2 by the men of
Metapontum (Thuc. 7.33.5). I assume that these are troop transports. In this case, there
would be 8532 rowers and deck crew (not including hoplites and archers). In terms of the
other troops, there were 5000 hoplites from Athens and her allies (Thuc. 7.42.1), with
700 more provided by the Thourians (Thuc. 7.35.1), plus an unspecified number from the
Corcyrans (Thuc. 7.31.5). There were 150 javelin throwers from Iapygia, 300 from
Metapontum (Thuc. 7.33.4-5), and 300 from the Thourians (Thuc. 7.35.1) plus
unspecified numbers from the Athenians and her other allies (Thuc. 7.42.1). There were
also an unknown numbers of cooks, masons, carpenters, slingers, and archers. If we make
the same assumption in regard to the slaves as with the original expeditionary corps, there
would be 5846 slaves. In total, there would be 21578 men sent in the second expedition
plus the vast number of unspecified men. Thus, the final tally of men on the Athenian
side involved in the Sicilian Expedition was 55654 plus many other unspecified support
personnel. The number 55654 is broken into 10800 hoplites, 480 archers, 700 slingers,
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1480 cavalrymen, 30 horse archers, 120 light infantry, 750 javelin throwers, 26264
oarsmen, 3812 deck crew, and 11218 slaves.
Of course, we must factor in the number of casualties incurred during the
expedition. Here, we are given even less information than for the number of troops
involved. Ray estimates a total of 3375 hoplite deaths in land battles in the expedition.429
However, there were an unknown number of cavalrymen and light armed troops killed. In
the naval battles, slightly more accurate estimates can be made based on the number of
ships destroyed. For these calculations, I have assumed that all men die on a sunken
trireme. This is not necessarily the case, but certainly other men would be slain on ships
that were not destroyed. If we assume that a similar number of men escaped a sunken
trireme as the number of men who were killed on the ships that were not sank, we can
base the number of casualties on the number of troops on a standard trireme. Four major
naval battles took place during the expedition. For the first 3 battles, it seems that the
Athenians used the standard 200 men per trireme. During these first 3 battles, 28
Athenian triremes were lost.430 Thus, we can estimate that 5600 men died. However, in
the Battle in the Great Harbour, the Athenians likely used around 250 men per ship.431
Since the Athenians lost 50 ships (Thuc. 7.72.3), it is possible that 12500 men were killed
in this battle. Further, there were large numbers of deserters which would largely include
slaves and Sicel allies that had lost faith in the potential success of the expedition (Thuc.
7.75.5). Moreover, Thucydides mentions the illness running through the Athenian camp

429

Ray (2009), 303. I have added the number of casualties provided by Ray on the Athenian side for every
battle in Sicily before the Battle in the Great Harbour.
430
Thuc. 7.23.4, 7.34.6, 7.52.3.
431
See Hoplites in the section Essentials of Naval Combat in Chapter 2: The Battle in the Great Harbour.
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and this would have certainly caused many casualties (Thuc. 7.50.3, 7.60.2). Thus, I
conclude that during the course of the expedition, the Athenians lost up to 21475 men
plus an unspecified number of cavalrymen, light armed troops, deserters and deaths
caused by illness.
Thus, for the Athenian retreat, the grand total was 34179 plus the uncounted light
armed troops , hoplites, cooks, masons, carpenters, merchant ship crews, merchants and
traders that may become stuck with the Athenians, minus the unaccounted number of
light armed and cavalrymen casualties, deserters, captives and deaths caused by illness.
Therefore, the total number of men involved in the Athenian retreat might be closer to
40000 than commentators have assumed.
Original Expeditionary Corps
Military Troops
Troop Type

Number

Notes

Hoplite

5100

2200 Athenians, 500 Argives, 250 Mantinean
Mercenaries

Archer

480

Including 80 Cretan Archers

Slinger

700

Rhodian

Light Infantry

120

Megarian exiles

Cavalrymen

30

Athenian

Oarsmen

10200

170 Rowers per ship

Deck Crew

960

16 Deck Crew per ship

Naval Units
60 Fast Triremes

166

40 Transport Triremes
Oarsmen

2480

62 Rowers per ship

Deck Crew

640

16 Deck Crew per ship

Oarsmen

5780

170 Rowers per ship

Deck Crew

544

16 Deck Crew per ship

34 Allied Triremes
If All Fast Triremes

If All Transport Triremes
Oarsmen

2108

62 Rowers per ship

Deck Crew

544

16 Deck Crew per ship

If A 50/50 Mix of Fast and Transport
Oarsmen

3944

170 Rowers on 17 triremes and 62 rowers on the
other 17 triremes

Deck Crew

544

16 Deck Crew per ship

2 Rhodian Penteconters
Oarsmen

100

50 rowers per ship

Deck Crew

32

16 Deck crew per ship

Oarsmen

62

62 Rowers per ship

Deck Crew

16

16 Deck Crew per ship

Slaves

5372

If we assume that each hoplite has 1 slave and each
trierarch has 2 slaves

Cooks

???

Horse Transport

Miscellaneous Units

167

Masons

???

Carpenters

???

130 Merchant Ship
Crews

???

Grand Total of Troops Launched at the Beginning of the Expedition
30780 + the uncounted cooks,
masons, carpenters + merchant
ship crews+ merchants and
traders that may become stuck
with the Athenians

Assuming the average where exact numbers are not
variable.

Sicilian and Italian Allied Troops
3 Etruscan Penteconters
Oarsmen

150

50 Rowers per Ship

Deck Crew

48

16 Deck Crew per ship

Cavalrymen

1200

300 Egestaian, 100 Naxian, 800 Campanian

Sicel Troops

???

Thucydides simply says “many of the Sicel allies”
(Thuc. 6. 103.2). Beloch argues a grand total of
10000 troops added.

Grand Total of Sicilian and Italian Allies
1398 + unspecified number of Sicel allies

Cavalry Supplement in Spring 414 BC
Possibly 4 Troop Transports
Oarsmen

248

62 Rowers per Ship

Deck Crew

120

16 Deckhands, 10 Epibatai, 4 Archers
per ship
168

Cavalrymen

250

From Athens

Mounted Archers

30

From Athens

Grand Total

648

Eurymedon’s Reinforcements Winter 414/413 BC
10 Athenian Triremes
Oarsmen

1700

170 Rowers per ship

Deck Crew

300

16 Deck crew + 10 hoplites + 4
archers per ship

Grand Total of Eurymedon’s reinforcements
2000

This number assumes fast triremes
were used. This makes sense because
Eurymedon was sent to get to Sicily
as quickly as possible to inform the
Athenians that help was being sent.

Demosthenes’ Contingent in 413BC
If we assume 37, but 10 were sent to
aid Naupactus.

27 Fast Triremes
Oarsmen

4590

170 Rowers per Ship

Deck Crew

432

16 Deck Crew per Ship
36 from Athens and her Allies with 15
taken from Corcyra and 2 taken from
Metapontum.

45 Troop Transports

Oarsmen

2790

62 Rowers per Ship

Deck Crew

720

16 Deck Crew per Ship

Military Troops
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Hoplites

5700 +
???

From both Athens and her Allies with
700 picked up from the Thourians. An
unspecified number of hoplites are
taken from Corcyra.

Javelin Throwers

750 + ???

150 from Iapygia and 300 from
Metapontum and 300 from the
Thourians and an unspecified amount
in the original sailing from Athens

Slingers

???

Both with the original sailing from
Athens and picked up from the
Acharnanians

Archers

???

Miscellaneous Units
Slaves

5846

Cooks

???

Mason

???

Carpenters

???

If we assume one slave per hoplite
and 2 slaves per trierarch on each of
the 73 triremes from Athens and her
Allies.

Grand Total
20828

This assumes that of the 73 triremes
sent by Athens were divided nearly
50/50 between troop carrying and fast
triremes at the beginning. However,
10 fast triremes were sent to aid
Naupactus. I assume that the ships
from the other poleis were largely
troop transports.

Final Tally of men in Syracuse: 55654 + an unspecified number of other men.
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List of Casualties and Deserters
Land Battles

Hoplite Casualties

Anapus River

50

Terias River

25

Euryelus

50

Syca

0

Lysimeleia

200

Epipolae

100

Epipolae II

400

Epipolae III

2500

Lysimeleia II

50

Total Estimated Land Battle Casualties of
Hoplites + an unknown number of light
armed troops and cavalry

3375* These are estimates provided
by Fred Eugene Ray

Naval Battles

Casualties

Sea Battle in the Harbour I

3 Athenian Triremes (possibly up to
600 men)

Arrival of Demosthenes Battle

7 Athenian Triremes (possibly up to
1400 men) certainly too high of a
number of casualties since the ships
were not actually sank, but 7 were
highly damaged.

Naval Battle after the Eclipse

18 Athenian Triremes (possibly up to
3600 men)

Battle in the Great Harbour

50 Athenian Triremes (possibly over
12500 men)

Total Estimated Naval Battle Casualties

Possibly 18100
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Deserters and Other Casualties
Deserters

Number

Large Numbers of Sicel Allies and Slaves after
the Defeat at the Great Harbour

???

Illnesses

??? + the men abandoned at
Lysimeleia before the march.

Impossible to estimate the number of deserters
and casualties caused by illness, but the numbers
are presumably large.

Total Casualties and Deserters: 21475 + an unknown number of deserters and death
owing to illness.
Grand Total for the Athenian Retreat: 34179 + the uncounted light armed troops ,
hoplites, cooks, masons, carpenters + merchant ship crews+ merchants and traders that
may become stuck with the Athenians – the unaccounted number of light armed
casualties and deaths caused by illness. Thus, the 40 000 mentioned by Thucydides is
certainly plausible.
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